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ABSTRACT
This program of research consists of three studies centered on the development and validation of a
measure of psychological closure along with an investigation of how different strategies for
recalling and writing about unresolved autobiographical events inform attributions of closure and
aspects of emotion (valence, intensity, and reaction).
Study 1 (Ntotal =601) centered on the construction of the Psychological Closure Scale
(PCS). This began with a multifaceted conceptualization based on a thorough review of definitions
and theoretical contexts. Factor analyses revealed a robust, good-fitting, and reliable structural
solution. The PCS contains 42 items that assess seven facets of event resolution: finality,
understanding, felt distance, emotional relief, changed experience, less preoccupation, and reduced
need to act. Model fit was replicated using independent MTurk (Study 2) and undergraduate
(Study 3) samples.
Study 2 (N = 182) examined issues of construct validity for the PCS. Convergent and
discriminant validity were supported via statistically meaningful correlations amongst the PCS and
theoretically related constructs (e.g., unfinished business resolution), along with the lack of
correlations with theoretically unrelated constructs (e.g., event impact).
Study 3 (N = 351) used a 15-minute randomized control writing paradigm to explore
changes in closure and emotion at retrieval and 1-2 days later. Participants selected an unresolved
event and were instructed to write about it using one of two narrative perspective shift sequences:
third-person to first-person (shift-to-first) vs. first-person to third-person (shift-to-third). Firstperson entailed recalling and visualizing the event as if through one’s own eyes and writing about
it using the pronoun, ‘I’. Third-person involved envisioning the event as if through the eyes of an
observer and writing about it using the pronouns ‘He’, ‘She’, or ‘They’ to refer to the self.
Participants were then prompted to use one of two mental foci to continue writing about their
iv

event: an experience focus consisted of reporting on the event’s concrete details, whereas a
coherence focus entailed reporting on its self-narrative significance. The control condition was
instructed to think about their event in a “true and honest manner.” All participants completed the
PCS, emotion, and exploratory items (cognitive avoidance, centrality of event) immediately
following the manipulation and 1-2 days later.
The shift-to-first condition reported greater closure, relative to the shift-to-third and control
conditions, particularly on subscales pertaining to finality, understanding, emotional release,
mental liberation, and behavioural deactivation. These effects were greater when followed by an
experience (not coherence) focus, however mental focus conditions showed no difference on
closure. The shift-to-first condition also indicated less negative affect, emotional intensity, and
reactivity than the other conditions. The magnitude of these effects remained after 1-2 days. All
writing conditions showed increases in closure over time along with decreases in negative affect,
while the control condition showed no change. The shift-to-first condition also reported less
cognitive avoidance and less event centrality to identity and life story relative to the other groups.
This research offers a new measure of psychological closure with preliminary evidence of
good psychometric properties. It also addresses theoretical and empirical discrepancies concerning
the function and adaptive value of imagery and narrative perspectives, identifies effective shift
sequences that support greater resolution, and suggests possible mechanisms by which this occurs.
Theoretical and clinical implications along with future directions are discussed. Closure, memoryinduced emotion regulation, and adaptive self-reflection are thought to be facilitated by features of
the retrieval context that support sufficient distance from, followed by engagement with,
unresolved past events, elements within the events, and the self as rememberer, tied to the present.
Keywords: Psychological closure, emotion, autobiographical memory, unresolved events,
construal levels, psychological distance
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CHAPTER 1
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Following the occurrence of a seemingly senseless or uncontrollable event, such as the loss
of a loved one, serious accident, or illness, people often struggle to make sense of the event in an
effort to “move past it” or “put it behind them,” so to speak. This sense of psychological closure (or
simply, ‘closure’) has been theorized to encompass a subjective appraisal of resolution or
understanding of an event that is accompanied by a reduced emotional arousal and reduced need to
take action (Beike & Wirth, 2000; Beike & Wirth-Beaumont, 2005). On the other hand, “open”1
memories are evaluated as unresolved and are emotionally charged; they are events that continue to
nag at our minds, vying for our attention and cognitive resources. Open memories can arouse strong
emotions in the present that are similar in type and intensity to the original experience (Schwartz,
Weinberger, & Singer, 1981; Singer & Salovey, 1993). Recalling an unresolved argument with a
loved one, for instance, might conjure a sinking feeling in the pit of one’s stomach, regret, anger, or
confusion about why it happened or what to do about it. Open memories, then, are not simply
memories of events that were emotionally arousing in the past; they are emotionally arousing
memories of events in the present (Beike & Wirth-Beaumont, 2005).
Although open memories prompt cognitive action, people are notoriously unskilled at
attempting to “think through” unpleasant unresolved experiences in order to achieve resolution or
greater clarity. Indeed, such attempts to reconcile persistent “open” memories have been associated
with increased rumination, which makes people feel worse (e.g., Gruber, Eidelman, Johnson, Smith,
& Harvey, 2011; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008; Wilson, 2002), and over time,
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The terms ‘open’ and ‘closed’ are not intended to communicate a dichotomy. Appraisals of closure are regarded on a
continuum from low-closure to high-closure and can be applied to events as they are recalled or aspects of experience
during recollection.
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can lead to depression, anxiety, and lower self-esteem (Beike, Kleinknecht, & Wirth-Beaumont,
2004; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). Conversely, arriving at a sense of psychological closure for
remembered events has been associated with physical (Beike, 2002) and mental health benefits
(e.g., improved self-esteem; Beike et al., 2004; Park, 2010; Pennebaker & Chung, 2007, 2011).
Indeed, memory closure is thought to support a view beyond the bounds of the internal so that
people may consider themselves and the events they experience in context and arrive at a more
integrated understanding of how the events relate to the self and the world around them. This
broader, more contextualized understanding of personal past events can, in turn, offer a meaningful
guide for life choices (Beike et al., 2004). It is therefore important to find ways to help people
increase closure for personally troubling memories.
Low-closure memories tend to be positively associated with unfavourable health outcomes,
whereas high-closure memories tend to be related to favourable outcomes, suggesting that degree of
closure serves an important regulatory function. An open memory in which one suffered an attack,
for example, might invoke feelings of anger or shame, while a sense of closure for such events
might involve self-assertion, forgiveness, or compassion. Closure can also influence memoryrelevant behaviours (Beike, Adams, & Naufel, 2010). Further, on reflection, some aspects of events
may be more emotionally evocative than others. For instance, recalling the perpetrator’s face from
the vantage point taken at the time of the attack is likely to be more evocative than recalling the
event as if from the perspective of a distant observer (e.g., Kross & Ayduk, 2011). Indeed,
emphasizing the experiential features (concrete details) vs. coherence features (self-narrative
connections) of events during recall has been shown to influence attributions of event impact,
centrality to identity (Boucher & Scoboria, 2015), and negative affect (Boucher & Scoboria, 2019).
Open memories are also regarded as psychologically closer to the self in the here-and-now relative
to closed memories (Beike & Wirth-Beaumont, 2005). The ability to “move past” or “get over” an
2

event, then, arguably depends upon the creation of sufficient psychological distance between that
event, elements contained within the event, including associated past selves, and the current self as
rememberer of the experience.
The concept of psychological distance has garnered considerable interest in the field, partly
due to its demonstrated utility across a range of regulatory functions (e.g., self-control, prediction,
planning, evaluation) and other aspects of psychology, from lower-level perception (e.g., seeing the
details vs. the gestalt), to cognition (e.g., thinking in exemplars vs. categories), to higher-level
constructs (e.g., situational vs. trait attributions; Liberman & Trope, 2014). Dimensions of distance
include objective temporal (how long ago an event actually occurred), subjective temporal (how
long ago the event is felt to have occurred; Janssen, Hearne, & Takarangi, 2015; Wilson & Ross,
2001), geographic, social, and hypothetical distances (Trope & Liberman, 2010).
Trope and Liberman (2010; Liberman & Trope, 2014) proposed that the ability to traverse
psychological distance is related to levels of construal in mental representation. For instance,
relative to concrete event representations, abstract representations contain fewer specific details, are
more schematic, prototypical (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Smith, 1998), and are regarded as more distal
on dimensions of distance (Trope & Liberman, 2010). Methods of construal refer to changes in
aspects of retrieval, including perspectives used to envision events (imagery perspective), personal
pronouns used to narrate events (narrative pronoun use), a focus on change or stability amongst past
and present selves (self-consistency), and a focus on the broader self-narrative significance or the
concrete details of events (mental focus). This is to say that there are many methods of narrowing or
widening the cognitive “lens” through which individuals examine and evaluate events that show
promise for regulating memory-induced emotion, making meaning, and fostering a sense of closure.
The current studies explored just this by tapping individuals’ ability to move beyond the self
in the here-and-now as a means of altering the retrieval context and determining effects on
3

appraisals of closure and emotion. As the adaptive value and longevity of various construal methods
(e.g., vantage points at recall, pronoun use in written narratives) has been debated (Kross & Ayduk,
2011; Lemogne et al., 2009; McIssac & Eich, 2004; Nigro & Neisser, 1983), additional aims were
to explore relations amongst construal methods, cognitive avoidance, and perceived centrality of the
event to identity and life-story, along with whether any effects of construal methods would hold 1-2
days later. The remembered events of interest were those experienced as unresolved and distressing
(i.e., “open” memories). Thus, criteria for event selection concerned appraisals of memory-induced
distress rather than the nature and content of events per se, with emphasis placed on individuals’
current relation to the events under consideration. For instance, high- and low-closure trauma
memories may consist of the same experience at the time of the event but can be distinguished by
the fact that the latter arouses more agitated emotion and a desire for resolution in the present.
I turn now to an overview of foundational concepts, including psychological distance and
methods of creating distance within the realm of autobiographical memory (refer to Appendix A for
a comprehensive glossary of key terms).
Psychological Distance
The concept of psychological distance has varied across subfields in psychology. Construal
level theory (CLT; Trope & Liberman, 2003, 2010) proposes that abstraction enables the traversing
of psychological distance and vice versa (traversing distance enables abstraction). The reference
point is the self in the here-and-now, and stimuli – be they objects, people, or events – can be
removed from this point along temporal, spatial, social, and hypothetical (imagined) dimensions.
The authors theorize that these dimensions of distance vary in tandem, such that the sentence, “A
long time ago, in a ___ place” is likely to be completed with “far away” rather than “nearby” (Trope
& Liberman, 2010, p. 442). The further removed an object (e.g., event-memory) is from direct
experience, the higher (more abstract) the construal of that object. Conversely, the more abstractly
4

an object is construed, the further away (more psychologically distant) it should feel from the
present. Abstraction allows specific, idiosyncratic, and incidental information to fall away, thereby
facilitating connections with other stored information, hence, new meaning (Trope & Liberman,
2010). For example, a memory of an exchange with a colleague that occurred last week (proximal)
might be represented as “planning a conference presentation at a campus coffee shop” (concrete),
whereas a memory of such an exchange that occurred 10 years ago (distal) might be represented as
“an important bonding experience” (more abstract). Per Trope and Liberman (2010), altering a
higher-level abstract feature of an object influences the meaning of that object more than altering a
lower-level concrete feature. For instance, the meaning of the conversation is likely to change more
if the colleague were changed than if the location were changed. The meaning of lower-level
features also depends on higher-level features more than the reverse. For instance, the location
details of an upcoming meeting would become more important if the topic was intriguing. Liberman
and Trope (2014) argue that the ability to traverse psychological distance by way of abstraction is
adaptive to human functioning because it supports contemplation and decision-making about events
not part of the here-and-now.
The notion of psychological distance has also figured prominently in a variety of other
theories. For instance, Lewin’s (1951) field theory regards life space as the combined distances
amongst important objects including goals, people, pasts, and futures. In the field of
autobiographical memory, psychological distance is often operationalized more narrowly as a felt
(subjective) or actual (objective) sense of how close or far away events are in time (e.g., Janssen et
al., 2015; Wilson & Ross, 2001). According to fuzzy-trace theory (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995),
retrieval becomes more abstract with the passage of time, as verbatim memory traces decay. In a
clinical realm, distancing from painful past events may be conflated with suppression (Freud,
1894/1962, 1896/1962) or cognitive avoidance (McIsaac & Eich, 2004).
5

Van Boven and colleagues (Van Boven, Kane, McGraw, & Dale, 2010) posit that perceived
psychological distance is grounded in, and influenced by, the phenomenology that coincides with
objective distance. For instance, greater emotional intensity and perceptual vividness is typically
associated with less objective distance, and hence, psychological distance, operationalized as the
extent to which an event feels “very close” versus “very distant” and “like yesterday” versus “very
far away” from the present (Ross & Wilson, 2002). Van Boven et al. also indicated other factors
that influence psychological distance, including perceptual fluency (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2008;
Unkelbach, 2006), imagery perspective (Frank & Gilovich, 1989; Nigro & Neisser, 1983; Robinson
& Swanson, 1993), and self-consistency (Eibach, Libby, Gilovich, 2003). Other constructs thought
to reflect a common underlying mental capacity to distance from the self in the here-and-now
(Bernstein, Hadash, Lichtash, Tanay, Sheperd, & Fresco, 2015) include cognitive defusion (Hayes,
Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999), cognitive distancing (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Ingram &
Hollon, 1986), decentering (Safran & Segal, 1990), detached mindfulness (Wells, 2005),
metacognitive awareness (Teasdale, Moore, Hayhurst, Pope, Williams, & Segal, 2002),
metacognitive mode (Wells, 2000), mindfulness (e.g., Bishop et al., 2004), reperceiving (Shapiro,
Carlson, Astin, & Freedman, 2006), self-as-context (Grieger, 1985; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson,
1999, 2012), and self-distancing (Kross, Ayduk, & Mischel, 2005).
Relatedly, contemplating past, future, or hypothetical situations, along with thoughts about
these situations, requires a general capacity to direct attention away from the immediate
environment and inward to mentally reconstruct and reexperience events in subjective time. This
ability, referred to as autonoetic consciousness (Tulving, 1985; Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997), is
theorized to enable mental time travel (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997; Tulving, 1985) into the
personal past and future. Within the context of autobiographical memory, this capacity allows
people to flexibly call to mind different representations of past experiences, and in so doing, aids in
6

the construction of new meaning and emotional responses at retrieval (e.g., Boucher & Scoboria,
2015; Kross & Ayduk, 2011; Libby & Eibach, 2011a). Various indicators of psychological distance
are therefore thought to be related to a fundamental human ability to shift experiential perspective
from within one’s experience onto that experience (James, 1890/1950) and to mentally travel in
subjective space and time.
Herein, I use the term ‘psychological distance’ broadly to refer to the dynamic intersection
of multiple dimensions along which subjective proximity or remoteness can be created within the
realm of mental simulation. The current studies investigated personal event-memories, which are
assumed to involve some degree of mental simulation or sense of re-experiencing, are believed to
have occurred to the self in the past, and are thought to be recalled with sufficient accuracy (i.e.,
‘believed memories’; Scoboria et al., 2014). Anchors of distance can be classed along features
contained in the representation (e.g., sensorial and contextual details, emotions, facets of selves
contained in the event), the representation as a whole across time (past to future), in relation to
current experience (e.g., present appraisals of event importance, impact, and valence), or in terms of
objective, subjective, and hypothetical realities. Essentially, psychological distance is thought to be
informed by construal representations that cause a mental object (believed memory) to seem closer
to or further away from one’s present experience along a variety of dimensions.
Relative to CLT’s conception of psychological distance, the current definition includes a
wider focus on characteristics of event memories that are recognized to interact dynamically; that is,
it offers a complex multi-dimensional “view” of the cognitive-affective field so to speak. Due to the
fact this notion of psychological distance recognizes the aggregate of distances along multiple
dimensions, it is assumed that not all dimensions of distance necessarily operate in tandem. For
instance, an event that occurred long ago (temporal distance) might involve persons with whom one
closely identifies (social proximity). This view of psychological distance is also narrower in scope
7

relative to self-observation (e.g., mindfulness) in that it refers specifically to ways of construing
events not part of the here-and-now.
The notion that people can view life events as distal objects that can be segmented and
contained aligns with the idea that psychological states are grounded in bodily experience
(Barsalou, 2008). People feel as though they can “move on” from the past, “bury” memories, or
“close a chapter” in their lives. Indeed, a sense of closure may be induced by performing acts like
sealing messages or objects in envelopes or containers (Gu, Botti, & Faro, 2013; Li, Wei, & Soman,
2010). Features of expressive writing may also serve to increase closure by way of psychological
distance. The construction and disclosure of narratives, which are key to the success of expressive
writing (Graybeal, Sexton, & Pennebaker, 2002), aids in the objectification of experience by
fostering separation of the self in the present (as narrator) from a self in the past (as protagonist;
Apgar, 1997; Wilson & Ross, 2003); it also prompts consideration of others’ perspectives (Labov &
Fanshel, 1977), promotes a focus on broader contexts (Meier, 2002), and leads to increased fading
of negative affect (Pasupathi, 2007; Pillemer, Desrochers, & Ebanks, 1998; Skowronski, Gibbons,
Vogl, & Walker, 2004). Noteworthy, all of these processes involve moving beyond the egocentric
viewpoint of the current self.
Imagery and Narrative Perspective
One construal method that has received considerable attention throughout psychology’s
history and has been suggested to inform psychological distance is the perspective used to envision
events (e.g., Freud, 1899/1962, 1907/1960; Galton, 1883; V. Henri & C. Henri, 1897): A firstperson (field) imagery perspective entails mentally “seeing” an event as if from one’s own eyes,
whereas a third-person (observer) imagery perspective involves visualizing the event as if from the
eyes of an observer so that one can mentally see themselves and their surroundings (Nigro &
Neisser, 1983). Changes in imagery perspective have been shown to influence the phenomenology,
8

conscious experience, and content of autobiographical memories (Eich, Handy, Holmes, Lerner, &
McIsaac, 2012; Rice, 2010) along with current thoughts, feelings, and goals (e.g., Berntsen, Willert,
& Rubin, 2003; Kross & Ayduk, 2011; Libby & Eibach, 2011a; McIsaac & Eich, 2004).
Closely related to the perspective used to envision events is the perspective used to narrate
them (Gu & Tse, 2016): a first-person narrative perspective involves the use of the first-person
pronoun, ‘I’, whereas a third-person narrative perspective employs third-person pronouns, ‘He’,
‘She’, or ‘They’. In investigations of pronoun use for negative or traumatic events, Fergusson
(1993; as cited in Wilson & Ross, 2003) found that instructing people to use a third-person pronoun
conferred greater benefits in terms of increased felt distance, greater understanding, lower distress,
and fewer illness complaints, as compared to a first-person pronoun. Further, just as people are able
to flexibly shift amongst perspectives in mental imagery (e.g., Robinson & Swanson, 1993), they
can also shift amongst pronouns in narrative accounts (Chang, Huang, & Lin, 2013; Jin, 2010).
Many of the effects of different shift sequences in imagery perspective (first-to-third vs. third-tofirst) on emotion (e.g., Berntsen & Rubin, 2006a; Robinson & Swanson, 1993) are also paralleled in
research on pronoun use. For instance, Gu and Tse (2016) found that an instructed shift from firstperson to third-person pronouns attenuated the emotional intensity of both pleasant and unpleasant
memories, whereas the shift from third-person to first-person had no effect on ratings of intensity.
Changes in pronoun use also led to changes in imagery perspective (e.g., first-person pronoun use
incited first-person imagery).
This idea of an optimal order to narration is supported by research showing that people
benefit from the repeated retelling of events (Pennebaker, 1997), and that shifts in perspective from
first- to third-person (Park, Ayduk, & Kross, 2016), or shifts in narrative processing from external
(what happened) to internal (what is felt) and reflexive (what it means; Angus & Greenberg, 2011),
accounts for these effects. Given memory-induced emotion is subject to shifts in pronoun use (Gu
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& Tse, 2016), characterizes appraisals of closure (Beike & Wirth-Beaumont, 2005), and relates to
the development of new insights about events (Kross & Ayduk, 2011), then narrative perspective
shift sequences should inform attributions of closure. Study 3 examined, in part, how different
orders of perspective, in mental imagery and pronoun use, inform closure and emotion for
unresolved event-memories, with hypotheses gleaned through the role of space context in memory.
To illustrate, I refer to Rubin and Umanath’s (2015) theatre metaphor, in which memories of
events consist of a stage on which the remembered event is played out – the ‘where’ for the ‘what’
to take place (see also, Hassabis & Maguire, 2007). When people attempt to understand negative
events, they tend to visualize them through their own eyes as if it were happening all over again
(Grossman & Kross, 2010; Verduyn, Van Mechelen, Kross, Chezzi, & Van Bever, 2012). Indeed,
memories are likely to contain more first-person relative to third-person imagery (D’Argembeau &
Van der Linden, 2004). Individuals may therefore be inclined to “take the stage” where they can
view and describe the scene from a perspective as actor (first-person). Conversely, a third-person
perspective, affords people a seat in the audience where they can view and describe what unfolds on
stage, from a distance and relative to the spatial context of the event. It may very well be this seat away from the stage rather than on it - that fosters the type of detached observation and objective
appraisal akin to that of a spectator or critic. Simply put, the development of new memorial
attributions first requires the objectification of event-memories so that they may be perceived as
entities distinguishable from present self-experience.
To this end, imagery perspective and pronoun use can be regarded as relatively simple
manipulations of mental construal, and hence, psychological distance: a third-person perspective is
associated with more abstract and distal representations of events whereas a first-person perspective
is associated with more concrete and proximal representations (Libby & Eibach, 2011b). Imagery
perspective has also been shown to be closely related to perceptions of self-change versus self10

stability (self-consistency; Libby & Eibach, 2002; Libby, Eibach, & Gilovich, 2005; Sutin &
Robins, 2010), a focus on the broader significance versus concrete details of events (mental focus;
Libby & Eibach, 2009, 2011a), how long ago events occurred (objective temporal distance; e.g.,
Berntsen & Rubin, 2006a; Kihlstrom & Harackiewicz, 1982; Talarico, LaBar, & Rubin, 2004), and
how far away events feel from present experience (subjective temporal distance; Gu & Tse, 2016;
Libby & Eibach, 2011b; Wilson & Ross, 2003).
Thus, there are many factors that correspond to different levels of event construal, and
hence, could be regarded as potential determinants of psychological distance. It may be that
combinations of methods of construal, via their influence on psychological distance, differentially
inform appraisals of closure. If memory-induced emotion is a marker of closure (Beike & WirthBeaumont, 2005), then variables known to affect emotion at retrieval, including imagery
perspective, pronoun shifts, temporal distance, and mental focus should also influence perceived
closure. There are, however, discrepancies in the literature concerning one of the most widely
researched methods of construal – imagery perspective – that predict different effects on emotion.
Theoretical and empirical discrepancies. Research differs in suggesting adaptive and
maladaptive functions of imagery perspective, most prominently with regard to third-person
imagery. For instance, a third-person perspective has been associated with adaptive outcomes in
terms of emotion regulation, self-understanding, social cognition, and future planning (Libby &
Eibach, 2011b). Further, the use of a third-person perspective for distressing memories has been
suggested to foster a sense of separateness amongst past and present selves, which supports
favourable current self-views and an ability to face such memories with less intrusive reexperiencing of unpleasant emotions (Sutin & Robins, 2010; Wilson & Ross, 2003). For instance,
Lawrence (1990; as cited in Wilson & Ross, 2003) posited that narrating events in the third-person
allows individuals to adopt “a more dispassionate, detached, retrospective view” (p. 97) of the self,
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by way of reducing the psychological threat of recollected experience. Conversely, other research
indicates that a third-person perspective for trauma memories is related to problematic outcomes
like cognitive avoidance and PTSD symptoms, greater memory intrusions, and increased
rumination (Berntsen et al., 2003; Williams & Moulds, 2007). Relatedly, Finnbogadóttir and
Berntsen (2014) found third-person recall to be associated with greater negative affect and
maladaptive thinking patterns including excessive worry or repetitive fear-based thinking. Further,
Williams and Moulds (2007) highlight the adaptive value of the first-person perspective as an aid in
fostering the re-engagement and re-processing of the emotional features of memories, not afforded
by the third-person perspective.
Kross and Ayduk (2011) refer to these discrepant effects as the “self-reflection paradox”:
On the one hand, reflecting on negative emotions can lead to physical and mental health benefits
(e.g., Pennebaker, 1997; Wilson & Gilbert, 2008), but it can also incite ruminative thinking, which
can exacerbate distress (e.g., Gruber et al., 2011; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). Other research
distinguishes adaptive versus maladaptive types of repetitive thinking (i.e., reflection motivated by
curiosity and openness vs. rumination motivated by fear; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999; Watkins,
2008). Perhaps then, adaptation to unpleasant events in memory, as indexed by appraisals of closure
and reduced emotional arousal, may not depend on the amount of thinking devoted to the events per
se, but rather, on whether such thoughts are considered to be a matter of concern.
There are also inconsistencies in the literature regarding the function of imagery perspective
in regulating cognition and emotion. I consider three main views, all of which rely on some form of
self-evaluation and/or motive: self-distance, self-salience, and self-integration. To situate this
discussion, I begin with the facets of self proposed by William James (1890/1950): The “I”, or
experiential self (self as subject of thought, self as knower), refers to the experience of the self as
engaging with the immediate environment (Legrand & Ruby, 2009). Conversely, the “Me”, or
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conceptual self (self as object of thought, self as known), regards a general self-awareness that
includes theories of personality, values, life themes, and goals (Conway, 2005; McAdams, 2001).
Self-distance. As previously reviewed, third-person imagery has been suggested to serve a
generalized self-distancing (e.g., Holmes & Mathews, 2010; Kenny et al., 2009) or “dispassionate
observer” function (Sutin & Robins, 2008) in that it psychologically removes the self that reasons
about a past event from the self that has experienced it, thereby diminishing associated emotion and
facilitating reflection on the meaning (why) rather than the process (how) of the event (Kross &
Ayduk, 2011; Fujita, Henderson, Eng, Trope, & Liberman, 2006). To this end, Ayduk and Kross
(2010) have shown that a self-distanced (third-person) perspective on negative events reduced
distress, whereas a self-immersed (first-person) perspective had the reverse effect (see also,
Berntsen & Rubin, 2006a; Kross & Ayduk, 2008; Kross et al., 2005; McIssac & Eich, 2002;
McNamara, Benson, McGeeney, Brown, & Albert, 2005; Robinson, 1996; Robinson & Swanson,
1993; Williams & Moulds, 2007). Note that the term ‘distancing’ as used by Ayduk and Kross
differs from the current notion of psychological distance in that it specifically refers to a removed
view of past experience and regards the self as it relates to recollected concrete experience; thus,
separation from self in this context necessarily refers to separation from the Jamesian “I”.
Self-salience. According to the self-salience view, a third-person perspective serves to
increase emotional response during recall by binding the current self with the recalled self, and by
increasing visual and emotional attention on the self (e.g., Terry & Barwick, 1995; 1998). In line
with gestalt figure-ground principles (Duval, Silvia, & Lalwani, 2001), third-person perspective is
proposed to increase self-awareness by moving the self into the foreground where it occupies the
majority of one’s mental visual field. This appears to apply to memories involving a focus on the
self or self-conscious emotions (e.g., shame, embarrassment; D’Argembeau & Van der Linden,
2008; Nigro & Neisser, 1983).
13

Self-evaluation. According to Sutin and Robins (2008), support for these opposing accounts
(i.e., that compared to a first-person perspective, a third-person perspective blunts vs. magnifies
emotional arousal) depends on self-evaluation motives at retrieval. Individuals seek to enhance the
current self by disowning events, or features of events, that reflect poorly on them (selfenhancement motive; Leary, 2007; Sanitioso, 2008; Sedikides & Gregg, 2003). However, they are
also inclined to verify congruence amongst past and present selves (self-verification motive; Libby
& Eibach, 2002; Libby et al., 2005; Sutin & Robins, 2008). Threats to self-consistency (e.g., an
event-memory involving an entirely different version of the self) prompts efforts to try to make
sense of how the past event and associated self relates to current self-views (Conway, 2005). Selfenhancement and self-verification motives can work together to promote a coherent selfunderstanding that spans time (a broader motive to achieve self-coherence; McAdams, 1997;
Vinitzky-Seroussi, 1988). However, self-enhancement and self-verification can also conflict,
resulting in what Swann and colleagues call a “cognitive-affective crossfire” (Swann, Griffin,
Predmore, & Gaines, 1987, p. 882). For example, asking someone with low self-esteem to recall a
past failure might satisfy the self-verification motive but not the self-enhancement motive. In such
cases, people tend to choose cognitive verification or consistency over affective enhancement. For
instance, low self-esteem individuals tend to ignore positive information in favor of attending to
negative information that is consistent with their current self-views (Swann et al., 1987).
Self-integration. Self-distancing versus self-salience functions of imagery perspective may
depend upon perceived discrepancies between past and present selves (Sutin & Robins, 2008).
Libby and Eibach (2011b) acknowledge the dual-faceted self in contending that the function of
imagery perspective is determined not only by experiential self-separation, but also by conceptual
self-integration. Specifically, first-person imagery is thought to form the basis for the experiential
self, whereas third-person imagery is thought to form the basis for the conceptual self. Thus, rather
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than solely causing people to adopt a detached interpretation of an event, third-person imagery can
also prompt integration within a broader framework of general self-views, and emotional reactions
reflect ensuing subjective meanings. This aligns with an aim to acquire a coherent understanding of
the self (self-coherence) rather than to disown events that undermine the present self (selfenhancement). Indeed, a theory of oneself as having changed versus remaining stable has been
shown to predict imagery perspective irrespective of valence: self-stability incited first-person
imagery and self-change incited third-person imagery for both positive and negative events (Libby
& Eibach, 2011a).
It follows, then, that in order for a third-person perspective to promote adaptive coping and
regulation, an adaptive self-theory (e.g., change vs. stability) and mental focus (e.g., self-narrative
significance vs. concrete details) must be specified to guide the emotional and meaning-making
process that occurs. In other words, Libby and Eibach’s (2011b) account suggests that support for
self-distance and self-salience should depend on individuals’ currently operating theories of change
or stability in the self since the occurrence of the event in question.
The current studies examined whether and which of these accounts of imagery perspective
could extend to a narrative perspective shift paradigm. Returning to the theatre metaphor to explain
the asymmetric effects of perspective shifts on emotion (e.g., Gu & Tse, 2016), it may be that the
sequence of perspectives from stage (first) to seat in the audience (third), but not seat to stage,
fosters a progression toward abstraction, via perceptions of greater distance (self-distancing view)
or change in the self (self-integration view), which in turn tempers emotional reactivity upon recall.
On the other hand, according to the self-salience view, such a shift could magnify memory-induced
emotion. In any case, given the adverse effects of unresolved event-memories on current
experience, it is worthwhile to examine how methods of construal can be combined to inform
resolution, and to explore whether such strategies serve adaptive or maladaptive functions.
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Overview of the Present Studies
The overarching aim of this research was to investigate whether the ordering of narrative
perspective shift sequences (first-to-third vs. third-to-first) influence appraisals of unresolved events
in terms of psychological closure and aspects of emotion (valence, intensity, and reactivity). Effects
1-2 days following the intervention were also explored based on discrepancies in the literature
regarding carry-over effects of writing interventions. For instance, Park et al. (2016) reported
greater effects of spontaneous distancing (third-person) 1 day following an expressive writing task,
whereas Gu and Tse (2016) demonstrated effects immediately after a guided shift in narrative
pronoun use from first- to third-person. It is less clear, however, whether these narrative shift
effects remain in the days that follow the intervention. Given methods of describing memories can
influence closure at retrieval (Beike & Wirth-Beaumont, 2005) along with the type of information
that is later recalled (Dudukovic, Marsh, & Tversky, 2004; Tversky & Marsh, 2000), narrative
perspective shifts were expected to influence ratings of closure at the follow-up 1-2 days later.
Sound investigation of factors that influence or are associated with psychological closure,
however, first required a validated measure. That is, although closure had been proposed as an
emotionally-tagged memory phenomenon (Beike & Wirth-Beaumont, 2005), operationalization has
varied across prior studies and existing scales make no reference to memory-induced experience.
Thus, the construction and validation of a measure of psychological closure was the focus of
Studies 1 and 2. Study 3 examined the effects of narrative perspective shift sequences and mental
focus (coherence vs. experience) on appraisals of closure and emotion (intensity, valence, and
reactivity), and whether effects could be accounted for by changes in subjective distance or selfchange. Ancillary aims were to explore carry-over effects and relations amongst narrative
perspective, cognitive avoidance, and perceived centrality of events to identity and life-story.
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CHAPTER 2
PCS DEVELOPMENT
Although psychological closure (as conceptualized by Beike & Wirth-Beaumont, 2005) has
been associated with beneficial physical and psychological health outcomes (e.g., Beike, 2002;
Beike et al., 2004), the concept has never been subjected to rigorous measurement development and
construct validation. Closure has also been inconsistently operationalized across studies (e.g.,
Beike, Adams, & Wirth-Beaumont, 2007; Savitsky, Medvec, & Gilovich, 1997) and reviews of
related constructs (e.g., coherent positive resolution; Pals, 2006) suggests conceptual overlap. Given
closure is related to appraisals of events (e.g., as finished) and the experience of events upon
retrieval (e.g., reduced emotional reactivity; e.g., Beike & Wirth-Beaumont, 2005; Skitka, Bauman,
& Mullen, 2004), the conceptual scope of closure warrants reconsideration. Indeed, earlier notions
of closure regard such aspects as inherent to the construct, rather than as potential predictors or
outcomes of it (e.g., Albert, 1983). The objective of Study 1 was to elucidate more precise
boundaries of this broader conceptualization of psychological closure via the development of a
valid self-report measure for use with non-clinical populations and a range of autobiographical
memories, titled the Psychological Closure Scale (PCS). Clark and Watson’s (1995) approach to
scale construction (as informed by Lovinger, 1957) was used to derive a theoretically and
empirically based conceptualization of closure based on (1) a thorough review of prior attempts to
operationalize closure and related constructs, (2) the formation of a broad and representative item
pool, and (3) an iterative process involving item creation, testing, deletion, or refinement.
Conceptualizing Psychological Closure
The concept of psychological closure has interested researchers and clinicians for some
time, particularly in relation to traumatic or life-altering experiences (e.g., Albert, 1983; Gold &
Faust, 2002; Hamber & Wilson, 2002; Skitka et al., 2004). The term has its origins in the Gestalt
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principle of closure, which describes the human tendency to automatically synthesize missing units
into perceived wholes so as to complete visual and auditory forms. This organizational motive
extends to behavioural and psychological phenomena, as in “the act, achievement, or sense of
completing or resolving something” (VandenBos, 2015, p. 196). In common parlance, closure
signifies a desirable end-state following a stressful event, conflict, or problem (e.g. a relationship
dissolution), and often entails an active search for missing information (e.g., to understand why or
what to do about it). In the context of psychotherapy, closure is said to be achieved when clients
have reconciled a psychological or relational issue (however, see Boss & Carnes, 2012, regarding a
‘myth’ of closure for ambiguous loss). Perhaps the most comprehensive social-cognitive definition
of psychological closure comes from Albert (1983, p. 159):
The concept of closure is essential to the concept of change, for given the finite capacity of
human beings, some sense of closure seems to be necessary to make possible new activities.
But a sense of psychological closure to temporal events implies more than that they have
ended; it implies a sense of harmonious completion. It is this sense of harmonious completion,
of balance and equilibrium restored, of tension reduced, that allows the pursuit of new
challenges and activities.

Albert outlined four complimentary models of closure that together highlight the following
18 characteristics: change or transition, completion, acceptance, equilibrium, tension reduction,
summation (historicizing), symbolic retention, temporal continuity (past to future), rationalizing,
shifting attention to other concerns, expressing positive sentiments, optimistic forecasting, temporal
embeddedness (i.e., a beginning and an end in history; a complete story), importance reduction,
distance from self, and historical remoteness (temporal distance, pastness).
Notably, Albert (1983) acknowledged the role of separation between mental representations
of an event and the present self while more contemporary definitions make no such reference. As it
pertains to autobiographical memories, closure has been likened to a sense that an event is
sufficiently understood, complete, and part of the past (Beike et al., 2007). Importantly, open and
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closed memories do not refer to categorically different events (e.g., a parental divorce may be open
for some but closed for others), and in fact, they can be regarded as equally emotionally intense and
important (Beike et al., 2004). Beike et al. (2010) claim that a “sense of closure is not inherent in
the person, or in the experience, but rather is a consequence of the construction of the
autobiographical memory at recollection” (p. 41). Therefore, thought processes and mental
representations that follow an event, rather than the qualities of the original experience, are critical
to appraisals of closure. In line with this view, prior research has shown that memorial
characteristics such as emotional intensity, valence, and memory age, are associated with
attributions of closure: Relative to closed memories, open memories tend to be experienced as more
unpleasant or agitating (Beike & Wirth, 2000) and emotionally arousing (Beike et al., 2007; Beike
& Wirth-Beaumont, 2005), to feel closer to the present, (Rim, Trope, Liberman, & Shapira, 2013),
and to incite a need to take action (Beike et al., 2007).
Taken together, the preceding research suggests that there are many important features of
psychological closure that coalesce into a broad preliminary definition:
A process of mentally segmenting, sealing off, or containing part of one’s past in subjective
space and time; appraising it as complete, concluded, resolved, newly or more completely
understood, distant from present experience, belonging more to the past, and containing fewer
contextual and perceptual details; and experiencing it as less emotionally arousing and
unpleasant. Finally, it is accompanied by a reduced motive to take action, either physically
(e.g., searching for information) or cognitively (e.g., devoting more attention to the event).
Appraisals of psychological closure can, therefore, refer to the event as it is recalled, the
quality of the mental representation, or the felt experience during recollection.

This definition of closure intentionally excludes objective forms of resolution and assumes
that subjective appraisals vary independently of objective indicators. For example, the legal
sentencing of one’s abuser may not necessarily reflect or foster a sense of resolution for the past
transgression. Relatedly, people’s memories are not assumed to be entirely veridical representations
of the past. With the passage of time, event representations can change as a function of forgetting,
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reconstruction, and increased reliance on scripted knowledge (James, 1890/1950; Robinson &
Clore, 2002). Thus, appraisals of closure necessarily refer to the temporally bound mental
representation and the rememberer’s experience at retrieval.
It is important to clarify the concept of closure because it is implicated in adaptive physical
and psychological outcomes (e.g., Beike et al., 2004). Open memories that arouse negative
emotions, whether such arousal derives from the contents of the remembered event or the
experience of it as unresolved, hold special status in the summoning of cognitive, emotional, and
behavioural efforts. Individuals devote great energy to closing memories so they can re-direct their
attention to other concerns. People also tend to ruminate on unresolved events which, without a
framework to guide the meaning-making process, is known to be ineffective (Nolen-Hoeksema et
al., 2008). Further, individuals tend to better remember incomplete tasks than complete tasks
(Lewin, 1927), and they are likely to regret and think about inactions more than actions (Zeigarnik
effect; Zeigarnik, 1935), where inactions are associated with lower closure (Savitsky et al., 1997).
Generally, people are highly motivated to resolve uncertainty and to reduce the tension that comes
along with it (Hogg 2000; Tobin & Raymundo, 2010; Wilson, Centerbar, Kermer, & Gilbert, 2005)
From an evolutionary perspective, emotion-driven tendencies toward closure can be
adaptive. Open memories arouse strong emotions in the present (Singer & Salovey, 1993), which
can interfere with problem-solving and goal-attainment. Further, reaching meaningful conclusions
about events helps people to draw on the experience when imagining, predicting, and planning for
the future (Addis, Pan, Vu, Laiser, & Schacter, 2009). For example, understanding the cause of a
serious car accident can offer preventative actions that aid survival. Given human predispositions to
avoid unpleasant experiences, it is perhaps not surprising that there are far more words for negative
than positive emotions, that positive outcomes are more readily accepted compared to negative
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outcomes (Kahneman & Varey, 1991), and that negative emotions fade faster over time relative to
positive emotions (Holmes, 1970; Walker, Vogl, & Thompson, 1997).
The processing of emotion in memory also points to adaptive functions. Through associative
memory-mood networks, memories can incite emotional states that are congruent in valence
(Bower, 1981), and these states can, in turn, activate behavioural tendencies (e.g., Frijda, Kuipers,
& ter Shure, 1989; Izard, 1991). When memories are inconsistent with the emotional tone of the
environment, it can result in inappropriate behaviour. For instance, laughing at a car accident victim
as they recount their near-death experience is likely to hinder relational understanding. According
to Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000), retrieval systems reduce emotional detail in memory to
protect against the effects of re-experiencing, so emotions can reflect what is happening in the
present rather than what happened in the past; this agrees with research showing a shift over time
toward greater reliance on semantic knowledge about emotion rather than episodic memory
(Robinson & Clore, 2002) and more localized processing of emotion in the brain (Fink et al., 1996).
In sum, the current definition of psychological closure captures many relevant aspects that
have been theorized or investigated across multiple domains of research. Measurement
development, construct validation, and further research on closure offers many important theoretical
and practical implications that may inform understanding of adaptive human functioning.
Existing Measures of Psychological Closure and Related Constructs
Measures of closure. Psychological closure has been operationalized in many ways, a
number of which are ostensibly similar to other constructs. Definitions vary depending on the target
event and subject of interest. For instance, closure has been used to refer to aspects of perception
(e.g., contour closure; e.g., Elder & Zucker, 1993; Pemberton, 1952; White, 1954), symbolic
resolution in post-conflict societies (i.e., symbolic closure; Hamber & Wilson, 2002), political
equilibrium following acts of terrorism (e.g., Skitka et al., 2004), psychological adaptation in end21

of-life populations (i.e., life closure; e.g., Dobratz, 2004), task completion (e.g., Savitsky et al.,
1997), goal-fulfillment (i.e., regulatory closure; e.g., Baas, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2011), consumer
decision-making (i.e., choice closure; Gu et al., 2013), person-computer conversational transactions
(e.g., Miller, 1968), watching satisfying TV series finales (e.g., Nussbaum, 2013), relational
resolution (e.g., Eads, 2008), dispositional motives (i.e., need for closure; Webster & Kruglanski,
1994), and dispositional mindedness (i.e., open- vs. closed-minded; Kruglanski, 2004; Onraet, Van
Hiel, Roets, & Cornelis, 2011). Related constructs include reconstrual (deriving meaning from
negative events; Kross, Gard, Deldin, Clifton, & Ayduk, 2012) and resolution of stressful life
events (e.g., Harnish, Aseltine, & Gore, 2000; Pals, 2006; Reynolds & Turner, 2006; Turner &
Avison, 1992), including interpersonal conflict (e.g., Makinen & Johnson, 2006; Singh, 1994) and
sexual abuse victimization (Wright, Crawford, & Sebastian, 2007).
Further, most studies attempting to assess closure have relied on measures with unknown
psychometric properties. These brief, often single item, measures do not thoroughly reflect
definitions of the construct, they used items with different rating scales, or they employed subsets of
items with no attempt at validation. For instance, Skitka et al.’s (2004) closure items refer to a
readiness to “move on” and “turn my attention to other problems,” (p. 749), while Beike and WirthBeaumont (2005) made no reference to shifts in attention or cognitive spatial direction. Beike and
colleagues (Beike et al., 2007; Beike, Markman, & Karadogan, 2009) added an item to their closure
scale pertaining to a desire to “figure out why the experience happened” (p. 383), while other
studies used subsets of these items (e.g., Savitsky et al., 1997). Additionally, Savitsky et al. (1997)
contend that closure (or a lack of open-endedness) is characterised by resolution, psychological
completeness, reduced action, less rumination, and a sense of pastness, which they liken to “ancient
history”, “water under the bridge”, and “moving on” (pp. 249-250); however, their items made no
reference these notions. Moreover, Beike and colleagues have argued that open memories are
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characterized by “a highly emotional representation” (Beike et al., 2004, p. 146), that closure is a
“subjective state that arises in part from the extent to which this resulting autobiographical memory
is emotional” (Beike & Wirth-Beaumont, 2005, p. 575), and that other properties of memories and
external states (e.g., finished or unfinished actions) determine closure. Their scale (Beike et al.,
2007), however, did not reflect these ideas; something this study seeks to explore. Noteworthy,
Beike and Wirth-Beaumont (2005) assert that closure pertains to the experience at retrieval rather
than encoding, however, the cues they used to elicit open and closed event-memories pertained only
to the experience at encoding. Further, while their scale assessed explicit appraisals of closure for
events, there may be less explicit items that better reflect closure, for instance, those assessing
experiential changes, attentional changes, felt distance, or a desire a to act in search of resolution.
Other measures of related constructs, like coherent resolution, entail experimenter ratings of
participant accounts rather than participants’ self-report ratings (e.g., Adler & Poulin, 2009, King et
al., 2000; Pals, 2006). These coding schemes reflect the extent to which individuals are perceived as
no longer ‘‘stuck’’ in the consequences of the experience; that is, their stories reflect “a sense of
closure, a capacity to experience positive emotion, and a lack of unresolved issues and emotions”
along with a “definitive, resolved ending” (Adler & Poulin, 2009; p. 915). Additionally, these
authors distinguish closure from denial and numbing by the presence of “threat, struggle, or effort”
(p. 915). They also note that past-tense verbs indicate more resolution relative to present-tense
verbs, which suggest ongoing struggle. The concept of closure also appears to be embedded in
definitions of coherent positive resolution (Pals, 2006): “the construction of a coherent and
complete story of a difficult event that ends positively, conveying a sense of emotional resolution or
closure” (p. 1082). Empirically demonstrated indicators of coherent positive resolution include
emotional resolution, a coherently structured conclusion, and a positive narrative ending (Pals,
2006). The use of unvalidated measures of closure and operational inconsistencies within and
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across studies impedes interpretation, replication, and a fair comparison of results. As such, there is
a clear need to better operationalize psychological closure.
Based on the preceding review, the current measure of psychological closure was expected
to include items pertaining to the following 10 factors: (1) explicit closure/completeness, (2) event
understanding, (3) felt distance, (4) emotional deactivation, (5) less preoccupation, (6) experiential
change, (7) reduced need to act, (8) reduced negative reactions, (9) increased positive reactions,
and, (10) coherence/connectedness. Per Watson and Clark (1995), the initial item pool (see
Appendix B) was created with the intent of (a) capturing a comprehensive set of items that extend
beyond the bounds of my own theoretical view of the construct, and (b) including content expected
to be tangential to the core construct (e.g., self-understanding, memory characteristics); that is, I
aimed to err on the side of overinclusion.
In sum, psychological closure has been operationalized inconsistently across studies and
existing measures have not been validated. Elucidating the construct of closure involves the
development of a sound measure, hereafter referred to as the Psychological Closure Scale (PCS).
Study 1 Methods
Study 1 Participants
Males have been found to rate memories as more closed relative to females (Beike & WirthBeaumont, 2005), therefore, it was important to seek relatively even sex/gender distributions.
Participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), a widely used platform for
data collection that yields more demographically heterogeneous samples compared to
undergraduate samples (Paolacci & Chandler, 2014). Participant eligibility was assessed using
Turkitron (Foster, Michael, & Garry, 2014), an online tool that aids in study management by
assessing necessary preconditions for participation in the study (i.e., that Turk workers are human
respondents from North America who have never completed the study) before redirecting them to
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the survey link. This method of participant recruitment was used for two successive iterations of
model testing using independent samples. Study 1a consisted of 284 cases and Study 1b consisted
of 317 cases, meeting sample size recommendations for factor analysis (Comrey, 1988; Guadagnoli
& Velicer, 1988). Refer to Table 1 for demographic information.

Table 1
Study 1 Participant Demographics

Age

Gender/Sex

Ethnicity

Education

N
M
SD
Range
Female
Male
Other/Not Specified
White, Caucasian
Black, African
Hispanic/Latino
Asian
Multiethnic
Indigenous
Other/Not Specified
Undergraduate University, College, Associate
Graduate University, College
High School
Vocational, Trades

Study 1a
284
35.71
10.82
18 – 76
50.4%
48.6%
1.1%
77.5%
6.7%
3.9%
8.1%
1.8%
0.4%
1.8%
71.5%
15.1%
12.3%
1.1%

Study 1b
317
36.24
11.60
18 – 81
53.3%
46.4%
0.3%
76.3%
5.4%
3.8%
9.1%
2.8%
0.3%
2.2%
71.6%
15.1%
12.3%
0.9%

Study 1 Materials and Measures
Psychological closure. The primary measure consisted of the preliminary 67-item pool for
the PCS. Each potential factor consisted of 4-6 items. Items were informed by existing measures
that query closure and related constructs (Beike & Wirth-Beaumont, 2005; Kross et al., 2012;
Savitsky et al., 1997; Skitka et al., 2004; Turner & Avison, 1992). For instance, Beike and
colleagues’ measure is based on a principle of lost opportunity and assesses individuals’ sense of
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completion or resolution regarding a life regret (Beike et al., 2007; Beike & Wirth-Beaumont,
2005). Two of six items refer to the event as ‘unfinished business’ or a ‘closed book’ (derived from
Savitsky et al., 1997). Items pertaining to features of memories, including valence, intensity,
coherence, and subjective distance (drawn from Beike & Wirth-Beaumont, 2005; Johnson, Foley,
Suengas, & Raye, 1988; Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003) were also included due to their
suggested relation to closure (Beike & Wirth-Beaumont, 2005). Additional items were derived from
narrative coding schemes (Adler & Poulin, 2009; Pals, 2006) and other descriptions of closure in
the literature (e.g., Albert, 1983; Gu et al., 2013). Items employed Likert scales anchored, 1
(completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree).
Ancillary items. Four validity check items (adapted from Oppenheimer, Meyvis, &
Davidenko, 2009) were included throughout the survey to assess attention to the study (“Check the
[first, third, second, last] box”; Appendix C). Two open-ended questions were included to provide
participants with the option of further describing their event and/or providing feedback about their
experience in the study (Appendix D). A demographics questionnaire querying age, sex/gender,
race/ethnicity, and education using open-response fields was also included (Appendix E).
Study 1 Procedure
The study was completed online. Prior to beginning the study, participants indicated
informed consent via the submission of an online consent form. All procedures received ethics
clearance through the University of Windsor’s Research Ethics Board.
A pilot study (N = 25) was conducted to assess completion time, adverse reactions, and to
ensure the cues and items were well-understood and elicited sufficient variance in responses. Due in
part to the greater prevalence of closed vs. open memories (Beike & Wirth-Beaumont, 2005),
individuals were asked to identify one open memory and one closed memory, counterbalanced, and
probed according to appraisals of resolution (Appendix F). Since closure has been associated with
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memory age (e.g., Crawley, 2010), participants selected events dated within 12 months of each
other (Beike & Wirth-Beaumont, 2005). The focus and purpose of the scale was to assess closure
for unresolved event-memories; hence, this cueing method was used to acquire a range of open
memories that varied in content and degree of closure.
After providing a short title or description for each event, participants completed the PCS
items in a randomized fashion (to manage order effects), the validity items, and the demographics
questionnaire. The survey took about 17 minutes to complete, on average (for Study 1a, M = 16.99,
SD = 12.40; for Study 1b, M = 16.78, SD = 9.47). This procedure was repeated using two separate
samples on two separate occasions to reach a final factor structure for the PCS: Study 1a tested the
original closure item pool and Study 1b tested the revised pool.
Study 1 Results
For each Study 1a and Study 1b, the data were first screened for statistical assumptions
(absence of univariate and multivariate outliers, univariate and multivariate normality, absence of
multicollinearity/singularity, linear relationships amongst factors and variables, sample
heterogeneity, and absence of non-random missing data; Yong & Pierce, 2013). The data were also
reviewed to ensure participants followed the event cue instructions and correctly responded to the
four validity check items. The reporting of results was guided by Jackson, Gillaspy, and PurcStephenson (2009), and Schreiber, Stage, King, Nora, and Barlow (2006). Refer to Table 2 for
descriptive statistics of composite closure ratings by event type and order for Studies 1a and 1b.
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for Closure Ratings by Order Condition and Event Type for Studies 1a and 1b

Study 1a
Closure
Study 1b
Closure

UR Order
(Study 1a n = 150)
(Study 1b n = 160)
Unresolved Events
Resolved Events

RU Order
(Study 1a n = 134)
(Study 1b n = 157)
Unresolved Events
Resolved Events

M [95% CI]

SD

M [95% CI]

SD

M [95% CI]

SD

M [95% CI]

SD

3.71
[3.56, 3.86]

0.94

5.36
[5.22, 5.49]

0.83

3.39
[3.23, 3.54]

0.90

5.34
[5.20, 5.48]

0.85

3.71
[3.56, 3.86]

0.96

5.45
[5.33, 5.58]

0.81

3.44
[3.30, 3.59]

0.91

5.28
[5.17, 5.43]

0.83

Notes. RU = resolved-unresolved for those who selected and rated a resolved event prior to an unresolved event. UR =
unresolved-resolved for those who selected and rated an unresolved event first. Non-overlapping CIs for unresolved
events are indicated in bold.

Study 1a
Data screening. For Study 1a (original N = 295) unresolved events, an examination of antiimage correlation matrices indicated sampling adequacy for the individual variables and sphericity
(all values > 0.25; KMO measure of sampling adequacy = 0.93; Bartlett’s Test of sphericity
x2(2211) = 12558.25, p < .0001), and all skewness and kurtosis values were acceptable (between +
2 and + 3, respectively). Missing data constituted 1-3% of data for the closure items and were found
to be missing completely at random, Little’s MCAR x2(15531) = 15294.19, p = .911. Missing data
were replaced using expectation maximization (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007). Findings reported below
did not differ based on non-imputed versus imputed data, hence the latter were used in subsequent
reporting. Three cases were removed due to inaccurate responding to the validity items, four cases
were removed for extremely low variability in responding (i.e., failing to use the full range of the
scale; cut-off was 3 SDs above and below MSD = 1.97), and four cases were removed based on
multivariate outlier estimates using Mahalanobis distance, using x2(67, 288) > 143.42, p < .0001.
The final sample consisted of 284 cases.
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Analyses. A two-way ANOVA was used to examine the influence of order on closure item
ratings for resolved and unresolved events. Results indicated that order did not significantly
influence responding for resolved events, F(1, 282) = 0.03, p = .872; Mdiff = 0.02, 95% CI [-0.18,
0.21], dunb = 0.02 [-0.21, 0.25], but did for unresolved events, F(1, 282) = 8.23, p = .003; Mdiff =
0.32, [0.10, 0.54], dunb = 0.35 [0.11, 0.58]. Those who selected an unresolved event first indicated
higher average ratings on the closure items relative to those who selected it second, thus, the cueing
method used produced sufficient response variability for unresolved event-memories.
As the objective of Study 1a was to probe the underlying factor structure of the construct of
closure based on a set of observed variables that were expected to be related, without imposing a
preconceived structure, exploratory factor analysis (EFA) with principle axis factoring and direct
oblimin rotation was used in SPSS Version 25 (2017, IBM Corp). This contrasts the aim of
principal components analyses (PCA), which is to reduce the number of variables into a smaller set
of principal components that account for the same variance. EFA has a long tradition of being
associated with measurement and construct validation (Clark & Watson, 1995).
Factors were identified based on the convergence of multiple metrics, including an
examination of eigenvalues (> 1; Kaiser, 1960), scree plot (Cattell, 1978), parallel analysis (above
intersection amongst observed and nonsense solutions: Horn, 1965), and minimum average partial
(MAP) test (above numerical directional change in average squared partial correlations; Velicer,
1976). Refer to Table 3 for the list of items comprising the closure item pools, along with
exclusions, inclusions, and revisions.
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Table 3
Comprehensive List of Items Included in Studies 1a and 1b for the Creation of the Psychological
Closure Scale (PCS)
1
2
3
4b
5
6a
7a
8a
9b
10b
11
12
13
14b
15
16b
17a
18a
19bc
20b
21bc
22b
23c
24a
25c
26c
27
28a
29c
30a
31a
32

Study 1a Items (Original Pool)
I have complete closure on this event
I have made peace with this event
This event feels settled or put to rest
I have moved on from this event
The event is like a 'closed book' to me
The event is 'unfinished business' for me (R)
The pieces of this event fit together like a complete
story with a beginning, middle, and end
This event comes to my mind as disconnected
scenes, facts, or experiences (R)
This event is part of a meaningful story for me
This event is meaningfully connected to other events
in my past, present, and future
I have reached a meaningful conclusion about this
event
I have a clear understanding of the event
I am confused about this event (R)
I have unanswered questions about this event (R)
I can make clear sense of what happened
I just wish I could figure out why the event happened
(R)
I can make sense of this event in relation to my
identity
I can make sense of this event in relation to my life
story
I have grown a lot from this event
This event is part of who I am
I understand how this event affected my personal
development
This event has taught me an important lesson about
myself
I can now turn my attention to other problems and
concerns
Now I can stop thinking about this event
I am not preoccupied by this event
This event will stay stuck in my mind for a long time
(R)
This event is taking a lot of my mental energy (R)
I want to stop thinking about this event but I can't
(R)
I feel the need to replay the event over and over in
my mind until I solve it (R)
I need more time to completely move on from this
event (R)
I feel ready to move on from this event
I feel the need to do something to resolve this event
within myself (R)
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Study 1b Items (Revised Pool)
I have complete closure on this event
I have made peace with this event
This event feels settled or put to rest
I have moved on from this event
The event is like a 'closed book' to me

This event is part of a meaningful story for me
This event is meaningfully connected to other events
in my past, present, and future
I have reached a meaningful conclusion about this
event
I have a clear understanding of the event
I am confused about this event (R)
I have unanswered questions about this event (R)
I can make clear sense of what happened
I just wish I could figure out why the event happened
(R)

This event helped me to grow as a person
This event is part of who I am
This event helped to shape the kind of person I am
today
This event has taught me an important lesson about
myself
This event is keeping me from attending to other
things (R)
I am preoccupied by this event (R)
I am mentally ‘stuck’ on this event (R)
This event is taking a lot of my mental energy (R)
I feel like I have to go over this event again and
again in my mind (R)

I feel the need to do something to resolve this event
within myself (R)

33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40c
41c
42
43a
44a
45a
46a
47a
48
49a
50a
51c
52a
53a
54c
55a
56c
57ac
58a
59
60
61c
62bc
63a
64
65a
66

I feel the need to do something to resolve this event
with others (e.g., to make amends or to get revenge)
(R)
I now think differently about the event
I have a new understanding of the event
The meaning this event holds for me has changed
The way I relate to this event has changed
The experience I have when I think about this event
has changed
This event feels like ancient history
It feels like this event happened a really long time
ago
I have put this event behind me completely
The event feels far away from me
I no longer identify with the person I was when this
event occurred
As I think about the event now, I feel like an outside
observer
Thinking about the event now, the details are vivid in
my mind
As I think about the event now, I feel like I am reexperiencing it (R)
As I think about the event now, the images that come
to my mind are from a perspective as seen through
the eyes of an observer
This event arouses strong emotions in me right now
(R)
As I think about the event now, my emotions are
intense (R)
Thinking about the event now, I have a
physical/bodily reaction (R)
As I think about the event now, my emotions are
close to the surface (R)
This event feels 'alive' in the present moment (R)
I feel powerless in relation to this event (R)
I feel that this event is holding me back from doing
things I want to do (R)
I have regrets about this event (R)
I feel pressure to resolve my feelings about this event
(R)
As I think about the event now, I feel upset (R)
This event is an active source of distress for me (R)
I feel bothered, tense, or uneasy as I think about the
event now (R)
As I think about the event now, it brings up
unpleasant emotions (R)
I feel that I have been released from the emotional
grip of this event
I have recovered emotionally from this event
As I think about the event now, my emotions are
balanced
I feel relief, satisfaction, or fulfillment as I think
about the event now
The ending of this event is more positive than the
beginning
I have come to a positive resolution about this event
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I feel the need to do something to resolve this event
with others (e.g., to make amends or to get revenge)
(R)
I now think differently about the event
I have a new understanding of the event
The meaning this event holds for me has changed
The way I relate to this event has changed
The experience I have when I think about this event
has changed
This event feels like ancient history
It feels like this event happened a really long time
ago
This event is completely behind me now
The event feels far away from me

This event arouses strong emotions in me right now
(R)

Thinking about this event now, I feel emotional (R)

This event is mentally holding me back (R)
I feel pressure to take steps to resolve my feelings
about this event (R)
Part of me is still upset about this event (R)
I feel bothered, tense, or uneasy as I think about the
event now (R)
As I think about the event now, it brings up
unpleasant emotions (R)
I feel free from the emotional grip of this event
I am in a good place emotionally when it comes to
this event
I feel relief, satisfaction, or fulfillment as I think
about the event now
I have come to a positive resolution about this event

67a

As I think about the event now, it brings up pleasant
emotions

100
101
102b
103b
104
105
106
107
108
109

This event feels far-off in the distant past
This event feels like a distant memory
It feels like this event happened just yesterday (R)
My feelings toward this event have changed
I now have a different perspective on this event
I now have a new way of looking at this event
I fully understand what this event is about
I am totally over this event
This event feels resolved
As I think about this event now, I feel content with
the way things worked out
As I think about this event now, I feel acceptance for
what happened
I have come to terms with this event
I have lingering negative feelings about this event
I really wish this event happened differently (R)
Deep down, this event still irritates me (R)
This event means a lot to me
This event is personally significant
I feel the need to take action to put this event to rest
(R)
I have an urge to do something that will help me get
over this event (R)
This event has loose ends that I just have to tie up
(R)
This event is demanding of my attention (R)
This event needs a lot more thinking (R)
This event is intruding on my thoughts (R)

110b
111b
112
113
114
115b
116b
117
118
119
120
121b
122

Note. a and b indicate eliminations based on low extracted communality estimates (h2 < 0.35), low loadings (< 0.40),
cross-loadings with multiple factors, item redundancies, or reconsideration of predictors and outcomes of the core
construct for Studies 1a and 1b, respectively. c denotes changes to item phrasing. (R) denotes reverse scoring.

Given this early stage of scale development, a larger number of items and potential latent
variables were retained. These items, 49 in total, loaded onto eight factors, tentatively labelled as
follows (refer to Figure 1 for corresponding item numbers): completion/freeing finality,
understanding/clarity, changed perception, felt distance, reduced emotional reaction, reduced
behavioural activation, reduced preoccupation, and personal meaning. Twenty-three items were
removed due to low extracted communality estimates (h2 < 0.35), low loadings (< 0.40), crossloadings with multiple factors, or reconsideration of predictors and outcomes of the core construct
(refer to Table 3 above). For instance, items 7, 8, 17, 18, and 43-47, which pertained to event
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coherence, self-narrative relevance, and select memory characteristics, were deemed peripheral to
the construct of closure. The phrasing of some items were changed and new items thought to be
central to the construct of closure were added for Study 1b (also noted in Table 3). Figure 1
illustrates a potentially emerging structural model.

Figure 1. Study 1a potential structural model for the Psychological Closure Scale (PCS). e = error.
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Study 1b
Data screening. For unresolved events in Study 1b (original N = 324), an examination of
anti-image correlation matrices indicated sampling adequacy for the individual variables and
sphericity (all values > 0.25; KMO = 0.94; Bartlett’s Test = x2(1225) = 12393.98, p < .0001), and
skewness and kurtosis values were acceptable (between + 2 and + 3). Missing data constituted 1.2%
of the closure item data, were missing completely at random, Little’s MCAR x2(15235) = 15482.01,
p = .079, and were replaced using expectation maximization. Five cases were removed due to
inaccurate responding on the validity items, four cases were removed for low response variability,
one case was removed for excessive missing responses (> 16), and seven cases were removed based
on multivariate outlier estimates using Mahalanobis distance, for a total sample size of 317.
Analyses. A two-way ANOVA to assess order effects indicated a statistically meaningful
effect for unresolved events, F(1, 322) = 5.78, p = .017; Mdiff = 0.25, [0.04, 0.46], dunb = 0.27 [0.05,
0.49]. As with Study 1a, those who selected an unresolved event first indicated higher average
ratings on the closure items relative to those who selected it second. For resolved event ratings, no
effect of order on closure was found, F(1, 322) = 3.64, p = .057; Mdiff = 0.17, [-0.01, 0.35], dunb =
0.21 [-0.01, 0.43].
Table 3 above details the closure items included in Study 1b. An EFA yielded 42 items that
clustered into seven factors: freeing finality (items 1, 2, 3, 5, 11, 41, 61, 64, 107, 108, 109), clear
understanding (items 12, 13, 15, 106), felt distance (items 39, 40, 42, 100, 101), experiential change
(items 34, 36, 37, 38, 104, 105), emotional release (items 57, 59, 60, 112, 114), mental liberation
(items 25, 26, 27, 54, 120, 122), and behavioural deactivation (items 32, 33, 56, 117, 118).
A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) with Satorra-Bentler corrections (Satorra & Bentler,
2001) and maximum likelihood (ML) estimation (which is relatively robust against non-normality;
Kline, 2015) were then conducted to assess model fit using R version 3.4.0 (R Foundation for
34

Statistical Computing, 2017). The unit loading identity (ULI) method was employed with the first
latent variable path set to 1 (Kline, 2015). The model consisted of seven factors thought to comprise
the construct of closure: freeing finality, clear understanding, felt distance, emotional release,
experiential change, mental liberation, and behavioural deactivation. In line with common CFA
reporting practices (Boomsma, 2000; Jackson et al., 2009; McDonald & Ho, 2002), current
inferences relied on the following fit indexes: (1) model chi-square, x2, (2) normed chi-square, x2/df,
(3) root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA; Steiger, 1990), (4) comparative fit index
(CFI; Bentler, 1990), and (5) standardized root mean square residual (SRMR).
The model chi-square can be considered a “badness-of-fit” index as higher values indicate
worse correspondence to the data; hence, failure to reject the null would offer support for the
model. There are a number of limitations with x2: The hypothesis tested (i.e., perfect population fit)
is likely to be implausible; it is sensitive to non-normality (as is the case for 7-point Likert scale
data); and it is sensitive to sample size, with just sufficiently large enough samples leading to
greater x2 values and rejection of the null. Alternatively, the normed chi-square value (x2/df) is less
sensitive to sample size. Although there are no clear guidelines regarding acceptable normed chisquare estimates, Bollen (1989) has noted that values less than 5 have been recommended.
The RMSEA accounts for sample size, includes a correction for model complexity, and
approximates a non-central chi-square distribution, meaning the model is not assumed to be perfect.
The closer the RMSEA value is to zero, the better the fit. RMSEA values are considered acceptable,
or indicative of good fit, if the 90% CI includes a lower bound < 0.05 and an upper bound < 0.08
(MacCallum, Browne, & Sugawara, 1996). The CFI assesses improvement in fit relative to a
baseline model that assumes zero population covariances among the observed variables. CFI values
greater than 0.90 are generally taken to indicate good model fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). The SRMR is
a measure of the overall difference between observed and predicted correlations, with values less
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than 0.10 suggesting good fit (Kline, 2015). A priori cut-offs were therefore set as follows: NC < 5,
RMSEA lower bound < 0.05, RMSEA upper bound < 0.08, CFI > 0.90, and SRMR < 0.10.
Robust fit indexes for the 42-item, 7-factor model of the construct of closure are presented
in Table 4. This model was subsequently tested using independent MTurk (see Study 2
Participants) and undergraduate samples (see Study 3 Participants), the fit statistics of which are
also reported in Table 4. Tables 5 and 6 detail latent variable (factor) and item statistics,
respectively, for the PCS in the current sample. The final model is illustrated in Figure 2. Overall,
CFA findings indicated a robust good-fitting solution for the construct of psychological closure.

Table 4
Model-Fit Index Statistics for the Final 42-Item 7-Factor Solution for the Psychological Closure
Scale (PCS) Across Studies

Robust x 2 (798)

x2/df
Robust CFI
Robust RMSEA
SRMR

1162.98***

Study 3
Time 1
(n = 377)
90% CI []
1309.58***

Study 3
Time 2
(n =351)
90% CI []
1297.81***

1.69

1.46

1.64

1.63

0.933
0.051***
[0.046, 0.056]
0.064

0.916
0.057***
[0.049, 0.064]
0.095

0.939
0.044***
[0.040, 0.049]
0.053

0.947
0.048***
[0.044, 0.053]
0.054

Study 1b
(n = 317)
90% CI []

Study 2
(n = 182)
90% CI []

1345.64***

Notes. ***indicates statistical significance at p < .0001. Bolded fit index values indicate that these values met the cutoff criteria indicating good model fit. Robust estimates are based on the Satorra-Bentler correction.
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Table 5
Standardized Loadings, Parameter Estimates, Correlations, and Effect Sizes for Latent Variables
(Factors) Comprising the Psychological Closure Scale (PCS)
b

SE

z

ß

R2

p

Sig.

Felt Distance (FD)

1.67

0.17

9.66

0.72

0.52

.000

***

Emotional Release (ER)

1.06

0.14

7.30

0.57

0.32

.000

***

Experiential Change (EC)

1.00

0.15

6.80

0.47

0.22

.000

***

Clear Understanding (CU)

1.07

0.17

6.26

0.46

0.21

.000

***

Mental Liberation (ML)

1.00

0.16

6.40

0.45

0.20

.000

***

Behavioural Deactivation (BD)

1.03

0.17

6.05

0.41

0.17

.000

***

Emotional Release (ER)

0.91

0.16

5.80

0.38

0.14

.000

***

Experiential Change (EC)

1.00

0.19

5.20

0.36

0.13

.000

***

Clear Understanding (CU)

1.11

0.21

5.38

0.37

0.14

.000

***

Mental Liberation (ML)

1.41

0.19

7.30

0.49

0.24

.000

***

Behavioural Deactivation (BD)

1.24

0.22

5.62

0.38

0.14

.000

***

Experiential Change (EC)

0.35

0.14

2.51

0.16

0.03

.012

*

Clear Understanding (CU)

0.60

0.16

3.68

0.25

0.06

.000

***

Mental Liberation (ML)

1.40

0.16

8.67

0.61

0.37

.000

***

Behavioural Deactivation (BD)

1.39

0.18

7.90

0.53

0.28

.000

***

Clear Understanding (CU)

0.93

0.20

4.75

0.34

0.12

.000

***

Mental Liberation (ML)

0.12

0.18

0.66

0.05

0.003

.512

Behavioural Deactivation (BD)

-0.17

0.21

-0.81

-0.06

-0.004

.419

Mental Liberation (ML)

0.79

0.19

4.05

0.27

0.07

.000

Behavioural Deactivation (BD)

0.37

0.22

1.68

0.11

0.01

.094

2.44

0.21

11.77

0.78

0.61

.000

Latent Variables
Freeing Finality (FF)

Felt Distance (FD)

Emotional Release (ER)

Experiential Change (EC)

Clear Understanding (CU)
***

Mental Liberation (ML)
Behavioural Deactivation (BD)

Notes. *** Indicates statistical significance at p < .001; * indicates statistical significance at p < .05.
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Table 6
Item Loadings for the Psychological Closure Scale (PCS) 42-Item 7-Factor Solution
Latent
Variables
Freeing Finality (FF)

Items

ß

Sig.

2. I have made peace with this event

0.783

***

1. I have complete closure on this event

0.779

***

5. This event is like a 'closed book' to me
41. This event is completely behind me now

0.778
0.774

***
***

3. This event feels settled or put to rest
107. I am totally over this event

0.767
0.744

***
***

108. This event feels resolved
61. I feel free from the emotional grip of this event

0.738
0.719

***
***

64. I feel relief, satisfaction, or fulfillment as I think about this event now
109. As I think about this event now, I feel content with the way things worked out

0.682
0.624

***
***

11. I have reached a meaningful conclusion about this event

0.644

***

12. I have a clear understanding of this event

0.859

***

15. I can make clear sense of what happened
106. I fully understand what this event is about

0.829
0.696

***
***

13. I am confused about this event (R)

0.545

***

39. This event feels like ancient history

0.889

***

101. This event feels like a distant memory
100. This event feels far-off in the distant past

0.883
0.859

***
***

42. This event feels far away from me
40. It feels like this event happened a really long time ago

0.857
0.842

***
***

57. Part of me is still upset about this event (R)

0.855

***

59. I feel bothered, tense, or uneasy as I think about this event now (R)

0.826

***

112. I have lingering negative feelings about this event (R)

0.801

***

60. As I think about this event now, it brings up unpleasant emotions (R)

0.779

***

114. Deep down, this event still irritates me (R)

0.769

***

34. I now think differently about this event
105. I now have a new way of looking at this event

0.827
0.821

***
***

104. I now have a different perspective on this event
37. The way I relate to this event has changed

0.795
0.771

***
***

38. The experience I have when I think about this event has changed

0.743

***

36. The meaning this event holds for me has changed

0.733

***

Clear Understanding (CU)

Felt Distance (FD)

Emotional Release (ER)

Experiential Change (EC)
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Mental Liberation (ML)
26. I am mentally 'stuck' on this event (R)

0.886

***

122. This event is intruding on my thoughts (R)
54. This event is mentally holding me back (R)

0.884
0.856

***
***

25. I am preoccupied by this event (R)
27. This event is taking a lot of my mental energy (R)

0.828
0.819

***
***

120. This event is demanding of my attention (R)

0.810

***

117. I feel the need to take action to put this event to rest (R)

0.887

***

118. I have an urge to do something that will help me get over this event (R)
32. I feel the need to do something to resolve this event within myself (RS)

0.860
0.848

***
***

56. I feel pressure to take steps to resolve my feelings about this event (R)
33. I feel the need to do something to resolve this event with others (e.g., to make
amends or to get revenge) (R)

0.831

***

0.752

***

Behavioural Deactivation (BD)

Notes. (R) indicates the item is reverse scored.
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Figure 2. Final structural equation model, including beta weights, for the Psychological Closure Scale (PCS).
Latent factors and manifest variables are indicated by round and rectangular shapes, respectively. e = error.
Factor correlations and item loadings are also provided in Tables 5 and 6, respectively.

The potential for Common Method Bias (CMB), or spurious variance attributable to the
method of measurement (e.g., self-report, survey interface) rather than the construct, was assessed
using the Harman’s single factor method in which all items (measuring latent variables) were
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loaded into one common factor. Results revealed that this common factor accounted for 34.16% of
the variance, which is less than the majority (50%), suggesting that CMB did not unduly affect
inferences based on the results (P. Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & N. Podsakoff, 2003).
Finally, with regard to reliability estimates for the final model of the PCS, internal
consistency reliabilities (omega, w) were calculated for the full scale and subscales across Studies
1b, 2, and 3 (see Table 7), where value ranges from .70 to .79, .80 to .89, and .90 to .99, were taken
to indicate fair, good, and excellent reliability, respectively. Test-retest reliability for the PCS
composite was also assessed using data from Study 3, which consisted of two timepoints separated
by 1-2 days; the scale demonstrated good test-re-test reliability, r(349) = 0.86 [0.83, 0.89], p < .001.

Table 7
Internal Consistency Reliability (Omega, w) Estimates for the Psychological Closure Scale (PCS)
and Subscales Across Studies 1b, 2, and 3

PCS Composite and Subscales

Study 1b
(n = 317)
90% CI []

Study 2
(n = 182)
90% CI []

PCS Composite
Freeing Finality (FF)
Clear Understanding (CU)
Felt Distance (FD)
Emotional Release (ER)
Experiential Change (EC)
Mental Liberation (ML)
Behavioural Deactivation (BD)

0.95
0.93
0.82
0.94
0.90
0.90
0.94
0.92

0.92
0.95
0.69
0.92
0.87
0.91
0.92
0.88

Study 3
Time 1
(n = 377)
90% CI []
0.94
0.92
0.80
0.92
0.85
0.90
0.91
0.87

Study 3
Time 2
(n =351)
90% CI []
0.96
0.95
0.85
0.94
0.90
0.93
0.95
0.91

Study 1 Discussion
This study began with a broad and multifaceted preliminary conceptualization of
psychological closure based on various definitions in the literature. Study 1a explored the
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underlying factor structure of the construct of closure, whereas Study 1b tested goodness-of-fit for
the emergent 7-factor structural model. Findings indicated a robust, good-fitting, and reliable
solution that was replicated using two independent MTurk (Study 2) and undergraduate (Study 3)
samples. The resulting Psychological Closure Scale (PCS) is a 42-item self-report measure for use
with non-clinical populations that assesses seven aspects of autobiographical event resolution:
freeing finality, clear understanding, felt distance, experiential change, emotional release, mental
liberation, and behavioural deactivation. These factors align with the majority of the 10 proposed
factors (e.g., explicit closure/completeness, event understanding, felt distance, emotional
deactivation, less preoccupation, experiential change, reduced need to act, and reduced negative
reactions) along with the more than 18 aspects of closure mentioned in prior research (e.g.,
completion, tension reduction, rationalization, shifting of attention to other concerns, expression of
positive sentiments, temporal embeddedness, and historical remoteness; e.g., Albert, 1983; Beike &
Wirth-Beaumont, 2005). As such, the PCS offers a comprehensive yet parsimonious
operationalization of the construct of psychological closure, defined as follows:
The mental segmentation of part of one’s past in subjective space and time, accompanied by
appraisals of resolution or finality, refined understanding, changed aspects of experience at
recall, felt distance, emotional relief, the freeing of attention, and a reduced need to act. Such
appraisals can refer to the event as it is recalled or one’s experience of the event during
recollection.

By empirically investigating manifestations of latent constructs and subfactors of
psychological closure as articulated in theory, this study establishes support for the structural
integrity and internal validity of the PCS (per Lovinger, 1957). However, as this was a first attempt
at devising a valid measure of psychological closure and its dimensions, additional iterations and
item refinements are likely to yield an even better-fitting solution or model structure.
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Suggestions for Model Revision and Further Investigation
Content saturation. It is interesting that items pertaining to regret or wishing things turned
out differently were not found to contribute to a unidimensional subfactor of the PCS given
previous definitions of closure based on the principle of lost opportunity (Beike et al., 2007; Beike
& Wirth-Beaumont, 2005; Zeigarnik, 1935). This may have been due to an insufficient number of
items pertaining to regret or the fact that it may not constitute a defining feature of the construct of
closure. Indeed, the notion of regret places emphasis on one’s own perceived errors of commission
or omission (personal actions, inactions, missed opportunities) when appraisals of closure can
derive from a host of other factors, including but not limited to the actions or inactions of others
(e.g., their perceived ignorance, maltreatment, or harsh evaluation) and associated effects on the
rememberer (e.g., emotional activation, confusion, preoccupation). Understanding how regret, or
the lack thereof, relates to or defines closure warrants further investigation.
Item refinements. The current PCS may also benefit from item refinements. For example,
extreme adverbs (e.g., “totally”, “completely”) could be removed to promote use of the full scale
range without repetition of anchor descriptors; items with multiple descriptors (e.g., “relief,
satisfaction, or fulfillment”, “bothered, tense, or uneasy”) could be simplified to reduce confusion
and associated residuals; and similar items (e.g., “I feel the need to do something to resolve this
event within myself” and “I feel the need to do something to resolve this event with others…”)
could be combined (e.g., “I feel the need to do something to resolve this event”) to reduce potential
redundancies and arrive at a more parsimonious or short-form measure of closure. To this end, 4-5
items per subscale (full scale item range = 28 to 35) has been recommended to ensure adequate
internal consistency reliability (Harvey, Billings, & Nilan, 1985). Short measures also work to
minimize response biases caused by boredom or fatigue (Schmitt & Stults, 1985).
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Subscale weighting. The different number of items across PCS subscales is also worth
discussing. The PCS subscales consist of 4 (Clear Understanding) to 11 (Freeing Finality) items,
which may unduly influence their representativeness as content domains of closure. Indeed,
according to Lovinger (1957), the proportion of items devoted to each content area should be
proportional to the importance of that content in the target construct, hence, it is acceptable for
broader content areas to be represented by more items than narrower content areas. Such
considerations are particularly relevant for the CU subscale as it is thought to be highly
characteristic of the construct of closure, but is represented by the least number of items, one of
which is reverse-scored. This may explain why, relative to the other scales, this subscale showed
lower internal consistency reliability (range = .69 - .85). The overall number of items may also
affect reliability estimates - the more items, the more reliable the scale is likely to be. Future scale
refinements should therefore consider the relative weighting of the different PCS subscales, with
possible item refinements and additions to the CU subscale, along with the overall number of items,
using predicted reliabilities for altered lengths of the PCS (Brown, 1910; Spearman, 1910).
Item ordering. Further, in the current study, items were presented to respondents in a
randomized fashion to guard against response biases that may be due to order effects. This raises
considerations of fixed item orders that offer reliable and valid estimates of closure. Should item
randomization not be feasible, a potential order of presentation for the PCS is offered in Appendix
G, organized in terms of face valid relevance to the construct. Nevertheless, a deeper understanding
of scale adaptations and fixed-order effects necessitates further investigation.
Limitations
There are some important limitations or cautions to consider in interpreting the current
results. Firstly, the use of confirmatory techniques (CFA) after item revisions had been explored
(EFA) in Study 1b is not entirely appropriate as EFA results are subject to capitalization on chance
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variation, and the specification of a CFA model based on EFA outcomes could exacerbate this
problem (Kline, 2015). Should future work seek to refine the PCS, it is preferable to validate the
factor structure across different samples and to use the same method (EFA or CFA) in both samples
or use a multiple-sample CFA (Hurley et al., 1997). However, that CFAs using subsequent
independent MTurk (Study 2) and undergraduate (Study 3) samples replicated good model fit
allows for more confident inferences based on the currently reported fit indexes for the PCS.
Secondly, although the use of reverse-scored items can encourage participants to carefully
consider each item, they may also bias estimates of the construct by introducing errors or
heterogeneity in interpretation and responding (DeCoster, 2005). Three subscales of the PCS
(Emotional Release, Mental Liberation, and Behavioural Deactivation) use reverse-coded items,
raising the possibility of a method factor. The use of negatively worded items also raises
considerations about whether the construct of closure can be appropriately captured by the absence
of, or reductions in, elements of experience as they pertain to event-memories. In other words, does
the attainment of greater resolution correspond to reductions in what characterizes a lack thereof?
The use of reverse-scored items to assess closure is arguably justified by references to both what
diminishes (e.g., unpleasant feeling upon recall, preoccupation, urge to take action in search of
resolution) and what develops (sense of understanding, completion, relief, peace), which is in
keeping with common parlance and with appraisals of event-memories offered in clinical contexts
(for further discussion on this perspective, see Paivio & Pascual-Leone, 2010). Nevertheless, future
research centered on scale refinements for the PCS may wish to examine the amount and influence
of positively versus negatively worded items on overall model structure and fit.
Thirdly, in a related vein, correlations amongst latent variables in the current study point to
the possibility of a nested or hierarchical conceptualization for the construct of closure with two
potential second-order factors: Segmentation-Integration (Freeing Finality, Felt Distance, Clear
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Understanding, Experiential Change) and Deactivation (Emotional Release, Mental Liberation,
Behavioural Deactivation). However, the current conceptualization of closure, hence the structural
model, derives from prior literature that references closure as a semi-dichotomous composite
appraisal rather than a collection of independent parts. In other words, in practice, people are likely
to state that they do or do not have closure, rather than to describe their degree of closure based on
qualitatively distinct, lower- or higher-order aspects of closure. In any case, exploring nested
operationalizations of the construct of closure constitutes a fruitful avenue for future research.
Future Directions
To summarize potential avenues for future research, scale refinements for the PCS may be
achieved through additional investigations of issues pertaining to content saturation, item revision,
subscale weighting, item ordering, the use of CFAs using independent samples, the presence of
method factors, and potential nested models for the construct of closure.
Additionally, although items comprising the PCS reference autobiographical eventmemories, this measure could easily be adapted to refer to other events and experiences (e.g.,
traumatic events, future events, current experiences, intra- or inter-personal difficulties). Different
types of autobiographical events are expected to yield differential degrees of closure, and as such,
produce differential effects. It would be interesting to assess whether the current CFA findings for
the PCS, which are based on unresolved events, hold for other types of events that vary in content
and/or severity. In addition to PCS adaptations for different event types, it would also be
worthwhile to validate the scale for use with different populations, including diverse cultural or
clinical populations (e.g., trauma survivors), and to explore relations amongst closure and posttraumatic growth (e.g., Blackie et al., 2017; Johnson & Boals, 2015).
Although not the primary focus of the current study, the order of event selection is worth
discussing as it may inform future research on unresolved event-memories. Individuals who
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selected an unresolved event first (before selecting a resolved event) indicated higher ratings of
closure, on average, relative to those who selected it second (after a resolved event), while ratings
for resolved events did not differ based on the order in which they were selected (first or second). It
is plausible that unresolved (vs. resolved) events are granted priority status for cognitive and
emotional management via their threat to internal equilibrium, making associated appraisals of
closure increasingly sensitive to contextual factors like event comparisons. That is, following the
retrieval and rating of a resolved event, ratings of closure for an unresolved event may be lower due
to the relative contrast, and increased sensitivity to this contrast, which stems from the drive for
reconciliation (Beike & Wirth-Beaumont, 2005). Recalling an unresolved event first, on the other
hand, offers no such comparative baseline or juxtaposition, so ratings of closure tend to be higher.
Resolved events do not call for such reconciliation efforts, therefore associated appraisals of closure
remain stable and may be subject to ceiling effects. To the extent unresolved events are negatively
valenced and resolved events are positively valenced, this accords with research showing biases
among people to spontaneously perceive life events as more pleasant than unpleasant (Walker,
Skowronski, & Thompson, 2003), and to view positive events as closer to the present, relative to
negative events (Ross & Wilson, 2002) – both indicators of greater closure. In any case, differences
in ratings of closure based on the order of event selection served the important function of creating
sufficient variability in ratings to construct the PCS.
Due to inherent limitations in quantifying human experience, the use of mixed-methods
approaches in future research is likely to offer a richer, more saturated understanding of
psychological closure and its core dimensions. For instance, a profitable avenue for future research
would be to explore how individuals’ narrative descriptions of closure using word analysis (e.g.,
LIWC; Pennebaker, Booth, & Francis, 2007) or coding schemes (e.g., Adler & Poulin, 2009; Pals,
2006) compare to their ratings on the PCS in addition to the content and wording of PCS items.
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In all, by empirically investigating the structure and measurement of psychological closure,
this study offers, for the first time, a multifaceted and parsimonious measure – the PCS.
Methodological and analytical changes, factor and items refinements, adaptations, and replications
constitute fruitful areas for future research. Furthermore, it is now possible to explore ways in
which dimensions of closure relate to one another along with their combined and independent
effects. Importantly, a robust investigation of construct validity also requires an examination of
convergent and discriminant relations with other constructs (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955) – the very
aim of Study 2.
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CHAPTER 3
PCS VALIDATION
Elucidating the construct of psychological closure calls for an examination of how it relates
to other conceptually similar and distinct constructs. To this end, Study 2 investigated the extent to
which the PCS aligned with (convergent validity) or could be distinguished from (discriminant
validity) existing measures. For instance, in the context of creative problem-solving, Jarman (2016)
outlined components of a “mental itch” experience: “(1) a persistent aversive arousal state, (2) an
urgency to reduce said arousal state, and (3) the desire to do so by solving the problem…A mental
itch, like its epidermal counterpart, is uncomfortable and insistent…” (p. 22). Given the emergence
of closure is characterized in part by less intrusiveness (mental liberation), a reduced need to take
action (behavioural deactivation), relief (emotional release), and completion (freeing finality), it
may be likened to the satisfaction of having a mental itch “scratched,” and so should negatively
correlate with the mental itch experience (per the Mental Itch Scale; Jarman, 2016).
Moreover, as psychological closure regards present attributions of a remembered event, it
can be distinguished from the need for cognitive closure (assessed using the Need for Closure
Scale; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), which regards an urgent need to achieve definitive answers to
avoid ambiguity and can be classed as an individual difference factor. Thus, whereas the need for
closure refers to individuals’ generalized desire to obtain closure, psychological closure refers more
broadly to their current state or appraisal of closure regarding a specific event. Although it is
possible for the need for cognitive closure to eventually bring about psychological closure, the latter
may be experienced or pursued irrespective of a generalized need for clear solutions. Closure
ratings are also assumed to be consciously accepted and honest appraisals of subjective reality
rather than unconscious defenses, and thus were not expected to correlate with other ways in which
individuals tend to respond to emotions such as suppression, avoidance, or rumination (measured
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using the Responses to Emotions Questionnaire; Jeffries, McLeish, Kraemer, Avallone, &
Flemming, 2016).
With regard to event types, although closure has been discussed in relation to self-defining,
turning-point, or traumatic events (arguably events individuals seek to further understand),
attributions of closure can refer to a range of autobiographical memories, not just those deemed
personally significant, pivotal, or frightening. This is to say that appraisals of closure are regarded
as distinct from appraisals of event centrality to identity and life-story (per the Centrality of Event
Scale; Berntsen & Rubin, 2006b), impact (Transitional Impact Scale; Svob, Brown, Reddon, Uzer,
& Lee, 2013), and significance (Subjective Impact and Personal Significance Scale; Wood &
Conway, 2006).
Further, although the development of new insights may theoretically be involved in the
attainment of closure, measures of the insight experience (per the Sudden Restructuring of
Experience Scale; Jarman, 2014) pertain to “mental click” moments or flashes of insight about
specific problems. Closure, on the other hand, involves a more gradual, purposeful process of
meaning-making wherein the “problem” is likely to be the unresolved nature of a recalled event
rather than the content of the event per se. To this end, the concept of resolution has been discussed
in the context of relationships (e.g., in seeking to resolve longstanding negative feelings toward
formative caregivers; Greenberg, 2015), which constitute a subset of autobiographical memories
subject to appraisals of closure. Given appraisals of closure can be applied to all event types,
including interpersonal events, PCS ratings were hypothesized to positively correlate with
appraisals of resolution for interpersonal unfinished business (assessed using the Unfinished
Business Resolution Scale; Singh, 1994). Refer to Table 8 for a summary of hypotheses.
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Table 8
Hypotheses Regarding Correlations Amongst the Psychological Closure Scale (PCS) and Other
Measures
Measures

Expected Relation with Psychological Closure Scale (PCS)

Mental Itch Scale (MIS)

Negative correlation*

Need for Closure Scale (NFCS)

No correlation

Responses to Emotions Questionnaire (REQ)

No correlation

Centrality of Event Scale (CES)

No correlation

Transitional Impact Scale (TIS)

No correlation

Subjective Impact and Personal Significance Scale (SIPS)

No correlation

Sudden Restructuring of Experience Scale (SRES)

No correlation

Unfinished Business Resolution Scale (UBRS)

Positive correlation*

Notes. For a detailed description of each measure see Study 2 Methods. * indicates anticipated statistical significance
using Holm-Bonferroni corrections.

Study 2 Methods
Study 2 Participants
A total of 239 MTurk workers participated in Study 2. Fifty-five cases were removed a
priori for failing to meet eligibility criteria (i.e., did not select an unresolved event, used plagiarized
information from the internet, completed the survey more than once), or for not passing the validity
check items (Appendix C). An additional two cases were removed for extreme responding
(standardized residuals > + 3.0 SD; Mahalanobis Distance > 55, a = 0.001; Leverage > 0.28). The
final sample consisted of 182 cases (59.3% male; 40.1% female; 0.5% other/not specified; Mage =
33.95, SD = 11.14, range = 18 – 74; 68.7% White/Caucasian, 12.1% Black/African, 8.2%
Hispanic/Latino, 4.9% Asian, 3.3% Multiethnic, 1% Indigenous; 1.6% other/not specified; 69.3%
undergraduate university, college, or associate education, 12.6% graduate degree, 14.3% high
school diploma, 3.8% trades).
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Study 2 Materials and Measures
All of the following measures are included in Appendices G through O.
Psychological closure. The newly developed Psychological Closure Scale (PCS) was used
to assess degree of perceived closure for autobiographical events. As described in Study 1, the PCS
is a 42-item self-report measure that assesses seven aspects of psychological closure: Freeing
Finality (FF), Clear Understanding (CU), Felt Distance (FD), Emotional Release (ER), Experiential
Change (EC), Mental Liberation (ML), and Behavioural Deactivation (BD). Items are rated on a
scale ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree), with higher scores signifying
greater closure. In the current study, data from the full PCS and subscales demonstrated good
internal consistency reliabilities (Full a = .92; FF a = .95; CU a = .68; FD a = .92; ER a = .86; EC
a = .91; ML a = .92; BD a = .88).
Mental itch. The Mental Itch Scale (MIS; Jarman, 2016) is a 15-item measure of an
aversive and unsettling state in the problem-solving and insight process (i.e., a "mental itch"). A
mental itch consists of persistent aversive cognitive arousal, a need to reduce said arousal, and the
desire to do so by solving the problem causing it. In the present study, “unresolved event” was used
in place of “problem.” Some items regard arousal (e.g., “There’s a feeling of unease in the back of
my mind”) while others concern motivational urgency (e.g., “It’s all I can think about”). Items are
rated from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). The MIS has demonstrated excellent internal consistency
(a = .96), strong correlations with descriptions of the mental itch experience, and prediction of
insight above ideation and intrinsic motivation (Jarman, 2016). Current a = .96.
Need for cognitive closure. The Need for Closure Scale - Short (NFCS; Roets & Van Hiel,
2011, based on Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) is a 15-item instrument that measures individuals’
generalized or trait motivation to arrive at definitive answers on a topic to avoid confusion or
ambiguity. The NFCS contains five facet scales: Order, Predictability, Decisiveness, Ambiguity,
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and Closed-Mindedness. Individuals rate the extent to which they agree with statements such as,
“When I am confronted with a problem, I’m dying to reach a solution very quickly,” on a scale
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). Roets and Van Heil (2011) reported good internal
consistency (a = .87), test-retest reliability (r = .79), and correlations with related factors (e.g., bigfive traits, need for structure, need for cognition, need for affect). In the current study, a = .87.
Responses to emotions. The Responses to Emotions Questionnaire (REQ; Jeffries et al.,
2016) is a 12-item measure designed to assess four common emotion regulation strategies:
Suppression (e.g., "I try to hold back or suppress my emotions"), Avoidance (e.g., "I try to avoid
things that will make me feel bad"), Rumination (e.g., "I dwell upon my thoughts and feelings"),
and Reappraisal (e.g., "I try to think about my feelings in a way that makes me feel less
distressed"). Participants rate their general use of each strategy on a scale ranging from 0 (not at all)
to 4 (a lot). The subscales have demonstrated acceptable reliabilities (a range = .61 - .71) and all,
save for the Avoidance subscale, have been found to correlate with emotion regulation difficulties
(Jeffries et al., 2016). For the full REQ, current a = .82.
Event centrality. The 7-item short form of the Centrality of Event Scale (CES; Berntsen &
Rubin, 2006b) measures how central an event is perceived to be in relation to one’s identity and life
story. Items (e.g., “I feel that event has become part of my identity”) are anchored 1 (totally
disagree) to 5 (totally agree). The scale has demonstrated good reliability (α = .88; current a = .89).
Transitional impact. The Transitional Impact Scale (TIS-12; Svob et al., 2013) is a 12-item
measure of changed and stable aspects of life following events. It consists of two subscales:
Material Impact (changes in the concrete context of daily living) and Psychological Impact
(changes in thoughts, attitudes, emotions, etc.). Items (e.g., “This event has changed the people I
hang out with”, “This event has changed the way I think about things”) are rated from 1 (completely
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disagree) to 5 (completely agree). The measure has demonstrated good internal consistency (full
scale α = .83; Material α = .79, Psychological α = .76). For the full TIS, current a = .90.
Subjective impact/personal significance. The Subjective Impact and Personal Significance
Scale (SIPS; Wood & Conway, 2006) assesses subjective appraisals of impact and significance for
self-defining memories. Subjective impact was proposed to reflect meaning-making, which is
critical to positive narrative identity and adjustment. Individuals are asked to rate an event using six
items (e.g., "I feel that I have grown as a person since experiencing this past event") from 1 (not at
all) to 7 (very much). The SIPS has shown good internal consistency (a = .86; current a = .87).
Sudden restructuring of experience. The Sudden Restructuring of Experience (SRE) Scale
(Jarman, 2014) is a 7-item measure of new insight, or the extent to which people experience
changes in how they view problems. Sample items include, “It was as if I were seeing the same
problem through new eyes” and “My new understanding of the problem really sunk in.” Items are
rated from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much), with higher scores indicating greater experiential
restructuring. The scale has demonstrated good internal consistency (a = .88; current a = .92).
Unfinished business. The Unfinished Business Resolution Scale (UBRS; Singh, 1994)
consists of 11 items that assess the degree to which individuals feel troubled by negative feelings
and unmet needs, or feel worthwhile in relation to, and accepting of, a specific person. Items (e.g.,
“I feel comfortable about my feelings in relation to this person”, “I have come to terms about not
getting what I need or want from this person”) are rated on a scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 5
(very much). Singh (1994) reported acceptable test–retest reliabilities over 1 month in student and
clinical samples (r = .73 and r = .81, respectively). Due to the fact individuals in the current study
were not asked to recall an interpersonal event per se, two screening questions assessing the
presence of others in the event were included prior to the UBRS. Current a = .71.
Ancillary items. As with Study 1, four validity check items were included to increase
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attention (Oppenheimer et al., 2009; Appendix C), two open-ended questions were included to
allow participants to further describe their event and/or provide feedback about the study (Appendix
D), and the same open-response demographics questionnaire was used (Appendix E).
Study 2 Procedure
Procedures were identical to Study 1 and ethically cleared, however for Study 2, participants
selected one unresolved event and, in addition to the new PCS, they completed the MIS, NFCS,
REQ, CES, TIS, SIPS, SRE, and UBRS. These measures were randomly presented to minimize
order effects. Study 2 took an average of 15.54 mins to complete, range = 3.35–61.13, SD = 10.21.
Study 2 Results
With respect to statistical assumptions, the study design and Durbin-Watson statistic (1.96)
indicated independence of residuals; visual inspection of studentized residuals by unstandardized
predicted values indicated that the scales were collectively linearly related to PCS values with slight
heteroscedasticity; partial regression plots indicated independent linear relationships with the PCS,
save for the SIPS, TIS, and CES (central density). Tolerance (range = 0.26 – 0.77; above 0.10) and
correlational analyses indicated an absence of multicollinearity (all rs < 0.17; below 0.70). There
were no influential observations (Cook’s Distance < 1). The data were determined to be normally
distributed based on the histogram (M = 0, SD = 1) and plot of standardized and studentized
residuals (points aligned on the diagonal). Finally, missing values analyses indicated a lack of
missingness for all measures (hence, Little’s MCAR test could not computed).
See Table 9 for descriptive statistics and internal consistency reliabilities for all measures.
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Table 9
Descriptive Statistics and Internal Consistency Reliabilities for the Main Measures
Scale Range

M [95% CI]

SD

Cronbach’s α

1–7

3.77 [3.63, 3.90]

0.90

0.92

Freeing Finality (FF)

1–7

3.43 [3.19, 3.67]

1.64

0.95

Clear Understanding (CU)

1–7

4.63 [4.44, 4.81]

1.24

0.68

Felt Distance (FD)

1–7

4.03 [3.78, 4.27]

1.70

0.92

Emotional Release (ER)

1–7

2.99 [2.79, 3.18]

1.33

0.86

Experiential Change (EC)

1–7

4.00 [3.78, 4.22]

1.52

0.91

Mental Liberation (ML)

1–7

3.99 [3.76, 4.22]

1.58

0.92

Behavioural Deactivation (BD)

1–7

3.80 [3.58, 4.02]

1.50

0.88

Need for Closure Scale (NFCS)

1–6

4.05 [3.93, 4.18]

0.88

0.87

Responses to Emotions Questionnaire (REQ)

0–4

29.41 [28.27, 30.54] 7.79

0.82

Mental Itch Scale (MIS)

1–7

4.17 [3.94, 4.39]

1.53

0.96

Sudden Restructuring of Experience Scale (SRES)

1–7

4.00 [3.76, 4.22]

1.57

0.92

Subjective Impact and Personal Significance Scale (SIPS)

1–7

5.07 [4.89, 5.25]

1.30

0.87

Transitional Impact Scale (TIS)

1–5

3.16 [3.01, 3.29]

0.94

0.90

Centrality of Event Scale (CES)

1–5

3.31 [3.17, 3.45]

0.99

0.89

Unfinished Business Resolution Scale (UBRS)

0–5

2.44 [2.32, 2.56]

0.83

0.71

Psychological Closure Scale (PCS)

Note. For the UBRS, n = 171; For all other scales, N = 182.

Correlational analyses. As shown in Table 9, the PCS and subscales demonstrated
acceptable-to-excellent internal consistency reliabilities. Two-tailed correlational analyses were
conducted using the main variables: PCS, MIS, NFCS, REQ, CES, TIS, SIPS, SRE, and UBRS2.
Holm-Bonferroni corrections were used because, relative to the classical Bonferroni correction, it is
more conservative and powerful in minimizing risks for Type I and II Errors when making multiple
comparisons (Aickin & Gensler, 1996; Holm, 1979). As noted in Table 10, statistically significant

2

Correlations amongst the PCS and UBRS were conducted separately due to the fact not everyone selected an
interpersonal event for which the UBRS assesses.
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medium and small correlations were found amongst the PCS and the UBRS (Unfinished Business
Resolution) and MIS (Mental Itch), respectively. The PCS was not found to correlate with the
remaining measures: NFCS, REQ, SRES, SIPS, TIS, or CES.

Table 10
Two-Tailed Bivariate Correlations with Holm-Bonferroni Corrections Amongst the Psychological
Closure Scale (PCS), Subscales, and Other Measures
PCS
r(180)
[95% CI]
p
PCS

NFCS

1

NFCS
r(180)
[95% CI]
p

REQ
r(180)
[95% CI]
p

MIS
r(180)
[95% CI]
p

SRES
r(180)
[95% CI]
p

SIPS
r(180)
[95% CI]
p

TIS-12
r(180)
[95% CI]
p

CES
r(180)
[95% CI]
p

UBRS
r(169)
[95% CI]
p

-0.14
[-0.28,0.00]
.058

0.01
[-0.16,0.15]
.854

-0.23**
[-0.36,-0.08]
.002

0.19*
[0.02,0.34]
.010

-0.14
[-0.30,0.03]
.070

-0.13
[-0.29,0.05]
.080

-0.20*
[-0.36,-0.04]
.006

0.57**
[0.42,0.69]
.000

1

0.43**
[0.31,0.53]
.000

0.30**
[0.13,0.45]
.000

0.18*
[0.03,0.32]
.013

0.24**
[0.11,0.38]
.001

0.19*
[0.04,0.33]
.010

0.19*
[0.05,0.31]
.011

-0.15*
[-0.30,0.00]
.047

1

0.43**
[0.29,0.55]
.000

0.38**
[0.22,0.52]
.000

0.33**
[0.18,0.47]
.000

0.41**
[0.25,0.53]
.000

0.31**
[0.16,0.43]
.000

-0.25**
[-0.41,-0.08]
.001

1

0.54**
[0.40,0.67]
.000

0.38**
[0.23,0.50]
.000

0.60**
[0.49,0.70]
.000

0.56**
[0.43,0.67]
.000

-0.37**
[-0.49,-0.23]
.000

1

0.41**
[0.26,0.54]
.000

0.59**
[0.46,0.69]
.000

0.49**
[0.35,0.62]
.000

-0.02
[-0.20,0.15]
.755

1

0.60**
[0.47,0.71]
.000

0.69**
[0.58,0.78]
.000

-0.18*
[-0.33,-0.01]
0.019

1

0.83**
[0.78,0.88]
.000

-0.34**
[-0.48,-0.19]
.000

1

-0.30**
[-0.44,-0.15]
.000

REQ

MIS

SRES

SIPS

TIS-12

CES
UBRS

PCS – FF

1
NFCS
r(180)
[95% CI]
p

REQ
r(180)
[95% CI]
p

MIS
r(180)
[95% CI]
p

SRES
r(180)
[95% CI]
p

SIPS
r(180)
[95% CI]
p

TIS-12
r(180)
[95% CI]
p

CES
r(180)
[95% CI]
p

UBRS
r(169)
[95% CI]
p

-0.032

0.21*

0.20*

0.47**

-0.02

0.19*

0.11

0.35**
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[-0.18,0.12]
.671

[0.07,0.35]
.005

[0.05,0.35]
.006

[0.35,0.59]
.000

[-0.17,0.13]
.757

[0.03,0.34]
.010

[-0.04,0.25]
.140

[0.20,0.48]
.000

PCS – FD

0.029
[-0.14,0.19]
.697

0.21*
[0.03,0.37]
.004

0.06
[-0.10,0.21]
.407

0.32**
[0.16,0.47]
.000

0.08
[-0.07,0.25]
.258

0.10
[-0.06,0.26]
.161

0.04
[-0.14,0.18]
.629

0.29**
[0.11,0.43]
.000

PCS – CU

0.07
[-0.07,0.24]
.339

0.05
[-0.12,0.22]
.500

-0.01
[-0.25,0.06]
.186

-0.06
[-0.22,0.11]
.405

0.12
[-0.04,0.26]
.114

-0.07
[-0.22,0.08]
.360

-0.00
[-0.16,0.16]
.969

0.30**
[0.14,0.45]
.000

PCS – EC

-0.01
[-0.17,0.17]
.933

0.24**
[0.08,0.41]
.001

0.22*
[0.05,0.37]
.003

0.54**
[0.41,0.67]
.000

0.27**
0.13,0.42]
.000

0.33**
[0.19,0.49]
.000

0.29**
[0.15,0.43]
.000

0.25**
[0.06,0.42]
.001

PCS – ER

-0.31**
[-0.46,-0.18]
.000

-0.35**
[-0.47,-0.21]
.000

-0.45**
[-0.58,-0.32]
.000

-0.13
[-0.30,0.04]
.082

-0.49**
[-0.63,-0.35]
.000

-0.48**
[-0.60,-0.34]
.000

-0.52**
[-0.64,-0.36]
.000

0.53**
[0.39,0.65]
.000

PCS – ML

-0.22*
[-0.36,-0.07]
.003

-0.39**
[-0.50.-0.27]
.000

-0.76**
[-0.83,-0.67]
.000

-0.48**
[-0.61,-0.35]
.000

-0.33**
[-0.46,-0.19]
.000

-0.60**
[-0.71,-0.48]
.001

-0.61**
[-0.70,-0.50]
.000

0.37**
[0.23,0.50]
.000

PCS – BD

-0.16*
[-0.31,-0.01]
.033

-0.34**
[-0.46,-0.22]
.000

-0.57**
[-0.70,-0.43]
.000

-0.42**
[-0.56,-0.28]
.000

-0.28**
[-0.41,-0.12]
.000

-0.40**
[-0.52,-0.26]
.000

-0.44**
[-0.56,-0.30]
.000

0.25**
[0.09,0.38]
.001

Notes. * Indicates statistical significance with no Type I Error correction. ** Indicates statistical significance with Holm-Bonferroni
correction. For the UBRS, n = 171; For all other scales, N = 182. FF = Freeing Finality; FD = Felt Distance; CU = Clear
Understanding; EC = Experiential Change; ER = Emotional Release; BD = Behavioural Deactivation; ML = Mental Liberation.

The same analyses were conducted using the PCS subscales to further delineate relations
with the other measures (see Table 10). Results yielded statistically significant correlations across
PCS subscales; notably, all subscales were found to positively correlate with the UBRS. Table 11
provides a summary of correlational findings amongst PCS subscales and the other measures.

Table 11
Correlational Findings for the Psychological Closure Scale (PCS) Subscales and Other Measures
PCS Subscales

Statistically Significant Correlations

Freeing Finality (FF)

Sudden Restructuring of Experience (SRES) +
Unfinished Business Resolution (UBRS) +

Felt Distance (FD)

Sudden Restructuring of Experience (SRES) +
Unfinished Business Resolution (UBRS) +

Clear Understanding (CU)

Unfinished Business Resolution (UBRS) +
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Experiential Change (EC)

Responses to Emotions (REQ) +
Sudden Restructuring of Experience (SRES) +
Subjective Impact/Personal Significance (SIPS) +
Transitional Impact (TIS) +
Centrality of Event (CES) +
Unfinished Business Resolution (UBRS) +

Emotional Release (ER)

Need for Closure (NFCS) –
Responses to Emotions (REQ) –
Mental Itch (MIS) –
Subjective Impact/Personal Significance (SIPS) –
Transitional Impact (TIS) –
Centrality of Event (CES) –
Unfinished Business Resolution (UBRS) +

Mental Liberation (ML)

Responses to Emotions (REQ) –
Mental Itch (MIS) –
Sudden Restructuring of Experience (SRES) –
Subjective Impact/Personal Significance (SIPS) –
Transitional Impact (TIS) –
Centrality of Event (CES) –
Unfinished Business Resolution (UBRS) +

Behavioural Deactivation (BD)

Responses to Emotions (REQ) –
Mental Itch (MIS) –
Sudden Restructuring of Experience (SRES) –
Subjective Impact/Personal Significance (SIPS) –
Transitional Impact (TIS) –
Centrality of Event (CES) –
Unfinished Business Resolution (UBRS) +

Notes. Statistical significance was based on Holm-Bonferroni corrections. + and – denote positive and negative
correlations, respectively.

PCS model fit. As noted in Study 1, another CFA was conducted on PCS ratings using the
current Study 2 sample. Results indicated replication of good model fit: robust x2(798) = 1162.98, p
< .0001; x2/df = 1.46; robust CFI = 0.916; robust RMSEA = 0.057, 90% CI [0.049, 0.064], p <
.0001; SRMR = 0.095.
Study 2 Discussion
Study 2 aimed to further investigate issues of construct validity for the PCS via correlational
analyses involving other measures of constructs expected to be theoretically related (convergent)
and unrelated (discriminant) to the construct of psychological closure. As predicted, psychological
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closure, using PCS composite ratings, was found to significantly, moderately, and positively
correlate with appraisals of unfinished business resolution (UBRS), and to slightly and negatively
correlate with the mental itch experience (MIS). Results yielded no statistically significant
correlations amongst the PCS and the remaining measures: NFCS (need for closure), REQ
(responses to emotions), SRES (sudden restructuring of experience), SIPS (subjective
impact/personal significance), TIS (transitional impact), and CES (centrality of event).
That there was no evidence to support statistically meaningful relationships amongst the
PCS and each the SIPS and the CES reinforces, at least in part, decisions to remove items assessing
personal meaning and self-narrative connections in the scale construction phase (Study 1). The
absence of significant correlations between the PCS and each the NFCS and REQ (individual
difference measures) also supports the event-specific state, rather than generalized trait, focus of the
PCS. Of worthy note, the PCS and CES were found to be statistically significantly related when
using the Bonferroni correction but not when using the Holm-Bonferroni correction, the latter of
which is more conservative and powerful (Aickin & Gensler, 1996). Still, covarying appraisals of
event centrality and closure need not necessarily indicate construct validity for the PCS, and indeed,
both may be related via other constructs. For instance, both centrality and closure have been
discussed in relation to trauma and post-traumatic stress (e.g., Berntsen & Rubin, 2006b; Flannery,
1999), however this research suggests that closure is likely to be inversely related to appraisals of
centrality. Future research may serve to further clarify or qualify the existence and nature of the
relationship amongst psychological closure and event centrality to identity and life-story.
The presence of statistically meaningful correlations amongst the PCS subscales and other
measures also supports a richer conceptualization of psychological closure as a multidimensional
construct. For instance, subscales pertaining to experiential change (EC), emotional release (ER),
behavioural deactivation (BD), and mental liberation (ML) were each found to correlate with at
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least six of eight measures, while the subscales pertaining to freeing finality (FF), clear
understanding (CU), and felt distance (FD) were found to correlate with one or two of the measures.
As a testament to the validity of the subscales, for instance, there were moderate-to-strong inverse
correlations between the MIS (mental itch) and each the BD and ML subscales, along with
moderate positive correlations between the SRES (sudden restructuring of experience) and each the
FF and EC subscales. It makes sense that the greater the mental itch, characterised by persistent
aversive cognitive arousal and a need to reduce said arousal, the lower one’s sense of mental
freedom and the greater the urge to take action in search of resolution. It is also conceivable that the
restructuring of experience aligns with notions of a welcome shift toward finality (e.g., “This event
feels resolved”) and experiential change (e.g., “The way I relate to this event has changed”). These
relationships are also indicative of appropriate factor labels.
Further, that select PCS subscales positively correlated with some measures, while other
subscales negatively correlated with the same measure (e.g., SRES, SIPS, TIS, CES) suggests that
psychological closure represents a distinct construct that may be defined at a higher level of
abstraction, incorporating or related to some aspects of these other measures, while simultaneously
qualifying and extending beyond them to more accurately capture the richness of the construct. To
the point raised in Study 1 regarding the potential for appraisals of closure to vary by event type, the
PCS subscale correlations suggest possible constellations or profiles of closure based on the event
in question (i.e., whether it is deemed significant, transitional, or central to identity) and/or
individual differences (i.e., in the need for closure or responses to emotions). Identifying factors
that may predict profiles of closure represents an intriguing avenue for future research. Certainly,
the current findings speak to the complex interconnectedness of human experience along with the
inherent challenges of attempting to disentangle and elucidate a single independent construct. In
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any case, that all PCS subscales were found to positively correlate with the UBRS lends additional
support for the current multifaceted operationalization of psychological closure.
Limitations
It is important to note that this study lacks evidence of convergence with other validated
measures of closure, as they do not exist. The UBRS was included as the next closest measure of
resolution and, although it has been widely used, this scale has never been subjected to rigorous
validity assessment. The UBRS and the MIS also regard interpersonal relationships and problemsolving processes, respectively. These scale referents stand in contrast to the PCS’ focus on
autobiographical event-memories. Moreover, significant correlations amongst the PCS and each the
UBRS and MIS may not necessarily lend support for the PCS’ internal validity – it is possible for
two scales to be related while also measuring something different from the intended construct or to
relate as predictors, outcomes, or both. Given definitions of closure accord with those for unfinished
business resolution, the PCS and UBRS are taken to represent a common construct, albeit with
different applications (event-memories vs. interpersonal events). Still, replication of the current
methodology with the inclusion of other validated measures of constructs expected to be related to
or distinct from psychological closure, along with different samples, would serve to contextualize
the current findings and further clarify issues pertaining to construct validity for the PCS.
Further, as with Study 1, the PCS items in the current study were presented in a randomized
fashion for the purpose of testing model fit in a new sample, while items for the other scales were
presented in a fixed order. This raises questions about whether the order of item presentation (e.g.,
allowing error variance to be evenly dispersed across PCS items vs. potentially restricting it to latter
items due to response fatigue) may qualify the current findings – yet another focus for future work.
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Future Directions
In sum, results from Study 2 revealed statistically significant relationships amongst
psychological closure and each the mental itch experience and interpersonal resolution and a lack of
significant correlations with the remaining measures (e.g., NFCS, TIS). These findings, together
with those regarding the PCS subscales, offer preliminary evidence for convergent and discriminant
validity, hence construct validity, for the PCS. Future research aimed at furthering this aim could:
(a) clarify relations amongst closure and event centrality, (b) investigate factors suspected to
identify, qualify, or predict profiles of closure, (c) replicate the current methodology using validated
measures of constructs predicted to be related to closure, and (d) examine the influence of item
ordering. Yet another useful means of assessing construct validity is to investigate the relative
malleability of closure ratings in response to controlled manipulations expected to exert effects Study 3 presents one such experimental paradigm.
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CHAPTER 4
EFFECTS OF NARRATIVE PERSPECTIVE AND MENTAL FOCUS
ON PSYCHOLOGICAL CLOSURE AND EMOTION
With a measure in place, it was then possible to explore factors that might influence
psychological closure. In the context of retrieving and writing about open memories, these factors
were hypothesized to be those that help individuals to psychologically separate from the self
contained in the memory and meaningfully integrate the past self and event within an overarching
conceptual self-view and life narrative. The aim of Study 3 was to investigate how narrative
perspective shift sequences (first-to-third vs. third-to-first) interact with levels of mental focus
(experience vs. coherence) to influence appraisals of unresolved distressing event-memories in
terms of closure and aspects of emotion at recall (valence, intensity, reactivity). Additional aims
were to explore carry-over effects 1-2 days later, and relations amongst narrative perspective
shifting, cognitive avoidance, and perceived centrality of the event to identity and life-story.
Recall that autobiographical memories can be envisioned as if from one’s own eyes at the
time of the event (first-person perspective) or from the eyes of an observer so that one mentally sees
themselves as well as the surroundings (third-person perspective; Nigro & Nesser, 1983). Firstperson imagery can result from using a first-person pronoun (‘I’) in written accounts of past events,
whereas third-person imagery can result from using a third-person pronoun (‘He/She’; Gu & Tse,
2016). As it relates to construal level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2010), imagery and narrative
perspectives are regarded as manipulations of construal, hence psychological distance, within the
realm of mental simulation. That is, when recalling a past event (which by definition is objectively
distant from present experience), perspectives can be dynamically altered to glean both abstract
(third-person) and concrete (first-person) understandings of the event. If perspective influences
psychological distance, then determinants of perspective might also influence distance, and thus,
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appraisals implicated by distance including closure and emotion. That is, when all else is equal,
shifting from the first-person to the third-person, or factors that support this shift, may serve to
extend psychological distance (which accords with self-enhancement and self-verification motives),
whereas a shift from third to first (operating “against the grain”) might fix or narrow this distance.
The phrase ‘shift-to-first’ is used to refer to the pronoun/imagery perspective shift sequence
from third-person to first-person, whereas ‘shift-to-third’ refers to the shift sequence from firstperson to third-person. The combination of imagery and pronoun use is denoted ‘narrative
perspective.’ As previously reviewed, narrative perspective shifts can produce asymmetrical effects
on emotion, with a shift-to-third leading to reduced emotional intensity at recall and a shift-to-first
producing in no change in intensity, irrespective of event valence (e.g., Gu & Tse, 2016; Robinson
& Swanson, 1993).
Just as visual imagery and pronoun use can be said to inform psychological distance, so too
can mental focus, or the relative emphasis placed on features of events upon retrieval (Libby &
Eibach, 2009, 2011a). An experience focus consists of reporting on the event’s concrete details,
whereas a coherence focus entails reporting on its self-narrative significance. Mental focus has been
shown to be intricately and bidirectionally related to imagery perspective (Libby & Eibach, 2002,
2005, 2009, 2011a). If different levels of mental focus (coherence vs. experience), like perspective
(third vs. first), represent different methods of event construal (abstract vs. concrete), then perhaps
mental focus, independently or in combination with narrative perspective shift sequences, can
further inform appraisals of closure and emotion. Indeed, in contrast to an experience focus, a
coherence focus explicitly prompts self-narrative integration, which has been suggested to
characterize adaptive self-reflection (Kross & Ayduk, 2011; Libby & Eibach, 2011b).
To elucidate the effects of construal methods on closure and emotion, Study 3 implemented
different levels of mental focus (experience vs. coherence) following the narrative perspective shift
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sequences (shift-to-first vs. shift-to-third), within a 15-minute recall and writing task. To address
whether narrative perspective shifting and/or mental focus drives increases or decreases in ratings
of closure and emotion, additional aims were to examine how writing conditions compared to
thinking alone (control) and whether any effects would hold 1-2 days following the intervention.
Implications for cognitive avoidance and perceived centrality of the event were also explored.
This study serves to elucidate effective construal method interventions and the potential
malleability of emotional reactions to, and appraisals of, significant personal events (see also, Beike
& Crone, 2012, who argue that such events are fixed in their meaning, save for when emotional
response is sufficiently low). Given the potential damaging effects of chronic unresolved (open)
memories, such as lowered self-esteem (e.g., Beike et al., 2004), brooding rumination (e.g., Gruber
et al., 2011), and related psychopathological consequences (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000), it is
important to establish ways of helping people achieve greater closure for such bothersome
memories.
To expound on the utility of methods of construal, and sequences thereof, I begin with a
review of the most widely researched tool for autobiographical event representation - vantage points
used during recall.
Visual Imagery Perspective
Visual imagery perspective is a reliable feature of memory and has been consistently related
to the intensity of emotion experienced at recall: first-person imagery tends to be associated with
greater emotional intensity, relative to third-person imagery (e.g., Siedlecki, 2015; Sutin & Robins,
2010). According to Kross and colleagues (Ayduk & Kross, 2008; Kross & Ayduk, 2008; Kross et
al., 2005), a third-person perspective affords greater distance from the experiential self contained in
the memory, which attenuates emotional reactivity. In their view, a third-person perspective
promotes adaptive reflection by fostering the reconstrual (vs. recounting) of events, and thus,
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buffers against rumination and the negative effects thereof. Others have suggested that a thirdperson perspective serves a cognitive avoidance mechanism for trauma memories (McIsaac & Eich,
2004), which in turn, inhibits access to affective information (Robinson & Swanson, 1993).
Research pointing to both self-distancing and avoidance functions of imagery perspective,
therefore, align with the self-distancing view (i.e., that a third-person perspective serves to blunt
emotion relative to a first-person perspective), but disagree in attributions of adaptive value.
Exploring the degree to which individuals wish to avoid or push away their thoughts and feelings
about their unresolved event-memories may therefore provide insight as to whether the current
recall and writing tasks offer adaptive means of reconciliation.
Libby and colleagues (Libby & Eibach, 2011b; Libby, Valenti, Pfent, & Eibach, 2011)
provide a more nuanced, but not entirely incompatible, account of how imagery perspective
influences emotion. In their view, instead of leading people to adopt a detached interpretation of an
event, third-person imagery allows people to integrate it within a broader framework of general
self-views (e.g., regarding personal traits, values, life themes, goals), and their emotional reactions
reflect the subjective meaning that results (e.g., Libby et al., 2011). Thus, in order for a third-person
perspective to promote adaptive coping and emotion regulation, an adaptive self-theory must also
be specified (e.g., self-change/stability) to guide the meaning-making and emotional reaction that
occurs (Libby & Eibach, 2011b). This account naturally accords with the self-integration view of
imagery perspective (i.e., that the function of imagery perspective depends upon current selftheories). For instance, if one believes that they have changed significantly since the occurrence of
an event (i.e., they hold a theory of self-change), then third-person imagery (vs. first-person
imagery) should accentuate this change along with any emotion (in valence and intensity)
associated with the change. Conversely, if one believes they have not changed over time (i.e., they
hold a theory of self-stability), then third-person imagery should highlight enduring characteristics.
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According to Libby and Eibach (2011b), without some theory of self-change since the
occurrence of an event, people might consider the negative past self as part of the present, in which
case third-person imagery could negatively affect well-being (Libby & Eibach, 2011b). For
example, third-person imagery has been associated with increased feelings of shame when recalling
a past failure, but only for individuals with low self-esteem (i.e., emotional valence accorded with
current self-views and so was magnified by a third-person perspective; Libby et al., 2011). Recall
that in such a “cognitive-affective crossfire” (Swann et al., 1987), cognitive consistency prevails
over affective enhancement. Further, given shame is a self-conscious emotion (Tracy & Robins,
2007) and participants rated themselves in terms of their self-esteem, this study can also be said to
lend support for the self-salience view (i.e., that third-person imagery magnifies the prominence of
the self in memory, and thus, increases associated emotion at recall).
Narrative Pronoun Use
Similar to visual imagery perspectives, different personal pronouns (e.g., I, You,
He/She/They) represent different ways of regarding the self in accounts of the personal past. People
are able to flexibly switch amongst pronouns in written, verbal, and introspective narration, which
can influence emotion regulation (e.g., Chang et al., 2013). For instance, use of first-person singular
pronouns in written narratives may undermine adaptive self-reflection (Grossmann & Kross, 2014;
Kross et al., 2014), where ‘adaptive’ in this context was taken to refer to emotional downregulation. Nevertheless, greater use of first-person pronouns in expressive writing has been related
to depressive symptomology (Bucci & Freedman, 1981; Rude, Gortner, & Pennebaker, 2004). In an
expressive writing task, Park et al. (2016) found that greater use of first-person singular pronouns
corresponded with greater self-immersion and less self-distancing (which here, roughly means
greater first-person relative to third-person perspective, respectively), however, they did not
examine use of third-person pronouns. In analyzing adult diaries, Jin (2010) found that the first68

person pronoun (‘I’) was associated with the disclosure of feelings, the second-person pronoun
(‘You’) resembled supportive inner dialogue, and third-person pronouns (‘He/She’) were related to
objective sense-making. Jin’s (2005, 2010) psychological displacement paradigm in diary writing
entails fixed shifts in personal pronoun usage from first to second to third, in order to yield
emotional benefits (however, see Seih, Chuang, & Pennebaker, 2011, for evidence to the contrary).
Following from this research, Gu and Tse (2016) manipulated narrative pronoun use to alter
visual imagery perspective and examined how different shift sequences influenced emotional
intensity. Participants reported on a positive event and a negative event that occurred within the past
year on two occasions, separated by 1 week. On each occasion, they used a different pronoun (first
or third) to write about the event. A shift-to-third, but not the other way around, was found to
attenuate emotional intensity for positive and negative events, and for negative events, this effect
was mediated by subjective temporal distance (how far away the event felt irrespective of when it
occurred). That is, a shift-to-third lessened the intensity of negative emotion by causing the event to
feel further from the present. While these findings appear to support the self-distancing account of
third-person imagery, mental focus was not incorporated in the design, and appraisals of selfchange were not measured, so it is unknown whether they would qualify these effects.
Gu and Tse’s (2016) results also indicated a main effect of session, or repeated retrieval, on
subjective temporal distance and emotional intensity. That is, emotional intensity decreased with
the passage of time (from the first to second session) and by calling the event to mind on multiple
occasions. This accords with research demonstrating shifts toward third-person imagery with
repeated retrieval (Butler, Rice, Wooldridge, & Rubin, 2016). A design involving single-session
shifting would more appropriately control for the effects of time and repeated retrieval.
Furthermore, that Gu and Tse (2016) found narrative pronoun use to be related to imagery
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perspective suggests that instructing individuals to use imagery and pronouns that agree in
perspective (i.e., narrative perspective) could strengthen manipulation adherence.
Given prior research suggesting that a fixed order to narration can inform emotional arousal
at retrieval, and emotional arousal relates to closure (Beike & Wirth-Beaumont, 2005), then factors
known to influence arousal, such as imagery perspective and pronoun use, should also inform
appraisals of closure. To this end, Crawley (2010) examined the effects of imagery perspective on
closure (using the scale in Beike & Wirth-Beaumont, 2005) for unresolved events by contrasting
three groups: one group recalled an event from the first-person perspective on one occasion (single
first-person); the second group recalled an event from the first-person on three occasions (repeated
first-person); and the third group recalled an event from the first-person on one occasion then the
third-person on two subsequent occasions (repeated third-person). Ratings of closure were found to
increase over time for all groups and important predictors included reduced emotional experience
and reduced feeling of reliving during recall. Only those in the repeated third-person group showed
decreased negative emotion and emotion intensity, aligning with previous findings concerning
distancing and third-person recall (e.g., McIsaac & Eich, 2002; McNamara et al., 2005; Williams &
Moulds, 2007). These results are, however, confounded with the effects of repeated retrieval (Butler
et al., 2016), narrative construction on more than one occasion (Pennebaker & Chung, 2007; Smyth,
1998), and the passage of time (Trope & Liberman, 2010), all of which are known to promote felt
distance from the event. As previously reviewed, disclosure or rehearsal are likely not sole
determinants of resolution. Other factors that can impact emotion, hence closure, include the degree
to which the event is understood (Beike & Wirth-Beaumont, 2005), personally significant
(Robinson, 1996; Sonnemans & Frijda, 1995), and relevant to identity (Singer & Salovey, 1993)
and life story (McAdams, 2001). Associations amongst emotion, self, and self-narrative also point

70

to potential narrative perspective shift effects on appraisals of an event’s perceived centrality to
identity and life story.
Mental Focus
Mental focus consists of two levels of construal: An experience focus involves focusing on
what it was like to experience an event directly as if actually there again, noting specific sensorial
and contextual elements (e.g., where the event took place, who was involved, what actions were
performed, and what was seen, heard, and smelled). Conversely, a coherence focus entails focusing
on the implications of the event within the context of one’s life as a whole, noting how it relates to
personal characteristics and other life events (e.g., accomplishments, relationships, and the future;
McAdams, 2001; Pillemer, 1998; Vallacher & Wegner, 1985). For example, in recalling the funeral
of a loved one, an experience focus might bear to mind the musty smell of the funeral home, the
sight of the mahogany casket, family pictures around the room, the sounds of weeps and sobs, or
reactions during the eulogy. A coherence focus on this event might instead call to mind lessons
learned from the loss, fond experiences with the loved one, the nature of the relationship, or how
the loss has informed one’s priorities in life and views of the future.
According to Libby and Eibach (2011a, 2011b), imagery perspective shapes the level of
meaning derived from event representations by changing individuals’ mental focus: first-person
images correspond to an understanding of events from the bottom-up, in terms of the
phenomenology evoked by concrete features (experience focus), whereas third-person images
correspond to an understanding of events from the top-down, in terms of abstractions that integrate
the event within a broader context (coherence focus); these levels of meaning correspond to the
Jamesian facets of self: “I” (experiential self/self as subject of thought) and “Me” (conceptual
self/self as object of thought; James, 1890/1950; Libby & Eibach, 2011a). If third-person imagery
promotes experiential self-distancing and conceptual self-integration via a coherence focus, then a
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coherence focus itself might foster psychological distance and/or an experience focus might serve to
constrict this distance. More abstract methods of construal, then, might aid in adaptive selfreflection by creating sufficient cognitive space within which to reconcile events with current selfviews and life-themes, wherein the generation of such space follows some optimal sequence of
contemplation and emotional processing.
It is worthwhile, however, to address controversies about whether distancing from emotion
in memory represents an adaptive response to difficult experiences. On the one side, “working
through” emotion is thought to be a necessary precondition for good adjustment (e.g., Brewin,
1996). Many psychotherapeutic modalities (e.g., experiential therapies) aim to heighten emotional
arousal to make the past “come alive” in the present so that new meaning can emerge (e.g.,
Greenberg, 2011). Further, according to learning-based approaches, experiential avoidance, or
attempts to avoid thoughts, feelings, memories, physical sensations and other mental experiences,
though reinforcing in the short term, can produce detrimental effects in the long run (e.g., Hayes et
al., 1999). Conversely, Beike and Wirth-Beaumont (2005) contend that “letting go” of emotion is
sufficient for good adjustment, and they note research suggesting that working through emotions is
not necessary for trauma recovery (e.g., Stroebe, 1992; Wortman & Silver, 1989).
Furthermore, although Kross and colleagues (e.g., Kross & Ayduk, 2011) claim that selfdistancing facilitates adaptive meaning-making by reducing emotional reactivity, other research has
demonstrated that distancing via third-person imagery is related to maladaptive thinking and
negative affect (e.g., Finnbogadottir & Berntsen, 2014; Giovanetti, Revord, Sasso, & Haeffel,
2019). Distancing aside, other strategies for coping might involve enhancing positive emotional
reactivity (e.g., Brooks, 2014; Crum, Salovey, & Achor, 2013), or working to accept unpleasant
emotions wholly and fully (e.g., Hayes et al., 1999). The emotional arousal that characterizes open
memories may be considered adaptive in so far as it motivates behavior, whether in action or in
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thought (Beike & Wirth-Beaumont, 2005). It is when this behavior goes awry, as in the case of
persistent self-focused ruminative thinking about uncontrollable events, that questions of
maladaptiveness arise.
Disagreements regarding the adaptive value of “working through” versus “letting go” of
emotions, and of repetitive self-focused thinking, are important to understanding how narrative
perspective shifting and mental focus may operate to promote adaptive autobiographical event
resolution. ‘Adaptive’, here, is taken to refer to good adjustment in response to cognitive,
emotional, social, and environmental changes where such adjustment is productive to individuals
and associated with psychological health. ‘Maladaptive’ or ‘less adaptive’, then, refers to the
inability to adjust well in response to changes, and such reactions are counterproductive and linked
to psychological dysfunction. Garnefski, Kraaij, and Spinhoven (2001) contend that “more
adaptive” strategies consist of positive refocusing, positive reappraisal, putting events into
perspective, refocusing on planning, and accepting events as they happened, whereas “less
adaptive” strategies include rumination, blaming oneself, blaming others, and catastrophizing. Thus,
every writing manipulation in the current study, by way of inciting different perspectives and ways
of reappraising unresolved events, were expected to be theoretically more adaptive than thinking
alone, which has been shown to be ineffective in facilitating an integrated understanding of events
(Lyubomirsky, Sousa, & Dickerhoof, 2006).
In terms of the ordering of narrative perspectives and mental foci, Angus and colleagues
(Angus, Levitt, & Hardtke, 1999; Angus & Greenberg, 2011) contend that emotionally salient
descriptions of autobiographical events offer a crucial starting point for the articulation of meaning,
and that repeated engagement with, and distancing from, events facilitates this process. In
particular, they encourage a fixed pattern of narration from external (what happened) to internal
(what was felt) and reflexive (what it means) to promote new ways of experiencing and
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understanding past events - key aspects of closure. Indeed, traditional expressive writing
instructions involve more than shifts in distance by way of perspective alone: individuals are
prompted to “link this event to your past, your present or your future, or to who you have been, who
you would like to be, or who you are now…” (Pennebaker & Chung, 2011, p. 419) and “to your
relationships” (Park et al., 2016, p. 3) - all features of self-coherence.
In investigating the effects of mental focus on appraisals of transitional events - those that
produce marked change in the way people perceive themselves and live their lives (e.g., illness,
divorce; Brown & Lee, 2010) - Boucher and Scoboria (2015) found that, relative to an experience
focus, a coherence focus incited appraisals of greater psychological impact, material impact, and
relevance to identity and life-story. Thus, even ostensibly “fixed” attributions of meaning for key
past experiences are subject to change depending on how retrieval occurs. In a follow-up study that
explored mental focus effects on emotion, a coherence (vs. experience) focus was found to produce
lower ratings of negative affect for negative transitions (Boucher & Scoboria, 2019).
However, contrary to Libby and Eibach (2011a), mental focus did not determine imagery
perspective, likely due to the fact Boucher and Scoboria (2015; 2019) cued participants to select
events from any point in their past that were themselves characterized by change (i.e., transitional),
which as already reviewed, can itself influence both subjective distance and imagery
perspective. Due to the fact the present study concerned unresolved memories, which tend to be
more emotionally evocative and subjectively closer to the present (vs. closed memories; Beike &
Wirth-Beaumont, 2005), mental focus may operate likewise to imagery perspective, but not
necessarily in accordance with it. This is because there may be other determinants of psychological
distance at play and distance dimensions need not operate in tandem. Further, while both imagery
perspective and mental focus vary in levels of construal, they are qualitatively different; that is,

74

relative to imagery perspective, mental focus more explicitly prompts a focus on sensorial and
contextual details (experience; concrete) vs. self-narrative integration (coherence; abstract).
Thus, direct manipulations of mental focus for unresolved event-memories, along with the
inclusion of potential mediators (subjective temporal distance, self-change), may further clarify the
role of construal and other mechanisms responsible for changes in appraisals of closure and
emotion. To the extent a reflexive mode of processing aligns with a coherence focus, the proposed
benefits of moving through the details and emotions of difficult experiences in order to move past
them suggests that a first-third-coherence focus sequence should progressively broaden the mental
landscape within which individuals contemplate unresolved event-memories, thereby increasing
closure and reducing emotional reactivity at recall. Conversely, then, a third-first-experience shift
should limit this mental scope to include mainly experiential elements, thereby restricting meaning
and intensifying memory-induced affect.
Study 3 Hypotheses
Due to the relative lack of literature examining the effects of imagery perspective and
pronoun shifts on closure, and in light of the intricate relationship amongst closure and emotion,
hypotheses were gleaned through research on imagery perspectives in isolation and their effects on
memory-induced emotion, with emphasis placed on the perspective individuals were instructed to
adopt last (third vs. first).
Hypothesis 1: Psychological closure and emotion. Appraisals of closure were predicted to
inversely correlate with appraisals of emotional valence, intensity, and reactivity upon recall, thus,
findings for closure were predicted to parallel those for emotion. Given a shift-to-third is expected
to foster a coherence focus, which is thought to support both experiential self-distancing and
conceptual self-integration (increasing psychological distance), then adding explicit instructions to
adopt a coherence focus to the shift-to-third sequence should produce ratings of greater closure and
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lower negative affect and emotional reactivity relative to all other groups, including the control
condition. Conversely, if a shift-to-first supports an experience focus, hence, experiential selfimmersion (decreasing distance), then adding this focus to the shift-to-first sequence should lead to
ratings of lower closure and higher negative affect and emotional reactivity than all other groups.
According to the self-salience view, the opposite pattern of findings should be observed,
with the shift-to-first condition reporting greater closure and lower negative emotionality, on
average, relative to the shift-to-third condition. In either case, the control group was expected to
produce the lowest mean ratings of closure and the highest mean ratings of negative affect and
emotional reactivity as compared to the other groups.
Hypothesis 2: Psychological closure and mediators. According to the self-distancing view
of imagery perspective, subjective temporal distance should mediate the effects of perspective
shifting and mental focus on closure, with a shift-to-third inciting greater distance (particularly for
those who adopt a coherence focus), and a shift-to-first inciting less distance (particularly for those
who use an experience focus). Per the self-integration view of imagery perspective, perceived selfchange should mediate these effects, with a shift-to-third prompting a greater focus on self-change
and a shift-to-first inciting a greater focus on self-stability.
Hypothesis 3: Psychological closure and emotion over time. The above effects were
expected to remain statistically meaningful 1-2 days following the intervention, and possibly more
pronounced due to the presence of determinants of distancing and closure (e.g., passage of time).
Hypotheses 4: Cognitive avoidance and event centrality. To the extent self-distancing
and self-integration, via abstract construal methods, promote adaptive self-reflection, and avoidance
is known to be a maladaptive approach to resolution, then those writing conditions that promote
engagement (first-person) followed by distance (third-person, coherence focus) were predicted to
incite ratings of less avoidance and greater identity centrality, relative to the other conditions.
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Study 3 Methods
Study 3 Design
This study employed a 2 (narrative perspective shift sequence: shift-to-first vs. shift-tothird) x 2 (mental focus: coherence vs. experience) repeated measures (time: intervention vs. 1-2
days later) experimental design with a control condition. A control condition was included to allow
for direct contrasts with the most common means of attempting to achieve resolution - focused
thinking. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four recall and writing conditions (narrative
perspective shift x mental focus) or the control condition (five groups).
Study 3 Participants
A total of 409 undergraduates participated in Part 1 of the study. Inclusion criteria consisted
of English as a primary language and the willingness to report on an unresolved event in a research
context. Twenty-two cases were removed a priori for incomplete participation, manipulation nonadherence, and/or failing to select an unresolved event. An additional 10 cases were removed for
extreme responding (+ 3 SDs) and/or excessive missingness (> 7%) on the main dependent
measures. A total of 377 participants adequately completed Part 1 of the study (83.9% female,
16.1% male, 0% other; Mage = 20.77 years, SD = 5.45, range = 17 - 57; 63.2% White/Caucasian,
12.2% Middle-Eastern, 8.3% Asian, 7.8% Multiethnic, 7.3% Black/African, 0.3% Hispanic/Latino,
1% other/not specified; 62.7% arts and social sciences majors; 27.7% natural sciences majors; 8.8%
business and economics majors; 0.8% other/not specified).
Of these, 13 individuals failed to complete Part 2, and an additional 13 were removed for
extreme responding and/or excessive missingness at Time 2, resulting in a final sample of 351
(85.5% female, 14.5% male, 0% other; Mage = 20.84, SD = 5.59, range = 17 - 57; 58.2% White/
Caucasian, 13.6% Multiethnic, 9.7% Middle-Eastern, 9.2% Asian, 6.7% Black/African, 0.3%
Hispanic/Latino, 0.8% other/not specified; 62.1% arts and social sciences majors; 28.7% natural
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sciences majors; 8.6% business and economics majors; 0.6% other/not specified; see Preliminary
Diagnostics below for more information on inclusion and exclusion criteria).
Study 3 Materials and Measures
Baseline emotion. In line with previous research (e.g., Ayduk & Kross, 2010), participants
provided baseline ratings of emotional reactivity, to be controlled in the analyses. They rated how
happy (1= very unhappy, 9 = very happy) and aroused (1 = calm; 9 = frenzied) they felt using the
valence and arousal subscales of the Self-Assessment Mannequin (SAM; Bradley & Lang, 1994), a
quick non-verbal measure of emotional reactivity (Appendix P). The SAM has demonstrated good
convergent validity with other measures of affect (see, Mehrabian & Russell, 1974).
Psychological closure. Psychological closure was assessed using the newly developed PCS
(Appendix G), a 42-item self-report measure of autobiographical event resolution. The PCS consists
of seven subscales: Freeing Finality (FF), Clear Understanding (CU), Felt Distance (FD), Emotional
Release (ER), Experiential Change (EC), Mental Liberation (ML), and Behavioural Deactivation
(BD). This scale has demonstrated good convergent validity, test-retest reliability (in the current
sample), r(349) = 0.86 [0.83, 0.89], p < .001, and internal consistency (see Study 2 Results): current
full scale α = .94 (Time 2 α = .96), and subscale α range = .80 to .92 (Time 2 α range = .85 to .95).
Emotion valence, intensity, and reactivity. State affect following the manipulation was
assessed using the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen,
1988; Appendix Q), which is comprised of two 10-item subscales: Positive Affect (PA; current
Time 1 α = .87; Time 2 α = .91) and Negative Affect (NA; Time 1 α = .84; Time 2 α = .89). This
measure prompts participants to rate the extent to which they feel certain emotions (e.g., upset,
proud) on a scale from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely). Three additional items that
employ 7-point Likert scales (drawn from Johnson et al., 1988; Rubin et al., 2003; Appendix R)
were also used to assess emotional valence, intensity, and reactivity upon recall. The validity of
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these items is derived from their demonstrated utility in numerous studies concerning recollective
memory (e.g., Boucher & Scoboria, 2015; D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2008; Rubin et al.,
2003; Scoboria et al., 2014).
Temporal and self-distance. Objective temporal distance was calculated using participants’
present age and estimated age at the time of the event. One item was used to assess subjective
temporal distance, or the felt distance of the event irrespective of when it was dated to have
occurred (per Libby & Eibach, 2011a; Ross & Wilson, 2002). Two items were used to assess the
degree of perceived self-change in relation to the event (adapted from A. Aron, E. Aron, &
Smollan, 1992; Crawley, 2010; Appendix S); these items were averaged to create an index of selfchange (Time 1 α = .84; Time 2 α = .81).
Manipulation checks. In addition to examiner reviews of participant narratives, participants
also rated the degree to which they felt they adhered to the narrative perspective and mental focus
instructions (adapted from Libby & Eibach, 2011a) along with the degree of difficulty in doing so
using 7-point Likert rating scales (adapted from Gu & Tse, 2016; Appendix T).
Cognitive avoidance. Ratings on two items (“When prompted to recall this experience: I
tried to avoid thinking about it” and “I tried to suppress (push away) my feelings about it”; 1 =
strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree) were averaged to create an avoidance index (Ayduk & Kross,
2010; Kross et al., 2012; Appendix U). Current Time 1 a = .87, and Time 2 a = .89.
Event centrality. The 7-item short form of the Centrality of Event Scale (CES; Berntsen &
Rubin, 2006b; Appendix K) measures how central an event is perceived to be in relation to one’s
identity and life story. Items (e.g., “I feel that event has become part of my identity”) are anchored 1
(totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree). The scale has good reliability (α = .88; current a = .89).
Open-ended questions. Two open-ended questions were included to allow participants the
option to further describe their event and/or provide feedback about the study (Appendix D).
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Demographics. Participants completed the open-response demographics questionnaire
(Appendix E).
Study 3 Procedure
This study comprised two parts: Part 1 (Time 1) entailed the narrative perspective shift and
mental focus manipulations in a campus laboratory, and Part 2 (Time 2) consisted of an online
survey with identical dependent measures that was completed 24 – 48 hours later (see Figure 3 for
an overview of the procedures). Participants provided informed consent prior to each Part 1 (via a
signed hard copy of the consent form with opportunities to seek clarification with the research
administrator) and Part 2 (via the submission of an online consent form). All procedures received
ethics clearance through the University of Windsor’s Research Ethics Board.

Figure 3. Illustration of procedures for Study 3: Effects of narrative perspective shift sequences and mental
focus on psychological closure and emotion. SAM = Self-Assessment Manikin. PANAS = Positive and
Negative Affect Schedule. CES = Centrality of Event Scale.
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During Part 1, participants were randomly assigned to one of five conditions in a 2
(narrative perspective shift sequence: shift-to-first vs. shift-to-third) x 2 (mental focus: coherence
vs. experience) repeated measures design with a control condition, which involved neither narrative
perspective shifting nor mental focus instructions. For the experimental conditions, the narrative
perspective shift instructions preceded mental focus instructions. After providing baseline ratings of
affect using the SAM, participants were prompted to retrieve a currently unresolved distressing
event that they were involved in and that occurred within the past 6 years but not in the last month
(see Appendix V for verbatim instructions). The time frame for event cues was provided as a
compromise amongst internal and external validity; it offered people a specified range within which
to select an event rather than tightly controlling the content and age of the event, thereby increasing
the generalizability of the findings without drastically altering the accessibility of both concrete and
abstract event elements.
Following event selection, participants were presented with the narrative perspective shift
instructions, which were adapted from Gu and Tse (2016) to include a statement of visual imagery
(derived from Libby et al., 2005) in an effort to strengthen manipulation adherence and allow for
more confident inferences regarding imagery perspective. Individuals in the shift-to-first condition
were exposed to the third-person imagery/pronoun instructions prior to the first-person instructions
(and vice versa for the shift-to-third condition). Following the narrative perspective shift
manipulation, individuals were presented with one of two mental focus instructions (coherence vs.
experience; Boucher & Scoboria, 2015; Libby & Eibach, 2011a; Appendix W), depending on their
assigned condition. Instructions pertained to the same event throughout. In line with Park et al.
(2016), those in the control condition were asked to “Please think about your event in a true and
honest manner for the next 15 minutes,” without instructions to adopt any perspective or mental
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focus. Groups were matched in terms of total time allotted for reflecting on the event by virtue of
the survey auto-advancing after 15 minutes.
All participants then provided ratings on the main dependent measures (PCS, PANAS,
emotional valence, intensity, and reaction), potential mediating variables (subjective temporal
distance, self-consistency), manipulation checks, exploratory measures (cognitive avoidance, CES),
and optional open-ended questions about their event and their experience in the study. One day
following the successful completion of Part 1, participants were invited to participate in Part 2,
which consisted of an online survey regarding the same event and containing the same measures.
They were given another day to complete Part 2 of the study.
Study 3 Results
Descriptive statistics, including sample sizes (n), means (M), standard deviations (SD), and
associated 95% confidence intervals (CIs) for the PCS, aspects of emotion, and exploratory
variables are provided for all narrative perspective shift by mental focus conditions along with the
control condition. In line with Cumming (2014), interpretations of statistical meaning were derived
from mean differences, unbiased standardized effect sizes (dunb), and 95% CIs, which are more
conducive to transparent reporting and accurate interpretation. This analytical strategy also aligns
with prior works that investigated mental focus (Boucher & Scoboria, 2015; 2019). Where more
complex statistical procedures (i.e., multiple linear regressions, mediation models) were used, α a
priori was set at .05, corresponding to a 95% CI.
Preliminary Diagnostics
Manipulation fidelity. Prior to the main analyses, participants’ narratives were reviewed
for manipulation adherence by independent raters (i.e., to verify selection of an unresolved event,
reference to the same event at both time points, use of specified pronouns and mental foci), with
high agreement, k = 0.95. A coding scheme ranging from 1 (total non-adherence) to 4 (total
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adherence) was applied to indicate manipulation fidelity. Using a conservative approach to
elimination, only those narratives with a code of 1 and a perspective shift difference of 0 or 1 were
removed. It was judged that 94.62% of the Part 1 sample sufficiently followed the narrative
perspective shift and mental focus instructions. A total of 22 participants (5.38%) were excluded
due to manipulation non-adherence; of these, one did not select an unresolved event, and one did
not report on the same event for Part 2.
Manipulation adherence was also assessed using the self-rated narrative perspective and
mental focus check items. Results indicated manipulation fidelity for the first-person narrative
perspective, M = 6.12 [5.95, 6.28], SD = 1.23, and third-person narrative perspective, M = 5.45
[5.24, 5.66], SD = 1.57 (scores > 4 were deemed sufficient). First-person adherence ratings were
statistically meaningfully higher, on average, relative to third-person adherence ratings, Mdiff = 0.67
[0.40, 0.94], d = 0.47 [0.28, 0.66]. Difficulty with narrative perspective adherence was also
analysed: Participants indicated greater difficulty, on average, with using a third-person narrative
perspective, M = 3.78 [3.55, 4.01], SD = 1.80, relative to a first-person narrative perspective, M =
2.06 [1.89, 2.23], SD = 1.34, Mdiff = 1.72 [1.44, 2.00], dunb = 1.08, [0.89, 1.27]. Finally, mental
focus adherence ratings suggested fidelity for coherence and experience focus conditions: M = 5.13
[4.88, 5.37], SD = 1.38, and M = 4.88 [4.60, 5.15], SD = 1.55, respectively, with no statistically
meaningful difference amongst conditions, Mdiff = 0.25 [-0.11, 0.61], dunb = 0.17 [-0.08, 0.42].
Of those participants who also completed Part 2 (N = 366), two were removed for failing to
report on the same event. The remaining cases were found to have completed Part 2 within the
allotted timeframe (< 2.5 days following Part 1), M = 1.30 days [1.26, 1.33], SD = 0.38. In total,
364 participants completed the entire study and satisfactorily met a priori requirements.
Missingness. For Part 1, missing values analyses (MVA) for the PCS and PANAS revealed
that missing data were missing completely random, Little’s MCAR x2(3120) = 3212.04, p = .123,
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with no items exceeding 0.5% missingness. The same was true for Part 2 responses, Little’s MCAR
x2(3575) = 3639.34, p = .222, however, five Part 2 cases were removed for excessive missingness
ranging from 7% to 36.7%. The remaining cases did not exceed 2.1% missingness. Missing data
were imputed using expectation maximization (to allow for additional PCS model testing). Eight
cases were removed for extreme responding on the PCS (> 3.0 SDs on either side of the mean).
Final sample and power. In all, there were a total of 377 participants who adequately
completed Part 1 (original N = 409; total exclusions = 7.82%), and 351 participants who adequately
completed both Parts 1 and 2 (original N = 364; total exclusions = 3.57%). Group contrasts
involving the PCS and PANAS were conducted using the full Part 1 sample and the Part 1
subsample (who also completed Part 2), indicating similar main findings.
In addition to a sufficiently large sample size, maximization of power was attempted via the
maintenance of a controlled experimental environment, inclusion of manipulation checks, analysis
of narratives by independent raters, use of a conservative approach to a priori exclusions, and
screening for statistical assumption adherence (see below). Nevertheless, given Time 2 analyses
were ancillary to those for Time 1, the demographics and main findings were similar for the full and
sub samples in Part 1, and that a larger sample supports more confident reporting when covariates
are included, the decision was made to retain the 26 cases who did not complete or did not
sufficiently complete Part 2 for the main Time 1 analyses.
Statistical assumptions. For group contrasts with covariates (SAM ratings, gender,
narrative perspective shift difficulty ratings), visual inspection of scatterplots (using loess lines)
indicated linear relationships among each covariate and the PCS for each cell of the design; a
comparison of the two-way ANCOVA model with and without interaction terms indicated
homogeneity of regression slopes, F(5, 341) = 0.84, p = .519; visual inspection of studentized
residuals by unstandardized predicted values indicated homoscedasticity; Levene’s test of
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homogeneity of variance indicated that the error variance was identical for all combinations of
narrative perspective shift sequences, mental foci, and the covariates, p = .235; there were no
extreme values for one or more of the covariates (leverage values < 0.02; below 0.20), influential
observations (Cook’s Distance values < 0.04; below 1), and the data were determined to be
normally distributed based the Shapiro-Wilks test (all values for each level of each independent
variable were not statistically significant, ps > .05), and plots of standardized by studentized
residuals (points aligned on the diagonal).
With respect to MRA assumptions, the study design and Durbin-Watson statistic (1.66)
indicated independence of residuals; visual inspection of studentized residuals by unstandardized
predicted values indicated that the conditions and possible mediating variables (subjective temporal
distance, self-change) were each collectively linearly related to the PCS composite and the residuals
were approximately equal for all predicted values (reflecting homoscedasticity); and the partial
regression plot indicated an approximate linear relationship between each potential mediator and
the PCS. Tolerance values ranged from 0.96 (subjective temporal distance) to 0.99 (self-change;
above 0.10) and correlational analyses indicated absence of multicollinearity (all rs < |0.15|; below
|0.70|). There were no leverage points (values < 0.02), influential observations (Cook’s < 0.04), and
the histograms (M = 0, SD = 1) and residual plots indicated the data were normally distributed.
Event Types. The unresolved events selected by individuals were categorized into the
following groups: relationships/self, health/existence, education/training, occupation/finance,
travel/relocation, and other (see Table 12 for proportions). It was possible for a single narrative to
be coded under multiple categories. Across groups, the majority of events were relational and/or
self-relevant in nature (e.g., break-up, identity change; 73%) and/or regarded threats to health or life
(e.g., diagnoses, abuse; 46%). The types of events reported within each condition were similar.
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Table 12
Proportions of Unresolved Event Types by Experimental Group and Overall
Shift to First

Shift to Third

Control
(n = 134)

Experience
(n = 64)

Coherence
(n = 62)

Experience
(n = 57)

Coherence
(n = 60)

Total
(N = 377)

Relationships/Self-image

0.63

0.78

0.78

0.78

0.74

0.73

Health/Existence

0.46

0.45

0.44

0.47

0.44

0.46

Education/Training

0.04

0.09

0.06

0.05

0.03

0.05

Occupation/Finance

0.01

0.06

0.06

0.07

0.08

0.05

Travel/Relocation

0.01

0.30

0.17

0.20

0.19

0.15

Other

0.01

0.01

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.01

Notes. Proportions of event types were calculated out of the total number of events (n) within each group. Events could
be coded under multiple categories, thus, group totals may not add to 100%.

Effects of Narrative Perspective Shifting and Mental Focus on Closure
Bivariate correlations were used to examine control factors suggested in prior research:
baseline state affect (Ayduk & Kross, 2010), gender (Beike & Wirth-Beaumont, 2005), and selfreported difficulty in adhering to the manipulation instructions (Gu & Tse, 2016). Statistically
significant correlations were found for the PCS composite and each the SAM composite, r(375) = 0.25 [-0.34, -0.15], p < .001; gender, r(375) = 0.21 [0.11, 0.31], p < .001; and difficulty r(375) = 0.12 [-0.22, -0.02], p = .012. Higher closure ratings corresponded with lower SAM ratings (pleasure
and arousal), lower difficulty ratings, and with identifying as male relative to female (there were no
other gender identifiers provided by participants). Memory age (a slightly more objective indicator
of distance), was calculated using participants’ current age and their estimated age at the time the
event occurred. The age of memories were similar across groups (all CIs included zero). Hence,
SAM scores, gender, and difficulty were controlled in the main analyses. See Table 13 for
descriptive statistics on memory age, the PCS composite, and the PCS subscales by group.
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Table 13
Memory Age and Psychological Closure Scale (PCS) and Subscale Scores by Group
Shift-to-First
Control
(n = 134)

Experience
(n = 64)
SD

Shift-to-Third

Coherence
(n = 62)
M [95% CI]

Experience
(n = 57)
SD

M [95% CI]

SD

Coherence
(n = 60)

M [95% CI]

SD

M [95% CI]

M [95% CI]

SD

Memory Age

2.57
[2.15, 3.00]

2.78

2.48
2.27
2.32
2.27
2.72
2.13
2.60
2.72
[1.85, 3.10]
[1.68, 2.94]
[2.06, 3.38]
[1.96, 3.24]

PCS-Full

3.32
[3.16, 3.48]

0.84

3.67
0.97
3.66
0.92
3.23
0.93
3.38
1.02
[3.44, 3.90]
[3.42, 3.90]
[2.98, 3.48]
[3.14, 3.61]

PCS-FF

2.65
[2.45, 2.86]

1.11

3.01
1.27
2.91
1.27
2.50
1.15
2.80
1.45
[2.72, 3.31]
[2.60, 3.21]
[2.18, 2.82]
[2.49, 3.10]

PCS-CU

4.42
[4.16, 4.67]

1.47

4.85
1.38
4.93
1.33
4.59
1.42
4.48
1.44
[4.50, 5.19]
[4.57, 5.29]
[4.21, 4.96]
[4.13, 8.84]

PCS-FD

3.13
[2.89, 3.38]

1.49

2.97
2.88
2.73
2.56
2.79
2.96
2.82
2.92
[2.64, 3.30]
[2.38, 3.07]
[2.43, 3.15]
[2.48, 3.16]

PCS-ER

2.28
[2.08, 2.48]

0.96

2.66
1.23
2.98
1.26
2.27
1.02
2.52
1.24
[2.37, 2.96]
[2.68, 3.28]
[1.95, 2.59]
[2.22, 2.82]

PCS-EC

3.96
[3.71, 4.22]

1.39

3.88
1.47
3.79
1.36
3.83
1.49
3.77
1.42
[3.51, 4.24]
[3.42, 4.16]
[3.44, 4.22]
[3.40, 4.14]

PCS-ML

3.89
[3.64, 4.14]

1.42

4.60
1.41
4.79
1.44
3.80
1.50
4.17
1.63
[4.24, 4.95]
[4.42, 5.15]
[3.41, 4.18]
[3.80, 4.53]

PCS-BD

3.78
[3.51, 4.05]

1.44

4.54
1.44
4.42
1.56
3.73
1.48
3.77
1.54
[4.16, 4.91]
[4.03, 4.81]
[3.32, 4.14]
[3.39, 4.16]

Notes. FF = Freeing Finality; CU = Clear Understanding; FD = Felt Distance; ER = Emotional Release; EC =
Experiential Change; ML = Mental Liberation; BD = Behavioural Deactivation. Reference group is the shift-to-first
condition. Means are adjusted, controlling for baseline affect, gender, and narrative perspective difficulty.

Group contrasts based on adjusted means indicated a statistically meaningful effect of
narrative perspective shifting on PCS ratings: The shift-to-first condition reported higher ratings of
closure, on average, relative to the shift-to-third condition, Mdiff = 0.37 [0.13, 0.61], dunb = 0.39
[0.13, 0.64], and the control condition, Mdiff = 0.35 [0.13, 0.57], dunb = 0.39 [0.15, 0.64], while the
shift-to-third condition did not statistically differ from the control condition, Mdiff = 0.06 [-0.17,
0.29], dunb = 0.07 [-0.19, 0.32]. There were no statistically meaningful effects of mental focus on
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closure, Mdiff = 0.06 [-0.17, 0.31], dunb = 0.07 [-0.18, 0.32]. Within the experience focus condition,
the shift-to-first group indicated statistically meaningfully higher average ratings of closure relative
to the shift-to-third group, Mdiff = 0.44 [0.10, 0.78], dunb = 0.46 [0.10, 0.82], and the control group,
Mdiff = 0.35 [0.09, 0.61], dunb = 0.40 [0.09, 0.69]. Within the coherence focus condition, ratings of
closure amongst narrative perspective shift groups did not meaningfully differ, Mdiff = 0.28 [-0.07,
0.63], dunb = 0.29 [-0.07, 0.64], however the shift-to-first-coherence group indicated higher average
ratings of closure relative to the control group, Mdiff = 0.34 [0.08, 0.60], dunb = 0.39 [0.09, 0.69]. All
other group contrasts approximated zero (CIs included zero). Refer to Figure 4 for an illustration of
these effects.

Figure 4. Psychological Closure Scale (PCS) composite mean ratings by experimental condition. The scale
ranges from 1 (low closure) to 7 (high closure), hence the vertical axis represents the low-to-mid segment of
the full scale range. Error bars indicate 95% confidence.

Analysis of the PCS subscales (see Table 14) revealed that narrative perspective shift effects
on ratings of closure were primarily driven by statistically meaningful differences for the Freeing
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Finality (FF), Emotional Release (ER), Behavioural Deactivation (BD), and Mental Liberation
(ML) subscales. The shift-to-first condition indicated higher ratings on the FF, ER, BD, and ML
subscales, on average, relative to the shift-to-third condition. The shift-to-first condition also
reported higher average ratings than the control condition across subscales, save for Experiential
Change (EC). There were no statistically meaningful differences amongst shift-to-first and shift-tothird conditions on the following PCS subscales: Clear Understanding (CU), Experiential Change
(EC), and Felt Distance (FD). Refer to Figure 5 for an illustration of these effects.

Table 14
Mean Differences, Effect Sizes, and Confidence Intervals for the Psychological Closure Scale
(PCS) and Subscales Amongst Narrative Perspective Shift and Control Conditions
PCS Composite and Subscales

Contrast:
Shift-to-First vs.

PCS Composite

Freeing Finality (FF)

Clear Understanding (CU)

Felt Distance (FD)

Emotional Release ER)

Experiential Change (EC)

Mental Liberation (ML)

Behavioural Deactivation (BD)

Mdiff [95% CI]

dunb [95% CI]

Shift-to-Third

0.37 [0.13, 0.61]

0.39 [0.13, 0.64]*

Control

0.35 [0.13, 0.57]

0.39 [0.15, 0.64]*

Shift-to-Third

0.32 [0.02, 0.64]

0.26 [0.02, 0.53]*

Control

0.31 [0.03, 0.59]

0.27 [0.02, 0.51]*

Shift-to-Third

0.22 [-0.13, 0.57]

0.16 [-0.09, 0.41]

Control

0.41 [0.07, 0.75]

0.29 [0.05, 0.53]*

Shift-to-Third

-0.09 [-0.43, 0.26]

-0.06 [-0.32, 0.19]

Control

-0.32 [-0.63, -0.02]

-0.26 [-0.50, -0.02]*

Shift-to-Third

0.41 [0.11, 0.71]

0.35 [0.09, 0.60]*

Control

0.54 [0.27, 0.81]

0.49 [0.24, 0.74]*

Shift-to-Third

0.04 [-0.32, 0.40]

0.03 [-0.22, 0.28]

Control

-0.13 [-0.47, 0.21]

-0.09 [-0.33, 0.15]

Shift-to-Third

0.70 [0.32, 1.08]

0.47 [0.21, 0.72]*

Control

0.81 [0.46, 1.16]

0.57 [0.32, 0.82]*

Shift-to-Third

0.73 [0.35, 1.11]

0.49 [0.23, 0.74]*

Control

0.71 [0.35, 1.07]

0.48 [0.24, 0.73]*

Notes. Reference group is the shift-to-first condition. Calculations are based on adjusted means, controlling for baseline
affect, gender, and narrative perspective difficulty. * indicates statistically meaningful (CIs do not include zero).
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Figure 5. Psychological Closure Scale (PCS) subscale mean ratings by narrative perspective shift condition.
The scale ranges from 1 (low closure) to 7 (high closure). Error bars indicate 95% confidence.

The effects of narrative perspective shift sequences on each of the PCS subscales were then
examined within each mental focus condition, using shift-to-first as the reference group (refer to
Table 15). Within the experience focus condition, the shift-to-first group indicated statistically
meaningfully higher average ratings than the shift-to-third group on the FF, ER, ML, and BD
subscales, and the control group on the FF, CU, ER, ML, and BD subscales. Within the coherence
focus condition, the shift-to-first group reported higher average ratings than the shift-to-third group
on the ML and BD subscales, higher average ratings than the control group on the CU, ER, ML,
and BD subscales, and lower average ratings than the control group on the FD subscale. All other
group contrasts were null.
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Table 15
Mean Differences, Effect Sizes, and Confidence Intervals for the Psychological Closure Scale and
Subscales Amongst Narrative Perspective Shift Sequences Within Each Mental Focus Condition
Experience Focus

PCS-Full

PCS-FF

PCS-CU

PCS-FD

PCS-ER

PCS-EC

PCS-ML

PCS-BD

Coherence Focus

Contrast:
Shift-to-First
vs.
Shift-to-Third

Mdiff [95% CI]

dunb [95% CI]

Mdiff [95% CI]

dunb [95% CI]

0.44 [0.10, 0.78]

0.46 [0.10, 0.82]*

0.28 [-0.07, 0.63]

0.29 [-0.07, 0.64]

Control

0.35 [0.09, 0.61]

0.40 [0.09, 0.69]*

0.34 [0.08, 0.60]

0.39 [0.09, 0.69]*

Shift-to-Third

0.49 [0.07, 0.92]

0.42 [0.05, 0.78]*

0.02 [-0.43, 0.47]

0.02 [-0.34, 0.37]

Control

0.39 [0.05, 0.73]

0.34 [0.04, 0.64]*

0.21 [-0.13, 0.56]

0.19 [-0.11, 0.49]

Shift-to-Third

0.28 [-0.23, 0.78]

0.20 [-0.16, 0.55]

0.40 [-0.09, 0.90]

0.29 [-0.07, 0.65]

Control

0.49 [0.06, 0.92]

0.34 [0.05, 0.64]*

0.50 [0.07, 0.93]

0.35 [0.05, 0.65]*

Shift-to-Third

0.17 [-0.35, 0.69]

0.12 [-0.24, 0.48]

-0.22 [-0.69, 0.24]

-0.17 [-0.53, 0.18]

Control

-0.18 [-0.61, 0.26]

-0.12 [-0.42, 0.18]

-0.55 [-0.96, 0.13]

-0.40 [-0.70, -0.10]*

Shift-to-Third

0.43 [0.02, 0.84]

0.38 [0.02, 0.74]*

0.43 [-0.01, 0.87]

0.35 [-0.01, 0.70]

Control

0.39 [0.08, 0.71]

0.37 [0.07, 0.67]*

0.62 [0.30, 0.94]

0.59 [0.28, 0.89]*

Shift-to-Third

0.04 [-0.49, 0.58]

0.03 [-0.33, 0.39]

-0.03 [-0.52,0.47]

-0.02 [-0.38,0.33]

Control

-0.02 [-0.44, 0.41]

-0.01 [-0.31, 0.29]

-0.12 [-0.53, 0.30]

-0.08 [-0.39, 0.22]

Shift-to-Third

0.81 [0.29, 1.33]

0.56 [0.19, 0.92]*

0.59 [0.06, 1.13]

0.40 [0.04, 0.75]*

Control

0.64 [0.22, 1.06]

0.45 [0.15, 0.75]*

0.75 [0.33, 1.18]

0.54 [0.23, 0.84]*

Shift-to-Third

0.69 [0.17, 1.21]

0.48 [0.12, 0.84]*

0.59 [0.03, 1.14]

0.38 [0.02, 0.73]*

Control

0.66 [0.24, 1.08]

0.47 [0.17, 0.77]*

0.52 [0.09, 0.95]

0.36 [0.06, 0.67]*

Notes. PCS = Psychological Closure Scale; FF = Freeing Finality; CU = Clear Understanding; FD = Felt Distance; ER
= Emotional Release; EC = Experiential Change; ML = Mental Liberation; BD = Behavioural Deactivation. Reference
group is the shift-to-first condition. Calculations are based on adjusted means, controlling for baseline affect, gender,
and narrative perspective difficulty. * indicates statistically meaningful (CIs do not include zero).

Mediation Analyses Involving Subjective Distance and Self-Change
Descriptive statistics for subjective temporal distance and self-change by experimental
condition are presented in Table 16.
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Table 16
Mean Ratings of Subjective Temporal Distance and Self-Change by Experimental Condition
Shift-to-First
Control
(n = 125)
M [95%
CI]

Experience
(n = 57)

Shift-to-Third

Coherence
(n = 58)

Experience
(n = 54)

Coherence
(n = 57)

SD

M [95% CI]

SD

M [95% CI]

SD

M [95% CI]

SD M [95% CI] SD

Sub. Temp.
Distance

3.33
[3.04, 3.63]

1.92

2.59
[2.17, 3.01]

1.69

2.46
1.47
[2.03, 2.90]

3.07
[2.63, 3.52]

1.70

2.60
1.61
[2.17, 3.03]

SelfChangec

6.66
[6.21, 7.10]

2.56

6.36
[5.73, 6.99]

2.46

6.14
2.45
[5.49, 6.80]

6.68
[6.02, 7.35]

2.58

6.24
2.76
[5.60, 6.89]

Notes. c = composite using two items pertaining to self-change. Sub. Temp. = subjective temporal.

Subjective temporal distance. Based on prior literature (Gu & Tse, 2016), subjective
temporal distance was explored as a possible mediating variable. Due to the fact mental focus was
not significantly related to PCS composite ratings, these analyses centered on narrative perspective
shifting effects. To test whether subjective distance mediated the relationship between narrative
perspective shifting and closure, the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2013; Hayes & Preacher,
2014) was used. The PROCESS macro uses ordinary least squares and logistic regression path
analysis to estimate direct and indirect effects. Inferences were based on 95% bias-corrected CIs,
bootstrapped using 5000 samples.
In a mediator model, the total effect represents the effect of narrative perspective shifting
on PCS without the mediator (path c). The relative direct effect represents the effect of narrative
perspective shifting on PCS after including the mediator (path c’). The total relative indirect effect
represents the effect of the mediator on the effectiveness of narrative perspective shifting to PCS,
which can be calculated as the total effect minus the direct effect.
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Narrative perspective shift sequence was entered as a multicategorical predictor variable (X;
coded per the indicator coding system, with the shift-to-first condition set as the reference group to
remain consistent with previously reported group contrasts). Psychological closure (PCS composite)
was entered as the outcome variable (Y), and subjective temporal distance was entered as the
mediator (M), accounting for the same covariates as in the above analyses. Refer to Table 17 for all
regression coefficients, t scores, and p values.

Table 17
Statistics for the Model Testing the Mediating Role of Subjective Temporal Distance on the
Relationship Between Narrative Perspective Shifting and Psychological Closure
Contrast
Path a
b [95% CI]
t(371)
p
Path b
b [95% CI]
t(370)
p
Path c
b [95% CI]
t(371)
p
Path c’
b [95% CI]
t(370)
p
Indirect, a*b
b [95% CI]
SE

Shift-to-First vs.
Shift-to-Third

Shift-to-First vs.
Control

Shift-to-Third vs.
Control

0.31 [-0.14, 0.75]
1.37
.173

0.81 [0.37, 1.25]
3.64
< .001

0.50 [0.08, 0.93]
2.32
.021

Subjective Distance
on Closure

0.19 [0.14, 0.24]
7.42
< .001
-0.27 [-0.50, -0.04]
-2.35
.019

-0.32 [-0.54, -0.09]
-2.73
.007

-0.04 [-0.26, 0.18]
-0.37
.715

-0.33 [-0.55, -0.12]
-3.04
.003

-0.47 [-0.68, -0.25]
-4.25
< .001

-0.14 [-0.34, 0.07]
-1.28
.202

0.06 [-0.02, 0.15]
0.04

0.16 [0.07, 0.28]
0.05

0.10 [0.01, 0.21]
0.05

Notes. Path a represents the effect of narrative perspective shifting on subjective temporal distance. Path b represents
the effect of subjective temporal distance on closure, using the Psychological Closure Scale (PCS) composite score.
Path c represents the total effect of narrative perspective shifting on closure without subjective temporal distance
included in the model. Path c’ represents the relative direct effect of narrative perspective shifting on closure, with
subjective temporal distance included as a mediator in the model. Bolded text indicates statistical significance at a < .05
and CIs that do not include zero.
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Results indicated that ratings of subjective temporal distance statistically significantly
predicted ratings of psychological closure (path b). For the shift-to-first versus shift-to-third
condition contrast, significant total effects (path c) and relative direct effects (path c’) were found,
with the shift-to-first condition reporting higher ratings of closure relative to the shift-to-third
condition. The shift-to-first versus control condition contrast revealed that narrative perspective
shifting significantly predicted ratings of subjective temporal distance (path a), along with
significant total effects (path c), relative direct effects (path c’), and relative indirect effects (path
a*b). Compared to the control condition, the shift-to-first condition reported less subjective
temporal distance and greater closure. The shift-to-third vs. control condition contrast yielded a
significant effect of narrative perspective shifting on subjective temporal distance (path a) and a
significant relative indirect effect (path a*b), with the shift-to-third condition reporting less
subjective distance and greater closure, than the control condition. Refer to Figure 6 for an
illustration of this mediation model and findings.
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Figure 6. Mediation model with narrative perspective shift condition (shift-to-first, shift-to-third, control) as
the categorical predictor (X), psychological closure as the outcome (Y), and subjective temporal distance as
the mediator (M). X1 denotes the contrast amongst shift-to-first and shift-to-third conditions; X2 denotes the
contrast amongst shift-to-first and control conditions. Path a represents the effect of shift condition (X1, X2)
on subjective temporal distance, path b represents the relationship amongst subjective temporal distance and
psychological closure, and paths c and c’ represent the total and relative direct effects of shift condition (X1,
X2) on psychological closure (Y), respectively. e = error. * = statistical significance at a < .05; ** =
statistical significance at a < .01; and *** = statistical significance at a < .001.

According to Hayes and Preacher (2014), evidence that at least one relative indirect effect is
different from zero supports the conclusion that M (subjective temporal distance) mediates the
effect of X (narrative perspective shifting) on Y (psychological closure). However, in terms of the
contrast amongst shift-to-first and control conditions, findings revealed a positive difference in
subjective temporal distance (positive path a) and a negative difference in closure (negative paths c
and c’). Further, greater subjective temporal distance corresponded to greater closure (positive path
b). Finally, the total effect of shift condition on closure (path c) was greater than the direct effect
(path c’). This pattern of effects, wherein the relative direct and indirect effects have opposite signs,
is suggestive of inconsistent mediation (Davis, 1985). That is, the magnitude of the relationship
between narrative perspective shifting and closure became larger when subjective temporal distance
was included in the model, thus, the mediating role of subjective temporal distance was not
supported.
Self-Change. The same analyses were conducted with self-change entered as the mediator
(per Libby & Eibach, 2011b). Two items pertaining to self-change were averaged, r(375) = 0.71
[0.62, 0.80], p < .001, to create a self-change composite. Refer to Table 18 for all regression
coefficients, t scores, and p values.
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Table 18
Statistics for the Mediation Model Testing the Mediating Role of Self-Change on the Relationship
Between Narrative Perspective Shifting and Closure
Shift-to-First vs.
Shift-to-First vs.
Shift-to-Third vs.
Subjective Distance
Contrast
Shift-to-Third
Control
Control
on Closure
Path a
b [95% CI]
0.21 [-0.46, 0.87]
0.40 [-0.26, 1.06]
0.20 [-0.44, 0.84]
t(371)
0.61
1.20
0.61
p
.543
.230
.545
Path b
b [95% CI]
0.05 [0.02, 0.09]
t(370)
2.85
p
.005
Path c
b [95% CI]
-0.27[-0.50, -0.04]
-0.32 [-0.54, -0.09]
-0.04 [-0.26, 0.18]
t(371)
-2.35
-2.73
-0.37
p
= .019
.007
.715
Path c’
b [95% CI]
-0.29 [-0.51, -0.06]
-0.34 [-0.56, -0.11]
-0.05 [-0.27, 0.17]
t(370)
-2.46
-2.93
-0.46
p
.014
.004
.647
Indirect, a*b
b [95% CI]
0.01 [-0.03, 0.06]
0.02 [-0.01, 0.07]
0.01 [-0.02, 0.05]
SE
0.02
0.02
0.02
Notes. Path a represents the effect of narrative perspective shifting on self-change. Path b represents the effect of selfchange on closure, using the Psychological Closure Scale (PCS) composite score. Paths c represents the total effect of
narrative perspective shifting on closure without self-change included in the model. Path c’ represents the relative direct
effect of narrative perspective shifting on closure, with self-change included as a mediator in the model. Bolded text
indicates statistical significance at a < .05 and CIs that do not include zero.

Findings revealed that ratings of self-change statistically significantly predicted ratings of
closure, with greater self-change corresponding to greater closure. For all group contrasts, narrative
perspective shifting did not predict ratings of self-change. Finally, all relative indirect effects
approximated zero, hence, ratings of self-change did not mediate the relationship amongst narrative
perspective shifting and closure (refer to Figure 7).

96

Figure 7. Mediation model with narrative perspective shift condition (shift-to-first, shift-to-third, control) as
the categorical predictor (X), psychological closure as the outcome (Y), and self-change as the mediator (M).
X1 denotes the contrast amongst shift-to-first and shift-to-third conditions, and X2 denotes the contrast
amongst shift-to-first and control conditions. Path a represents the effect of shift condition (X1, X2) on selfchange, Path b represents the relationship amongst self-change and psychological closure, and Paths c and c’
represent the total and relative direct effects of shift condition (X1, X2) on psychological closure,
respectively. e = error. * = statistical significance at a < .05; ** = statistical significance at a < .01; and ***
= statistical significance at a < .001.

Closure Ratings Over Time
PCS ratings for Parts 1 and 2 (time delay, M = 1.30 days, [1.26, 1.33], SD = 0.38) were
compared using repeated measures contrasts (see Table 19). Results indicated a main effect of time,
Mdiff = 0.30 [0.24, 0.36], dunb = 0.30 [0.23, 0.37], however, the magnitude of the effect for the shiftto-first condition was slightly larger than that for the shift-to-third condition, as was the effect for
the experience focus condition relative to the coherence focus condition (all effects were in the
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small-to-medium range). Mean closure ratings statistically meaningfully increased for those in each
experimental writing condition, whereas the control condition indicated no change over time.

Table 19
Psychological Closure Scale Ratings from Time 1 to Time 2 by Narrative Perspective Shift and
Mental Focus
Condition

Time 1

Time 2

Difference from Time 1 to Time 2

M [95% CI]

SD

M [95% CI]

SD

Mdiff [95% CI]

d [95% CI]

Shift-to-First (n = 115)

3.65 [3.48, 3.82]

0.95

4.05 [3.85, 4.23]

1.08

0.40 [0.20, 0.60]

0.40 [0.22, 0.57]*

Shift-to-Third (n = 111)

3.28 [3.10, 3.47]

0.98

3.62 [3.42, 3.82]

1.02

0.34 [0.15, 0.53]

0.34 [0.14, 0.53]*

Experience (n = 111)

3.43 [3.26, 3.60]

0.97

3.86 [3.67, 4.04]

1.08

0.42 [0.22, 0.62]

0.41 [0.21, 0.61]*

Coherence (n = 115)

3.51 [3.34, 3.67]

0.96

3.81 [3.62, 3.99]

1.04

0.30 [0.11, 0.49]

0.30 [0.11, 0.50]*

Control (n = 125)

3.31 [3.15, 3.48]

0.85

3.49 [3.31, 3.68]

1.02

0.19 [0.00, 0.37]

0.20 [0.00, 0.39]

Notes. Adjusted means, sphericity assumed. Psychological Closure Scale (PCS) ranges from 1 to 7, with higher scores
indicating greater closure. Time between sessions was 1-2 days. * denotes statistically meaningful (CIs do not include
zero).

Closure at Time 2. As with Time 1, at Time 2, the shift-to-first condition reported
statistically meaningfully higher average ratings of closure, relative to the shift-to-third condition,
Mdiff = 0.43 [0.15, 0.71], dunb = 0.41 [0.14, 0.67], and the control condition, Mdiff = 0.56 [0.29, 0.83],
dunb = 0.53 [0.27, 0.79]. Mental focus did not affect ratings of closure, Mdiff = 0.05 [-0.23, 0.33],
dunb = 0.05 [-0.21, 0.31], however, each the experience focus condition and the coherence focus
condition reported greater closure, on average, relative to the control condition: Mdiff = 0.37 [0.10,
0.64], dunb = 0.35 [0.09, 0.61], and Mdiff = 0.32 [0.06, 0.58], dunb = 0.31 [0.05, 0.56], respectively.
The shift-to-first-experience group provided statistically meaningfully higher closure
ratings, on average, than the shift-to-third-experience group, Mdiff = 0.42 [0.05, 0.80], dunb = 0.43
[0.06, 0.80], the shift-to-third-coherence group, Mdiff = 0.39 [0.03, 0.76], dunb = 0.39 [0.02, 0.76],
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and the control group, Mdiff = 0.57 [0.23, 0.91], dunb = 0.56 [0.24, 0.87]. The shift-to-first-coherence
group also provided higher average closure ratings than the control group, Mdiff = 0.41 [0.06, 0.75],
dunb = 0.36 [0.04, 0.67]. All other group contrasts approximated zero (see Figure 8).

Figure 8. Psychological Closure Scale (PCS) adjusted mean ratings by experimental group. The scale ranges
from 1 (low closure) to 7 (high closure), hence the virtical axis represents the low-to-mid segment of the full
scale range. Error bars indicate 95% confidence.

Analysis of PCS subscales at Time 2 (see Table 20) replicated those found at Time 1, with
the addition of narrative perspective shifting effects on the CU subscale. In all, the shift-to-first
condition reported statistically meaningfully higher ratings of closure on the FF, CU, ER, ML, and
BD subscales, on average, relative to the shift-to-third and control conditions. There were no
meaningful differences between shift-to-first and shift-to-third conditions on the EC and FD
subscales. The shift-to-third and control conditions indicated similar ratings across subscales of the
PCS (CIs included zero).
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Table 20
Time 2 Mean Differences, Effect Sizes, and Confidence Intervals for Psychological Closure Scale
and Subscale Ratings Amongst Narrative Perspective Shift and Control Conditions
PCS Composite and Subscales
PCS Composite

Freeing Finality (FF)

Clear Understanding (CU)

Felt Distance (FD)

Emotional Release (ER)

Experiential Change (EC)

Mental Liberation (ML)

Behavioural Deactivation (BD)

Contrast:
Shift-to-First vs.
Shift-to-Third

Mdiff [95% CI]

dunb [95% CI]

0.43 [0.15, 0.71]

0.41 [0.14, 0.67]*

Control

0.56 [0.29, 0.83]

0.53 [0.27, 0.79]*

Shift-to-Third

0.39 [0.04, 0.74]

0.29 [0.03, 0.55]*

Control

0.49 [0.15, 0.83]

0.37 [0.11, 0.62]*

Shift-to-Third

0.60 [0.24, 0.96]

0.44 [0.17, 0.70]*

Control

0.46 [0.09, 0.82]

0.32 [0.06, 0.57]*

Shift-to-Third

0.20 [-0.19, 0.59]

0.13 [-0.13, 0.40]

Control

0.26 [-0.13, 0.65]

0.17 [-0.09, 0.42]

Shift-to-Third

0.66 [0.29, 1.03]

0.46 [0.20, 0.72]*

Control

0.84 [0.48, 1.20]

0.59 [0.33, 0.85]*

Shift-to-Third

-0.06 [-0.42, 0.30]

-0.04 [-0.30, 0.22]

Control

0.06 [-0.30, 0.42]

0.04 [-0.21, 0.30]

Shift-to-Third

0.64 [0.25, 1.03]

0.43 [0.16, 0.69]*

Control

0.90 [0.51, 1.29]

0.59 [0.33, 0.84]*

Shift-to-Third

0.53 [0.14, 0.92]

0.36 [0.09, 0.62]*

Control

0.75 [0.37, 1.13]

0.50 [0.24, 0.75]*

Notes. Reference group is the shift-to-first condition. Calculations are based on adjusted means, controlling for baseline
affect, gender, and narrative perspective difficulty. * indicates statistically meaningful (CIs do not include zero).

Effects of Narrative Perspective Shifting and Mental Focus on Emotion
The effects of narrative perspective shift sequence and mental focus on measures of emotion
(PANAS, emotional valence, emotional intensity, physical reaction) were analysed using adjusted
means, controlling for baseline affect, gender, and narrative perspective difficulty (refer to Table 21
for descriptive statistics by group).
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Table 21
Descriptive Statistics for Emotion Items by Experimental Condition
Shift-to-First
Control
(n = 134)

Experience
(n = 64)
SD

Shift-to-Third

Coherence
(n = 62)
M [95% CI]

Experience
(n = 57)
SD

M [95% CI]

SD

Coherence
(n = 60)

M [95% CI]

SD

M [95% CI]

M [95% CI]

SD

PANAS-NA

2.28
[2.14, 2.42]

0.85

2.06
0.77
2.02
0.74
2.35
0.75
2.22
0.87
[1.87, 2.26]
[1.82, 2.22]
[2.14, 2.56]
[2.02, 2.42]

PANAS-PA

2.39
[2.24, 2.53]

0.81

2.16
0.83
2.17
0.90
2.16
0.72
2.21
0.84
[1.95, 2.37]
[1.96, 2.38]
[1.96, 2.37]
[2.01, 2.42]

Current
Valencea

3.12
[2.89, 3.32]

1.42

3.49
1.40
3.69
1.36
3.18
1.23
3.15
1.31
[3.18, 3.79]
[3.38, 4.00]
[2.87, 3.48]
[2.85, 3.46]

Current
Intensity

4.36
[4.07, 4.65]

1.48

3.93
1.56
3.84
1.55
4.21
1.65
3.96
1.82
[3.50, 4.36]
[3.41, 4.27]
[3.79, 4.63]
[3.55, 4.38]

Physical
Reaction

4.11
[3.72, 4.51]

2.22

3.05
2.05
3.24
2.10
4.08
2.22
4.06
2.18
[2.47, 3.63]
[2.66, 3.82]
[3.51, 4.66]
[3.50, 4.62]

Notes. Adjusted means. PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Schedule; NA = Negative Affect; PA = Positive Affect.
a
denotes that higher scores indicate less negative (more positive) emotion at recall.

PANAS. Results indicated that the shift-to-first condition indicated statistically
meaningfully lower ratings of negative affect, on average, relative to the shift-to-third condition,
Mdiff = -0.24 [-0.44, -0.05], dunb = -0.31 [-0.57, -0.06], and the control condition, Mdiff = -0.34 [0.55, -0.13], dunb = -0.41 [-0.66, -0.15]. The coherence focus condition also indicated lower average
ratings of negative affect as compared to the control condition, Mdiff = -0.22 [-0.43, -0.02], dunb = 0.27 [-0.52, -0.02], but not the experience focus condition, Mdiff = -0.07 [-0.27, 0.13], dunb = -0.09 [0.35, 0.17]. Each the shift-to-first-experience group and the shift-to-first-coherence group reported
statistically meaningfully lower ratings of negative affect relative to the control group, Mdiff = -0.30
[-0.56, -0.05], dunb = -0.37 [-0.69, -0.06], and Mdiff = -0.33 [-0.59, -0.08], dunb = -0.41 [-0.72, -0.10],
respectively. All other between-group contrasts regarding negative affect were null (see Figure 9).
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Figure 9. Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) Negative Affect (NA) adjusted mean ratings by
experimental group. The scale ranges from 1 (low negative affect) to 5 (high negative affect). Error bars
indicate 95% confidence.

For positive affect, findings revealed no statistically meaningful effects of narrative
perspective shift and/or mental focus; mean ratings on positive affect were similar across groups
(CIs included zero).
Valence item. For emotional valence ratings using the semantic differential item, anchored
1 (extremely negative) to 7 (extremely positive), those in the shift-to-first condition rated their
emotions at recall as statistically meaningfully less negative, on average, relative to those in the
shift-to-third, Mdiff = 0.43 [0.08, 0.78], dunb = 0.33 [0.06, 0.59] and control, Mdiff = 0.49 [0.14, 0.84],
dunb = 0.35 [0.10, 0.61], conditions. The shift-to-first-coherence group reported lower negative
emotion, on average, relative to the shift-to-third-experience group, Mdiff = 0.53 [0.05, 1.01], dunb =
0.41 [0.03, 0.78], and the control group, Mdiff = 0.53 [0.10, 0.96], dunb = 0.38 [0.07, 0.70]. All other
mental focus and between-group differences on emotional valence approximated zero.
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Intensity. Regarding emotional intensity at recall, the shift-to-first condition indicated
statistically meaningfully lower average ratings than the control condition, Mdiff = -0.48 [-0.86, 0.10], dunb = -0.32 [-0.58, -0.07], but not the shift-to-third condition, Mdiff = -0.37 [-0.81, 0.07], dunb
= -0.22 [-0.49, 0.04]. The coherence focus condition indicated lower emotional intensity ratings, on
average, relative to the control condition, Mdiff = -0.39 [-0.78, -0.02], dunb = -0.29 [-0.54, -0.04], but
not the experience focus condition, Mdiff = -0.21 [-0.16, 0.57], dunb = -0.10 [-0.36, 0.16]. All other
between-group contrasts concerning intensity were not statistically meaningful (CIs included zero).
Physical reaction. Regarding bodily reaction at recall, the shift-to-first condition indicated
statistically meaningfully lower ratings, on average, relative to the shift-to-third, Mdiff = -0.93 [1.49, -0.37], dunb = -0.44 [-0.70, -0.17], and control, Mdiff = -0.98 [-1.52, -0.44], dunb = -0.46 [-0.72, 0.21], conditions. The shift-to-first-experience group reported lower mean reaction ratings than the
shift-to-third-experience group, Mdiff = -1.03 [-1.84, -0.23], dunb = -0.48 [-0.86, -0.10], the shift-tothird-coherence group, Mdiff = -1.01 [-1.80, -0.22], dunb = -0.48 [-0.85, -0.10], and the control group,
Mdiff = -1.06 [-1.75, -0.38], dunb = -0.49 [-0.81, -0.17]. The shift-to-first-coherence group also
indicated lower average reaction ratings than the shift-to-third-experience group, Mdiff = -0.84 [1.65, -0.04], dunb = -0.39 [-0.76, -0.02], the shift-to-third-coherence group, Mdiff = -0.82 [-1.61, 0.03], dunb = -0.38 [-0.75, -0.01], and the control group, Mdiff = -0.87 [-1.55, -0.19], dunb = -0.40 [0.71, -0.09]. All other between-group contrasts approximated zero (refer to Figure 10).
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Figure 10. Physical emotional reactivity adjusted mean ratings by experimental group. The scale ranges from
1 (low reactivity) to 7 (high reactivity). Error bars indicate 95% confidence.

Emotion Ratings Over Time
Changes in aspects of emotion from Time 1 to Time 2 were analyzed using repeated
measures contrasts. Results indicated a main effect of time for negative affect, Mdiff = -0.34 [-0.46, 0.22], dunb = -0.41 [-0.56, -0.26], emotional valence, Mdiff = 0.28 [0.08, 0.48], dunb = 0.21 [0.06,
0.36], intensity, Mdiff = -0.47 [-0.71, -0.23], dunb = -0.29 [-0.44, -0.14], and reaction, Mdiff = -0.42 [0.73, -0.11], dunb = -0.20 [-0.35, -0.05], however, many of these effects were qualified by condition
(see Table 22). Negative affect ratings decreased for all writing conditions, but not the control
condition; valance ratings increased (became more positive, less negative) for the shift-to-first
condition; intensity ratings decreased for the shift-to-first, experience focus, and coherence focus
conditions; and reaction ratings decreased for the shift-to-third and coherence focus conditions.
Positive affect did not vary over time, Mdiff = -0.03 [-0.16, 0.10], dunb = -0.04 [-0.18, 0.11].
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Table 22
Emotion Ratings from Time 1 to Time 2 by Narrative Perspective Shift and Mental Focus
Measure/Condition

Time 1

Time 2

Difference from Time 1 to Time 2

M [95% CI]

SD

M [95% CI]

SD

Mdiff [95% CI]

d [95% CI]

2.03 [1.87, 2.18]

0.74

1.66 [1.51, 1.83]

0.75 -0.36 [-0.49, -0.22] -0.48 [-0.68, -0.29]*

Shift-to-Third (n = 111) 2.23 [2.08, 2.38]

0.80

1.90 [1.75, 2.05]

0.79 -0.33 [-0.48. -0.18] -0.42 [-0.61, -0.22]*

Exp Focus (n = 111)

2.16 [2.01, 2.30]

0.76

1.82 [1.67, 1.97]

0.75 -0.34 [-0.48, -0.20] -0.45 [-0.65, -0.25]*

Coh Focus (n = 115)

2.10 [1.95, 2.25]

0.79

1.74 [1.59, 1.89]

0.80 -0.36 [-0.51, -0.21] -0.45 [-0.65, -0.26]*

Control (n = 125)

2.32 [2.17, 2.46]

0.85

2.04 [1.88, 2.18]

0.89

-0.29 [-0.56, 0.00]

-0.32 [-0.65, 0.00]

2.16 [2.01, 2.31]

0.86

2.17 [2.00, 2.33]

0.94

0.01 [ -0.16, 0.18]

0.01 [-0.18, 0.20]

Shift-to-Third (n = 111) 2.19 [2.05, 2.34]

0.78

2.19 [2.04, 2.35]

0.88

0.00 [-0.17, 0.17]

0.00 [-0.20, 0.20]

Exp Focus (n = 111)

2.16 [2.02, 2.31]

0.77

2.22 [2.06, 2.37]

0.88

0.06 [-0.11, 0.23]

0.07 [-0.13, 0.27]

Coh Focus (n = 115)

2.19 [2.05, 2.34]

0.87

2.14 [1.98, 2.30]

0.94

-0.05 [-0.22, 0.12]

-0.06 [-0.25, 0.14]

Control (n = 125)

2.38 [2.24, 2.53]

0.82

2.23 [2.08, 2.39]

0.83

-0.15 [-0.30, 0.03]

-0.18 [-0.40, 0.03]

3.39 [3.13, 3.66]

1.37

3.78 [3.53, 4.02]

1.37

0.39 [0.14, 0.64]

0.29 [0.10, 0.47]*

Shift-to-Third (n = 111) 3.05 [2.80, 3.30]

1.27

3.28 [3.05, 3.51]

1.14

0.23 [-0.15, 0.61]

0.19 [-0.12, 0.50]

Exp Focus (n = 111)

3.14 [2.89, 3.39]

1.31

3.52 [3.29, 3.76]

1.25

0.38 [0.00, 0.76]

0.30 [0.00, 0.59]

Coh Focus (n = 115)

3.31 [3.05, 3.56]

1.34

3.53 [3.30, 3.77]

1.32

0.22 [-0.15, 0.59]

0.17 [-0.11, 0.44]

Control (n = 125)

3.01 [2.76, 3.26]

1.42

3.20 [2.97, 3.43]

1.25

0.19 [-0.06, 0.44]

0.14 [-0.05, 0.33]

3.93 [3.61, 4.24]

1.54

3.27 [2.97, 3.59]

1.57 -0.66 [-0.95, -0.37] -0.42 [-0.62, -0.23]*

Shift-to-Third (n = 111) 4.09 [3.79, 4.38]

1.75

3.85 [3.56, 4.15]

1.65

Exp Focus (n = 111)

4.09 [3.80, 4.39]

1.61

3.69 [3.39, 3.98]

1.63 -0.40 [-0.71, -0.09] -0.25 [-0.44, -0.06]*

Coh Focus (n = 115)

3.92 [3.62, 4.22]

1.69

3.44 [3.15, 3.74]

1.62 -0.48 [-0.79, -0.17] -0.29 [-0.48, -0.10]*

Control (n = 125)

4.35 [4.07, 4.65]

1.47

3.82 [3.52, 4.10]

1.58

-0.53 [-1.07, 0.00]

-0.34 [-0.69, 0.00]

3.17 [2.74, 3.59]

2.07

2.87 [2.46, 3.27]

1.90

-0.30 [-0.68, 0.08]

-0.15 [-0.34, 0.04]

Shift-to-Third (n = 111) 4.09 [3.69, 4.49]

2.19

3.52 [3.15, 3.90]

2.04 -0.57 [-0.98, -0.16] -0.27 [-0.47, -0.07]*

PANAS-NA
Shift-to-First (n = 115)

PANAS-PA
Shift-to-First (n = 115)

Current Valencea
Shift-to-First (n = 115)

Current Intensity
Shift-to-First (n = 115)

-0.24 [-0.57, 0.09]

-0.14 [-0.33, 0.05]

Physical Reaction
Shift-to-First (n = 115)
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Exp Focus (n = 111)

3.59 [3.18, 3.99]

2.17

3.26 [2.88, 3.64]

2.00

-0.33 [-0.74, 0.08]

Coh Focus (n = 115)

3.67 [3.27, 4.07]

2.14

3.13 [2.75, 3.50]

1.96 -0.54 [-0.94, -0.14] -0.26 [-0.46, -0.07]*

Control (n = 125)

4.09 [3.69, 4.49]

2.23

3.72 [3.34, 4.09]

2.19

-0.37 [-0.76, 0.02]

-0.16 [-0.35, 0.04]

-0.17 [-0.35, 0.01]

Notes. PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Schedule; NA = Negative Affect; PA = Positive Affect; Exp =
Experience; Coh = Coherence. Adjusted means, controlling for baseline emotion, gender, and narrative perspective
difficulty; sphericity assumed. Time between sessions was 1-2 days. a = higher scores indicate more positive (less
negative) emotion at recall.* denotes statistical meaning based on CIs.

Emotion at Time 2. An examination of narrative perspective shift and mental focus effects
on emotion at Time 2 paralleled many of those found at Time 1: For negative affect, the shift-tofirst condition indicated statistically meaningfully lower ratings, on average, relative to the shift-tothird condition, Mdiff = -0.23 [-0.43, -0.03], dunb = -0.30 [-0.56, -0.04], and the control condition,
Mdiff = -0.38 [-0.59, -0.17], dunb = -0.46 [-0.72, -0.20]. Each the experience focus and coherence
focus condition reported lower average ratings of negative affect relative to the control condition:
Mdiff = -0.22 [-0.52, -0.02], dunb = -0.27 [-0.52, -0.02], and Mdiff = -0.30 [-0.52, -0.08], dunb = -0.35 [0.61, -0.10], respectively. There were no statistically meaningful narrative perspective shift or
mental focus effects on positive affect (CIs included zero).
For emotional valence (semantic differential item) at Time 2, the shift-to-first condition
indicated that, as they thought about their event, their emotions were statistically meaningfully less
negative (more positive), on average, relative to the shift-to-third condition, Mdiff = 0.50 [0.17,
0.83], dunb = 0.40 [0.13, 0.66], and the control condition, Mdiff = 0.62 [0.29, 0.95], dunb = 0.47 [0.21,
0.73]. Additionally, each the experience focus and coherence focus condition indicated lower
negative (greater positive) emotion than the control condition: Mdiff = 0.37 [0.05, 0.69], dunb = 0.30
[0.04, 0.55], and Mdiff = 0.37 [0.04, 0.70], dunb = 0.29 [0.03, 0.54], respectively.
The shift-to-first condition also indicated statistically meaningfully lower average ratings of
emotional intensity at recall than the control condition, Mdiff = -0.57 [-0.97, -0.17], dunb = -0.36 [-
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0.62, -0.10]. Also at Time 2, the shift-to-first condition reported lower intensity, on average, relative
to the shift-to-third condition, Mdiff = -0.58 [-1.00, -0.16], dunb = -0.36 [-0.62, -0.09]. There were no
mental focus effects on intensity (CIs included zero).
Regarding physical reaction upon recall at Time 2, the shift-to-first condition indicated
statistically meaningfully lower ratings, on average, relative to the shift-to-third condition, Mdiff = 0.67 [-1.19, -0.15], dunb = -0.34 [-0.60, -0.08], and the control condition, Mdiff = -0.87 [-1.39, -0.35],
dunb = -0.42 [-0.68, -0.17]. Additionally at Time 2, the coherence focus condition indicated less
reactivity than the control condition, Mdiff = -0.60 [-1.13, -0.07], dunb = -0.29 [-0.54, -0.04].
All other between-group contrasts across emotion measures at Time 2 were not statistically
meaningful (CIs included zero).
Correlations Amongst Closure and Emotion
Relations amongst psychological closure and emotion were explored using bivariate
correlational analyses. At Time 1, higher ratings of closure were found to statistically significantly
correspond to lower ratings of negative emotion, r(375) = -0.67 [-0.72, -0.61], p < .001, emotional
intensity, r(375) = -0.53 [-0.60, -0.45], p < .001, and reactivity at recall, r(375) = -0.31 [-0.40, 0.22], p < .001. These relationships involving closure were also significant at Time 2: negative
emotion, r(349) = -0.65 [-0.71, -0.59], p < .001, emotional intensity, r(349) = -0.47 [-0.55, -0.39], p
< .001, and reactivity at recall, r(349) = -0.37 [-0.45, -0.28], p < .001.
Exploratory Analyses: Cognitive Avoidance, Event Centrality, and Participant Feedback
To further probe the effects of narrative perspective shift sequences and mental focus on
other variables, including cognitive avoidance and perceived centrality of the event to identity and
life story, additional contrasts were conducted. Refer to Table 23 for descriptive statistics on these
variables by group.
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Table 23
Cognitive Avoidance and Event Centrality Ratings by Experimental Condition
Shift-to-First
Control
(n = 134)

Experience
(n = 64)

Coherence
(n = 62)

Shift-to-Third
Experience
(n = 57)

Coherence
(n = 60)

M [95% CI]

SD

M [95% CI]

SD

M [95% CI] SD

M [95% CI]

SD

M [95% CI]

SD

Avoidancec

4.40
[4.08, 4.71]

1.84

4.11
[3.67, 4.55]

1.97

3.04
1.62
[2.58, 3.50]

4.33
[3.87, 4.78]

1.87

4.05
[3.60, 4.49]

1.78

CES

3.49
[3.30, 3.68]

1.02

2.94
[2.67, 3.20]

1.07

2.96
1.09
[2.69, 3.24]

3.32
[3.04, 3.59]

0.98

3.21
[2.94, 3.47]

1.10

Notes. c denotes composite of two items assessing cognitive avoidance. CES = Centrality of Event Scale (7 items;
Berntsen & Rubin, 2006b).

Cognitive avoidance. The extent to which individuals wished to avoid thinking about their
event was assessed using two items that were averaged to create an avoidance composite, r(375) =
0.76 [0.66, 0.78], p < .001. Results indicated a main effect of narrative perspective shift, with the
shift-to-first condition reporting statistically meaningfully lower avoidance, on average, relative to
the shift-to-third condition, Mdiff = -0.62 [-1.09, -0.15], dunb = -0.34 [-0.59, -0.08], and the control
condition, Mdiff = -0.83 [-1.28, -0.38], dunb = -0.45 [-0.69, -0.20]. There was also a main effect of
mental focus, with the coherence focus condition reporting statistically meaningfully lower average
ratings of avoidance relative to the experience focus condition, Mdiff = -0.68 [-1.14, -0.22], dunb =
-0.37 [-0.63, -0.12], and the control condition, Mdiff = -0.86 [-1.30, -0.42], dunb = -0.48 [-0.73, 0.23]. The shift-to-first-coherence focus group provided the lowest ratings of avoidance relative to
all other groups combined, Mdiff = -0.73 [-1.13, -0.34], dunb = -0.40 [-0.62, -0.18].
Event centrality. With regard to appraisals of how central to identity and life-story
individuals perceived their unresolved event to be (assessed using the CES; Berntsen & Rubin,
2006b), findings indicated a main effect of narrative perspective shift sequences, with the shift-to-
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first condition reporting statistically meaningfully lower centrality, on average, relative to the shiftto-third condition, Mdiff = -0.31 [-0.58, -0.04], dunb = -0.29 [-0.54, -0.04], and the control condition,
Mdiff = -0.54 [-0.80, -0.28], dunb = -0.51 [-0.76, -0.27]. Each the experience focus and coherence
focus conditions reported statistically meaningfully lower average ratings of centrality relative to
the control condition, Mdiff = -0.36 [-0.61, -0.11], dunb = -0.35 [-0.60, -0.10], and Mdiff = -0.41 [0.67, -0.15], dunb = -0.39 [-0.64, -0.14], respectively, however coherence and experience conditions
did not differ from each other, Mdiff = -0.05 [-0.22, 0.32], dunb = 0.05 [-0.20, 0.30]. Shift-to-first
conditions, followed by either an experience or coherence focus indicated lower mean ratings of
centrality, relative to the control group: shift-to-first-experience versus control, Mdiff = -0.56 [-0.87,
-0.25], dunb = -0.54 [-0.84, -0.24]; shift-to-first-coherence versus control Mdiff = -0.53 [-0.85, -0.21],
dunb = -0.51 [-0.81, -0.20]. All other group contrasts approximated zero.
Post-hoc analysis of optional participant feedback. As earlier mentioned, participants
were provided with the option to further describe their selected event and/or to provide feedback
about their experience in the study following Parts 1 and 2. These responses were analyzed to
further contextualize the present findings. This narrative analysis was not intended to be used as a
sole basis for interpretation. Approximately 54% of the sample at Time 1 and 18% of the sample at
Time 2 responded to one or both of these open-ended questions. Responses were reviewed for
indications of favourable or unfavourable impressions of the study, administrative procedures,
aspects of the survey, or internal effects of the study tasks or manipulations (refer to Table 24).
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Table 24
Frequencies and Proportions of Features of Unstructured Event Descriptions and Feedback by
Experimental Condition

Control
T1 n = 134
T2 n = 125

Time 1
Total Respondents
Frequency
% of Group
Unstructured Description
Frequency
% of Group
% of Respondents
Feedback
Frequency
% of Group
% of Respondents
Favourable Feedback

Frequency
% of Group
% of Respondents
Unfavourable Feedback
Frequency
% of Group
% of Respondents
Favourable Feedback
Re. Study Tasks
Frequency

Shift-to-First
Experience
Coherence

Shift-to-Third
Experience Coherence

T1 n = 64
T2 n = 57

T1 n = 57
T2 n = 54

T1 n = 62
T2 n = 58

T1 n = 60
T2 n = 57

Total
T1 N = 377
T2 N = 351

Provided response(s) to the optional unstructured event description and/or feedback openended questions.
98
28
21
28
29
204
73.13
43.75
33.87
49.12
48.33
54.11
Provided response only to the optional unstructured event description item.
95
19
16
18
21
70.90
29.69
25.81
31.58
35.00
96.94
67.86
76.19
64.29
72.41

169
44.83
82.84

Provided response only to the optional feedback item. Feedback pertained to favourable or
unfavourable impressions of the study, administrative procedures, aspects of the survey,
and/or internal effects of the study tasks or manipulations.
40
12
11
17
18
98
29.85
18.75
17.74
29.82
30.00
25.99
40.82
42.86
52.38
60.71
62.07
48.04
Feedback pertained to favourable impressions of the study (e.g., “This study was really
interesting”), administrative procedures (e.g., “The space where I completed the survey
felt safe and… comfortable to think about my past event”), superficial aspects of the
survey (e.g., “I am grateful that…we did not have to answer questions we were
uncomfortable with [and] there were a lot of options for each question”), and/or effects of
the study tasks or manipulations.
29
13
9
10
8
69
21.64
20.31
14.52
17.54
13.33
18.30
29.59
46.43
42.86
35.71
27.59
33.82
Feedback involved suggestions to improve the study (e.g., “15 minutes is too long for
reflection time”; “There could have been a few less questions”), and/or pertained to the
internal effects of the study tasks or manipulations.
10
5
4
9
8
36
7.46
7.81
6.45
15.79
13.33
9.55
10.20
17.86
19.05
32.14
27.59
17.65
Feedback pertained to favourable effects of the study or manipulations (e.g., “It was quite
interesting to have to think about the same event from different viewpoints and notice my
own reactions when trying to recall the event with that perspective”; “[This study] helped
me put the situation behind me and move on…”).
23
12
9
9
8
61
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% of Group
% of Respondents
Unfavourable Feedback
Re. Study Tasks
Frequency
% of Group
% of Respondents
Indicated Unresolved

Frequency
% of Group
% of Respondents

17.16
23.47

18.75
42.86

14.52
42.86

15.79
32.14

13.33
27.59

16.18
29.90

Feedback pertained to unfavourable effects of the study or manipulations (e.g., “I didn't
think writing out the story was going to affect me as much as it did. I feel emotionally
drained…”; “…explaining what I wrote took so much mental and emotional energy out of
me because it does hurt me still…”).
5
2
2
3
6
18
3.73
3.13
3.23
5.26
10.00
4.77
5.10
7.14
9.52
10.71
20.69
8.82
Indicated that the event was still experienced as unresolved (e.g., “…I know that I am still
not totally over it”; “I just need closure”; “I haven't had much of a conclusion regarding
that incident, and my memories and feelings about it are still fresh in my mind...”; “the
event was…an internal conflict that I could not come to terms with”).
56
2
2
8
8
76
41.79
3.13
3.23
14.04
13.33
20.16
57.14
7.14
9.52
28.57
27.59
37.25

Time 2
Total Respondents
Frequency
% of Group

31
24.80

7
12.28

7
12.07

7
12.96

11
19.30

63
17.95

Unstructured Description
Frequency
% of Group
% of Respondents

19
15.20
61.29

2
3.51
28.57

1
1.72
14.29

4
7.41
57.14

3
5.26
27.27

29
8.26
46.03

18
14.40
58.06

5
8.77
71.43

7
12.07
100.00

5
9.26
71.43

8
14.04
72.73

43
12.25
68.25

Feedback
Frequency
% of Group
% of Respondents
Favourable Feedback
Frequency
% of Group
% of Respondents
Unfavourable Feedback
Frequency
% of Group
% of Respondents
Favourable Feedback
Re. Study Tasks

e.g., “I really liked the 2 parts to the study because I was able to think more about the
event.”
13
6
9
4
8
40
10.40
10.53
15.52
7.41
14.04
11.40
41.94
85.71
128.57
57.14
72.73
63.49
e.g., “It was nice doing this over the computer [for Part 2]… I felt uncomfortable
answering these questions and reliving a hard time in my life around others [in Part 1].”
1
0
0
3
2
6
0.80
0.00
0.00
5.56
3.51
1.71
3.23
0.00
0.00
42.86
18.18
9.52
e.g., “Yesterday I was still angry and upset and reluctant to move on from it but today it’s
like the event happened some time ago and I've moved on from it”; ”Being able to look
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Frequency
% of Group
% of Respondents
Unfavourable Feedback
Re. Study Tasks

Frequency
% of Group
% of Respondents
Indicated Unresolved
Frequency
% of Group
% of Respondents

back on something like this was very relieving for me and I feel more at peace with the
experience”; “[This study] has changed the way that I view the event and for that I am
grateful.”
9
4
5
2
5
25
7.20
7.02
8.62
3.70
8.77
7.12
29.03
57.14
71.43
28.57
45.45
39.68
e.g., “The fifteen minutes of waiting seemed slightly long and unnecessary because I found
it extremely difficult to even think about the even for a minute let alone 15.”; “being told
that part two would be like part one resulted in very distressing feelings about having to
complete part two. I'm specifically referring to the unexpected feelings that occurred at the
thought of having to sit down and type out descriptions about the event again.”
1
0
0
0
1
2
0.80
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.75
0.57
3.23
0.00
0.00
0.00
9.09
3.17
e.g., “…though I don’t feel a complete sense of closure it helped me think about the
situation”; “this was difficult for me to do, but also put into perspective that I need to get
over it.”; “I still feel angry and confused about this event.”
6
1
0
1
2
10
4.80
1.75
0.00
1.85
3.51
2.85
19.35
14.29
0.00
14.29
18.18
15.87

Of particular interest, was participants’ feedback on what they found to be helpful or
unhelpful in the study. In terms of what participants found helpful, many mentioned the change in
perspective, focused self-reflection, increased understanding, and other aspects of closure (e.g.,
moving on, coming to terms, etc.). Refer to Table 25 for a sample of participant responses
illustrating favourable internal effects of the study tasks or manipulations following Part 1, along
with identified themes, by narrative perspective shift condition.
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Table 25
Select Feedback Responses for Indications of What Participants Found Favourable or Helpful
Regarding Their Experience in Part 1 of the Study
NPS
Condition
Control

Shift-to-Third

Feedback

Themes

I never looked back at what I have been through until today. I used to
push my experiences and thoughts to the back of my mind when it came
to this event. Today, thinking about most of what happened, I felt angry,
and upset, and depressed to the point where I really wanted to cry.
Throughout the years I never thought about what I've been through,
however, today, I realized that I've been through a whole lot more than I
remembered, I was a lot stronger than I remembered. Thank you for
helping me realize that.

Engagement with event
Less avoidance

This study made me really think about my specific event. Typically, I
don't like to analyze the situation but having 15 minutes to just think
about it had a surprising effect on me.

Engagement with event
Less avoidance

I was nervous at first but I would say that my overall experience was
good and that I would do more of these studies and would also
recommend these studies to my peers.

Generalized favourable
experience

It was really interesting to reflect on the event in a third person. I also
found your questions very thought provoking and interesting, things that
I would have never thought I would be asked.

Third-person interesting
Unexpected questions

This was an interesting way to talk about the event in 3rd person. I never
thought about it in that way until today.

Third-person interesting,
novel

I felt as though I was reliving the past event, it felt very unusual to have
to deeply think about the situation I was in many years ago. However, it
was satisfying to think about it and try to find some closure with it.

Sense of reliving unusual
Satisfying to think and seek
closure

At this time, I feel like the event seems a little more distant and less
emotional than it had at the beginning of the study. I think restating the
experience in third person helped me step back from the experience and
see it differently.

Less emotional
Third-person offered distance,
new view of event

I thought this study was extremely well done and it definitely asked the
proper questions to make me think about the event and why I feel so
strongly on it. It also gave me a sense of closure, and that the event is
done and over with.

Achieved sense of closure
Completion

It was nice to reflect back to it and see where I stand in the event.

Reflecting back
See where stand in event

I think this has made me feel slightly better about the situation. I feel
more accepting and more understanding of her prospective. Thank you.
I liked this study, it’s a good way for people to kind of seek some type of
closure about an event that took place in their life that maybe they’re not
comfortable speaking about aloud to people. They say writing down your

More accepting of other’s
perspective
Writing helps with identifying
problem, easier than talking,
good way to seek closure
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thoughts is a start to seeking help because you writing your thoughts is
the first step into identifying that there is a problem.
Shift-to-First

Writing from two different perspective helped me view things very
differently. For example, when I wrote in first person I focused more on
my feelings and actions but writing in third person made me think a little
outside the box. I really liked this study because it made me go and selfevaluate myself and the changes I made with my life.

Different perspectives offered
different ways of thinking
about event: first-person –
feelings, actions; third-person
– novel
Evaluation of self and life
changes

I thought it was quite interesting to have to think about the same event
from…different viewpoints and notice my own reactions when trying to
recall the event with that perspective. I feel I may try this way of
thinking in future when reflecting on a past event.

Different viewpoints
interesting
Noticing own reactions
Wish to try again

The study really did open my eyes about the event, I no longer feel
heartache but more self-confidence and self-aware and that every bad
thing I can make it into a positive thing or get a positive learning curve
from it.

Eye-opening
Less heartache, more selfconfidence, more selfawareness
Learning experience

Reliving this event has helped me put the situation behind me and move
on with my life.

Reliving helped put situation
behind, move on

This allowed me to have more closure in realizing I am not the bad guy
in this scenario and to not put all the blame on myself and to no longer
let that affect me. Thank you.

More closure
Realizing not bad, not worthy
of blame

I am just excited that I was able to go through the process and see from a
different perspective. It helped me see that the way I thought about it is
not the same as the way it actually happened and that it does not have to
hold me back rather it can help push me forward and help me grow
stronger for myself and others.

Excited to see from different
perspective
More realistic view
Experience can promote
growth

While I had done my own sort of reflecting on the event, I am still happy
to be here and have rethought about the experience in a third person
perspective. This helped me see the reality of the situation rather than the
way I was subjectively seeing it and beating myself up for no reason!

Third-person helped with
more realistic view
Less self-blame

This was a great study that I am so happy to have participated in it. It
helped me feel better about the situation that I described and now,
imagining it from another perspective, I can see how this event wasn't so
bad. This has helped me clear me mind a bit about it. Thank you for this.

Feel better
Another perspective helped
with new understanding of
event, greater clarity

This was a wonderful experience. I am going to go home and write out
my experience from the 3rd person to share with others.

Wish to share third-person
writing with others

When speaking in third person I did not recall noting that I was worried
about my period and that was what prompted me to tell my mother. I
think that was because I only focus on how the situation all unfolded, not
the reason behind it.

Third-person helped with
greater understanding of
reasons why

Notes. Participant feedback listed in this table is not an exhaustive representation of feedback on the whole. NPS =
Narrative perspective shift.
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Participants also provided feedback about their experience following Part 2 of the study. Select
portions of feedback and themes by narrative perspective shift condition are presented in Table 26.

Table 26
Select Feedback Responses for Indications of What Participants Found Favourable or Helpful
Regarding Their Experience in Part 2 of the Study
NPS
Condition
Control

Shift-to-Third

Feedback

Themes

Doing this study, I've realized that I'm still not over the event and I'm
still dealing with the pain from the event.

Realization that still
unresolved

I actually really enjoyed this study… I think for myself it was healthy to
reflect on the past and evaluate the situation from a different perspective.
I became more clear that I'm not completely over the event and have a lot
of self-reflection to do. This study helped me to understand that. Thank
you.

Different perspective healthy,
provided clarity
Realization that still
unresolved; need for selfreflection

I overall enjoyed participating in this study. I think it was great to
explore past events and reflect on them to see how they actually affect
us. I think by answering these questions I was able to reflect on the event
when I haven't before. I tended to avoid thinking about this event until
yesterday in part 1.

Exploration of effects of past
Engagement with event
Less avoidance

I feel like I have learned a little more about myself and I understand the
event better.

Self- and event-understanding

[This study] reminded me of the traumatic event, and how I overcame it
mentally and physically. I have come a long way, and it did provide
some sense of closure.

Realization of resilience and
growth

For a long time, I tried to avoid thinking about it. I feel that thinking
about it for this study has somewhat helped me.

Less avoidance
Thinking about event

This study was very informative about my thoughts, feelings, and
emotions. It really got me thinking that even though it has been almost 3
years these feelings are still there and very fresh.

Understanding of thoughts and
emotions
Realization that still
unresolved
Realization that still
unresolved

This was difficult for me to do, but also put into perspective that I need
to get over it.
I feel a bit better about now, after having do this study. Less anger and
regret. Doing this study was a good way for me to think of how my
current actions in relationships are influenced by the event and it made
me realize how much more positive my actions/thought are now
compared to how negative they were right after the event occurred.
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Less anger and regret
Thinking event connections to
actions and relationships
Realization of growth

Shift-to-First

Yesterday I was still angry and upset and reluctant to move on from it
but today it’s like the event happened some time ago and I've moved on
from it.

Distance from event
Indication of greater closure

This experience helped me put my feelings to rest.

Put feelings to rest

Thank you for creating this study. I felt like it was CBT first hand. I
found it very calming to reflect and think of the event in the 3rd person.

Third-person calming, like
therapy

The more I reflected upon the experience after the more it meant to me
that I was able to really type out what that event meant to me. I had never
done that before, only ran through in my mind and came to those
conclusions internally. Writing down those thoughts was really cathartic
for me and I'm happy I had the opportunity to do so.

Engagement with event
Writing and reflection helpful

Your questions did help me open up and understand my event a bit more
and learn about myself - THANK YOU!!!

Self- and event-understanding

Being able to look back on something like this was very relieving for me
and I feel more at peace with the experience. It has changed the way that
I view the event and for that I am grateful.

Relief, peace
Changed view of event

Notes. Participant feedback listed in this table is not an exhaustive representation of feedback on the whole. NPS =
Narrative perspective shift.

In terms of unfavourable aspects, many participants alluded to how emotionally difficult it
was to think/write about their chosen event. Mention about the continued unresolved experiences of
events were also analyzed. Approximately 42% of the control condition made explicit reference to
their event continuing to be experienced as unresolved, whereas mention of this ranged from 3% –
14% in the other groups. At Time 2, 6% of the control condition indicated that their event still felt
unresolved, compared to 1% - 2% in the other conditions (see Table 24).
PCS model fit. Additional CFAs were conducted on PCS ratings at both time points in the
current study. Results indicated replication of good model fit. For Time 1, robust x2(798) = 1309.58,
p < .0001; x2/df = 1.64; robust CFI = 0.939; robust RMSEA = 0.044, 90% CI [0.040, 0.049], p <
.0001; SRMR = 0.053. For Time 2, robust x2 (798) = 1297.81, p < .0001; x2/df = 1.63; robust CFI =
0.947; robust RMSEA = 0.048, 90% CI [0.044, 0.053], p < .0001; SRMR = 0.054.
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Study 3 Discussion
Study 3 investigated how narrative perspective shift and mental focus informed ratings of
closure, using the newly developed Psychological Closure Scale (PCS), and aspects of emotion
(valence, intensity, and reactivity) for unresolved autobiographical memories. Effects 1-2 days later
along with implications for cognitive avoidance and event centrality to identity and life-story were
also explored. Hypotheses were gleaned from the proposed functions of imagery perspective (Sutin
& Robins, 2008) and research demonstrating effects of narrative perspective shifting (e.g., Gu &
Tse, 2016), imagery perspective (e.g., Libby & Eibach, 2011a), self-distancing (e.g., Kross &
Ayduk, 2011), and mental focus (e.g., Boucher & Scoboria, 2015; 2019) on emotion, along with
relationships amongst emotion, closure (e.g., Beike & Wirth-Beaumont, 2005), narrative process
(Angus et al., 1999), and adaptive self-reflection (e.g., Ayduk & Kross, 2010). Finally, participant
feedback was reviewed for subjective indicators of what they found helpful regarding the recall and
writing interventions along with comments pertaining to the resolution status of events.
Psychological Closure and Distance
Findings demonstrated that instructing individuals to recall and write about unresolved
autobiographical event-memories using different narrative perspective shift sequences in mental
imagery and pronoun use (first-to-third vs. third-to-first) influenced appraisals of closure for the
event, with a shift from third-person to first-person producing greater closure (vs. the other way
around, or thinking alone). This was surprising in light of the aforementioned research suggesting
self-distancing, via third-person imagery and a coherence focus, as a mechanism involved in
increased cognitive and emotional resolution. Further, the addition of an experience focus following
narrative perspective shift sequences resulted in a meaningful difference in closure amongst the
shift-to-first group (higher closure) and the shift-to-third group (lower closure), whereas the
addition of a coherence focus resulted in no such difference. Additionally, these effects remained 1117

2 days following the intervention. Focusing on the concrete sensorial and contextual elements of
recalled events (vs. their broader self-narrative significance) following the narrative perspective
shift sequences, therefore, appears to magnify shifting effects, and such effects can carry for days.
Moreover, contrary to Gu and Tse (2016), the mediating role of subjective temporal distance
(how close or far away an event feels irrespective of when it is dated to have occurred) was not
supported by the current findings. Furthermore, although greater subjective temporal distance
corresponded to greater closure, in contrast to Crawley (2010), all writing conditions in the present
study indicated less distance relative to those who solely thought about their event (control).
Additionally, the Felt Distance (FD) subscale of the PCS (akin to subjective distance) remained
impervious to writing manipulations, while other subscales - Freeing Finality (FF), Clear
Understanding (CU), Emotional Release (ER), Mental Liberation (ML), Behavioural Deactivation
(BD) – varied in the same direction according to narrative perspective shift sequences.
What accounts for the current findings concerning distance? One possibility includes the
characteristics of memories in the current study as compared to prior research, due in part to
differences in methodology. For instance, while the preservation of ecological validity supports the
use of the current event cues, it is important to address potential confounds. These cues placed more
distal and wider limits on the timeframe for retrieval (“within the past 6 years but not in the last
month”), relative to other research examining perspective shifting and distance (“within one year
and more than 1 day ago”; Gu & Tse, 2016, p. 162); indeed, memories were much older in the
current study: 2.54 years vs. 3.33 months, respectively. According to fuzzy-trace theory (Reyna &
Brainerd, 1995), retrieval becomes more abstract with the passage of time as verbatim memory
traces fade. Additionally, negative events are generally remembered with less detail relative to
positive events (e.g., D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2008; Ross & Wilson, 2002). Differential
access to finer-grained information according to the age and valence of event-memories may thus
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inform the extent to which methods of construal, namely more concrete methods (first-person
perspective/experience focus) can exert effects, which in turn could explain discrepant findings.
Further, that groups were equivalent on memory age, while ratings of subjective distance for
writing (lower distance) versus control (greater distance) conditions varied, disagrees with construal
level theory (Trope & Leiberman, 2010), which predicts dimensions of distance to vary in tandem;
it also contradicts ideas about the function of writing (vs. thinking) as a means of cultivating
distance and reduced negative emotionality (Park et al., 2016). As discussed further below, ratings
of negative affect and emotional reactivity were also not equivalent across conditions, with the
shift-to-first condition reporting lower negative affect, lower reactivity, and greater closure, relative
to the other conditions. Memory age, emotional valence, reactivity, and subjective distance,
therefore, did not show similar patterns of variance across conditions.
In any case, that the recall and writing conditions generally indicated higher closure, lower
emotionality, and lower subjective distance, relative to the control group, suggests that proximity
and engagement with the event (recalling and writing about it using various points of view)
constitutes a potentially pivotal aspect, at least at the start, of the resolution-seeking process. To
further clarify determinants of, and boundaries within which, subjective distance characterises or
promotes psychological closure, future research might consider contrasting event-memories that are
expected to vary naturally in subjective distance (e.g., open vs. closed; negative vs. positive;
proximal vs. distal) or comparing methods by which people can produce narratives (e.g., writing vs.
talking vs. thinking) using additional sessions along with pre-post measures.
The lack of narrative perspective shift effects for the felt distance and experiential change
subscales of the PCS, in light of statistically meaningful effects for the other subscales, also
warrants further investigation of their malleability, stability, and validity under various conditions
expected to influence closure. For instance, that all recall and writing conditions consisted of shifts
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in construal may have nullified effects for the experiential chance subscale, for this subscale
assessed the degree to which individuals felt they had gained a new way of thinking about, viewing,
experiencing, or relating to their event. That is, changes in perspectives and mental foci across
conditions may account for the consistent reporting of experiential change regarding events.
Furthermore, narrative perspective shift effects on the clear understanding subscale emerged
at Time 2 (follow-up), but not at Time 1 (immediately after the intervention), suggesting that clarity
and understanding regarding unresolved events may be enhanced through additional processing
time between sessions. Indeed, select participant feedback at the follow-up session indicated as such
(e.g. “The more I reflected upon the experience after…”). Further, as added support for the current
operationalization of the construct of closure and use of reverse-scored items, participants were
noted to use many terms and phrases employed by the PCS to indicate closure (“relieved”, “peace”,
“distant”, “behind me”, “changed view”, “understand the event better”) or the lack thereof (“need to
get over it”, “still bothers me”, “I haven’t had much of a conclusion”). Observations pertaining to
participant feedback offers preliminary evidence of convergence using qualitative and quantitative
methods. Nevertheless, in addition to exploring potential first- and second-order factors of the PCS
(discussed in Study 1), probing issues of subscale malleability in response to experimental
manipulations, investigating what participants “do” with their event between sessions, and further
exploring narrative descriptions of closure are likely to hold important implications for scale
refinements, construct validation, and understanding of distinct facets of closure.
The addition of a control group in this study also offers greater context regarding the effects
of narrative perspective shifting on closure. That is, shifting from third-person to first-person when
recalling and writing about an unresolved event-memory, irrespective of whether it was followed by
an experience or coherence focus, prompted greater closure relative to the most common means
individuals use to try to achieve resolution – focused thinking. Moreover, whereas all writing
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conditions reported increased closure 1-2 days following the manipulation, ratings for the control
group remained stable. This qualifies the old adage about how time heals by adding that time and
thinking alone are not enough, at least not in the short term: Writing about an event, particularly
with a shift in narrative perspective from third-person to first-person, can help move the resolutionseeking process along, beyond the spontaneous contemplation that occurs with passage of time.
Statements to this effect were evident in participants’ feedback. For instance, one person in the
shift-to-first condition noted, “While I had done my own sort of reflecting on the event… a third
person perspective…helped me see the reality of the situation rather than the way I was subjectively
seeing it…” This is noteworthy in light of research showing that unstructured thinking about past
events can incite a form of brooding rumination that works against resolution and leads people to
feel worse (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008; Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003).
In all, these results suggest that it is not simply the reflection on unresolved events that
incites closure, but rather the way individuals go about and are guided through the process of
reflection: Rather than stepping back (third-person) to move on from a troubling past event, per the
self-distancing view of event resolution, the current findings suggest that stepping back (thirdperson) and then forward (first-person) aids resolution more than stepping forward (first-person)
and then back (third-person) or simply remaining still (thinking).
Psychological Closure and Emotion
As predicted, greater closure was found to correlate with lower negative affect, lower
emotional intensity, and lower reactivity at recall. This agrees with prior work suggesting that
attributions of closure are intricately related to subjective appraisals of event-related emotion at
recall (Beike & Wirth-Beaumont, 2005). That ratings of positive affect remained unaffected by
construal methods, with no changes over time, also accords with previous research involving
unresolved (open) memories (Crawley, 2010), and with studies showing that negative affect fades
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faster than positive affect (Fading Affect Bias; Walker et al., 1997). Indeed, diminishing negative
affect has been suggested to contribute to the transformation of open memories into closed
memories (Skowronski et al., 2004). As with findings regarding closure, it was the shift from thirdperson to first-person (vs. the other way around or thinking alone) that resulted in reports of lower
negative affect, emotional intensity, and reactivity at recall. All writing conditions indicated lower
ratings on these aspects of emotion relative to the control condition at each time point, which again
speaks to the benefits of writing about unresolved events using narrative perspective shifts,
particularly a shift from third to first, rather than thinking about events in hopes of resolving them.
Accounting for the Current Findings
Likewise to findings regarding closure, findings for emotion were surprising in light of
previous research concerning visual imagery, narrative perspective shifting, emotion, and closure. If
third-person (vs. first-person) imagery fosters subjective distance (McIsaac & Eich, 2002; Williams
& Moulds, 2007); greater distance leads to reductions in emotion (Kross & Ayduk, 2008) and
increases in closure (Crawley, 2010); closure and emotional intensity are inversely related (Beike &
Wirth-Beaumont, 2005); and shifting from first-person to third-person (not vice versa) reduces
emotional intensity (Gu & Tse, 2016), then what might account for the present contradictory
finding that a shift from third-person to first-person (vs. the other way around) resulted in greater
closure and lower ratings of negative affect, intensity, and reactivity at recall?
Methodological differences. To begin, this study was the first to use the PCS, which is a
more comprehensive and valid assessment of closure relative to the previous 5–6 item unvalidated
scale (Beike & Wirth-Beaumont, 2005; Beike et al., 2007). There are also other methodological
differences between this study and prior research on narrative perspective shifting, subjective
distance, and emotional intensity. For instance, in addition to the previously mentioned difference
in event cues used (which reflected differences in memory age), there were discrepancies in how
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narrative perspective shift manipulations were implemented. In contrast to the current singlesession shifting that also included mental focus, Gu and Tse (2016) prompted individual narrative
perspectives on two separate occasions (first-person or third-person in the first session and the other
in the second session), separated by 1 week. It may be that the additional time between sessions
allowed for continued processing of the event and/or a reversion back to baseline for the event that
allowed the second manipulation to exert construal-aligned (third/abstract/far vs. first/concrete/
close) effects on distance and intensity. Alternatively, perhaps the tight contrast amongst different
construals in the present study served to increase awareness of the available strategies for event
representation, and shifting from third to first (being a relatively less threatening more toward
engagement) offered greater comfort in the application of this insight. Indeed, as noted in the
review of participant feedback, individuals in the shift-to-first condition made frequent mention of
the benefits of using the third-person perspective. Other departures from Gu and Tse (2016) include
the manipulation instructions (imagery and pronoun vs. pronoun alone), cultural characteristics
(Canadian vs. Chinese samples), and event cueing (unresolved events vs. valenced events).
Points of perspective. Hypotheses based on the various proposed functions of imagery
perspective (self-distance, self-salience, and self-integration) with regard to emotion, and indirectly,
closure, stemmed from research concerning visual imagery perspectives in isolation (first vs. third).
This raises considerations about the applicability of these views in the current paradigm, where they
could be discussed in relation to the perspective individuals were instructed to adopt first (where
they started), the perspective they were instructed to adopt next (where they ended), but not what
happened in between (the shift from one to the other). That is, whereas current predictions placed
more emphasis on the final perspective taken (shift-to-first vs. shift-to-third), perhaps it is the shift
from that is deserving of further deliberation. Indeed, when it comes to negative autobiographical
experiences, there is evidence to suggest that recall generally occurs in the first-person, wherein
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people visualize the experience happening all over again through their own eyes (Grossmann &
Kross, 2010; Verduyn et al., 2012; however, see Kenny & Bryant, 2007, for evidence indicating
that highly avoidant individuals tend to recall trauma memories in the third-person). First-person
memories are also more prevalent than third-person memories (Nigro & Neisser, 1983; Robinson &
Swanson, 1993), and first-person imagery may be incited via emotional arousal (Sutin & Robins,
2008). In this study, individuals were cued to select an event that they “currently consider to be very
unpleasant and unresolved, meaning…it feels unsettled.” Thus, there may be another perspective
point worth considering – where individuals actually start – which is likely to be in the first-person.
The shift sequences, then, become this: first (spontaneous) to first (manipulated) to third
(manipulated) versus first (spontaneous) to third (manipulated) to first (manipulated).
Discrepancies amongst shift conditions at each time point may, therefore, have to do with
the ease with which individuals are able to adopt different perspectives when instructed. Ratings of
narrative perspective difficulty along with feedback reports in the current study lend credence to
this idea. Individuals indicated that it was more difficult to adopt a third-person perspective as
compared to a first-person perspective, and they frequently remarked on the novelty of the thirdperson perspective; this makes sense given people’s ego-centric viewpoints and the fact that events
are generally encoded as they were seen at the time they occurred. This, added to the complexity of
the single-session shifting within a brief period (15 minutes) may have constrained the influence of
the third-person narrative perspective, particularly when used last. Indeed, prior research exploring
shifts in imagery perspective for open memories (Crawley, 2010) allowed individuals to write using
a single perspective for 15 minutes. Further, as previously alluded to, it is apt to be less threatening
for individuals to reflect on unresolved distressing events using a third-person perspective before
moving back into the more familiar first-person perspective. In other words, the third-person
narrative perspective may offer a softer entry into working through the experiential details of
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unresolved event-memories. To this end, the shift-to-first condition, particularly when followed by
a coherence (vs. experience) focus, reported less cognitive avoidance, relative to the shift-to-third
and control conditions.
Manipulation interactions. The single-session shifting also bears questions about construal
interactions. Perhaps shifting is not so rapid or clear-cut, and the effects of prior perspectives linger
on in subsequent writing. Indeed, heightened negative affect following engagement with distressing
material is likely to eventuate in a gradual, rather than abrupt, return to baseline levels of affect
(Pascual-Leone, Yeryomenko, Morrison, Arnold, & Kramer, 2016). That is, the effectiveness of
construal manipulations on emotion may have been limited by what came before, with narrative
perspective shift sequences consisting of a gradual fading into rather than a discrete shift. This
could explain why experience and coherence focus conditions did not inform emotion relative to
each other and why mental focus adherence ratings were lower than in previous research on mental
focus per se (Boucher & Scoboria, 2015; 2019). In other words, the effects of mental focus in the
current design may have been obscured by the preceding narrative perspective shift manipulations,
and potentially, their associated affective consequences. Still, the present results at follow-up
revealed that writing about unresolved event-memories using either mental focus resulted in less
negative emotion and less reactivity as compared to the control condition.
These accounts for the current findings having to do with differences in methodologies,
temporal points of perspective, and construal interactions are, however, purely speculative. The
current design speaks only to the effects of narrative perspective and mental focus shift sequences
as recall and writing packages, relative to each other and to thinking alone. Disentangling issues
pertaining to event cues, split- versus single-session shifting, perspective defaults, construal
interactions (additive, synergistic, antagonistic), and functions with regard to emotion and closure
necessitates revised experimental designs. For instance, future research might consider including
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baseline measures of spontaneous perspective along with isolated and sequenced perspective
conditions. Other potential moderators or mediators to explore include the construction of a
coherent story (Graybeal et al., 2002; Meichenbaum & Fong, 1993), degree of focus on the self in
memory (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2008; Nigro & Neisser, 1983), and distinctions amongst
past and current selves (Kross, 2009; Libby et al., 2005).
With regard to the latter, the finding that perceptions of self-change did not mediate effects
of narrative perspective shifting on emotion, may have been due to the fact third-person imagery
can itself magnify appraisals of change in the self (Libby & Eibach, 2009). This is to say that
findings regarding self-change may have been nullified by the fact that all of the recall and writing
conditions in the current study entailed a third-person narrative perspective. Narrative word analysis
(e.g., LIWC; Pennebaker et al., 2007) using indicators of coherence (causation and insight words,
changes in the valence of emotion words, etc.), self-focus (self-conscious emotion words, greater
use of ‘I’ relative to other pronouns), and/or directly priming theories of self-change versus selfstability may clarify the roles of story coherence, self-focus, and temporally extended self-contrasts
in informing narrative perspective and mental focus effects on closure and emotion.
Self-salience. The role of self-focus in memory is deserving of further attention as a
possible determinant for the current direction of effects showing that a final distanced vantage point
did not serve to blunt emotional response. That is, to the extent the ending perspectives can be
considered pure (i.e., unaffected by what came before), the present findings do not lend support for
the self-distancing view (self-distance did not mediate effects) or the self-integration view (selfchange did not mediate effects) of imagery perspective, but they may be said to lend support for the
self-salience view. In such cases, the third-person perspective increases visual and emotional
attention to the self in memory (current cue: “…in your mind, form images of yourself and your
surroundings…”), which can strengthen the connection amongst current and recalled selves, thereby
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increasing emotion relative to the first-person perspective. This view is supported by studies
showing higher ratings of vividness and emotion for third-person as opposed to first-person
memories (Giovanetti et al., 2019; Marigold, Eibach, Libby, Ross, & Holmes, 2014; Terry &
Barwick, 1998).
Furthermore, the majority of events in this study were determined to be relational or selfrelevant in nature (e.g., break-ups, identity or role changes) or to center on health or loss-related
issues (e.g., receiving a diagnosis, losing a loved one). It may be that these events incite a greater
focus on the self and self-conscious emotions such as shame, embarrassment, guilt, or grief, making
them more susceptible to higher emotionality, hence lower closure, following a third-person (vs.
first-person) perspective. Indeed, these event types (i.e., relational and personal) align with those
found by Seih et al. (2011), who investigated perspective taking and perspective switching via
pronoun use. In line with the current findings, these authors found that a first-person perspective,
whether in isolation, or following a second- or third-person perspective conferred greater benefits in
expressive writing, in terms of subjective appraisals of value and emotionality. They also found
that, relative to ending in the third-person perspective, ending in the first-person perspective incited
greater cognitive processing for negative emotional experiences (indicated by cognitive mechanism
words like because, consider, realize, understand). Interestingly, participants in Seih et al. (2011)
also reported greater emotionality while writing in the first-person as compared to the third-person.
This contrasts the current referent for emotion ratings, which was after the entire intervention. This
raises questions about moment-to-moment cognitive and emotional change processes for recall and
writing interventions. To clarify the function of self-salience in this regard, future research could
investigate the degree of self-focus and the presence of self-conscious emotions prior to, during,
and following the retrieval and writing interventions, or manipulate events based on self-relevance.
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In terms of the “cognitive-affective crossfire,” wherein self-enhancement and selfverification motives conflict, the present findings (and Seih et al., 2011) suggest a preference for
cognitive consistency over affective enhancement (which accords with Swann et al., 1987). That is,
individuals appear to be more inclined and receptive to engaging in difficult experiential processing
if it supports greater understanding of how a past event, and self contained within the event, relates
to the present (and perhaps future), and that doing so eventually leads to reduced emotionality for
the event.
Implications for Narrative Process and Expressive Writing
Given the current interventions entailed written narratives of unresolved event-memories,
this study also prompts considerations about the course and consequences of constructing and reconstructing stories of life events. According to narrative process theory (Angus et al., 1999; Angus
& McLeod, 2004), repeated decentering and reengagement with distressing life experiences using
different vantage points can foster a new understanding of the self, and of the self in relation to
others. The reflexive processing of emotions, beliefs, needs, hopes, and motives regarding an event
is thought to enable the integration of that experience (micronarrative) within a broader life-story
(macronarrative; Angus & Hardtke, 1994). In may be then, that narrative perspective and mental
focus sequences foster novel and flexible deliberations about unresolved events that allow for the
cultivation of meaningful frameworks within which to understand and feel differently about them.
Vital to the development of reflexive elaboration and new understanding is emotional
arousal (Angus et al., 1999), the idea being not to move away from it (per self-distancing views;
Kross & Ayduk, 2011), but rather, to lean into it (per experiential or emotion-focused approaches to
resolution; e.g., Greenberg, 2011). To this end, Pascual-Leone et al. (2016) describe a jagged “two
steps forward, one step back” (p. 343) pattern of change in emotional arousal when reflecting on
traumas over the course of a 3-day expressive writing task, with localized (within session) increases
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and overall (across session) decreases in negative arousal. Descriptions of emotionally salient
autobiographical events are therefore thought to provide an essential experiential starting point for
the articulation of meaning (Foa & Kozak, 1986; Rachman, 1980), wherein a pattern of narration
from external to internal and reflexive is encouraged (Angus & Greenberg, 2011). Although
emotion-focused research has primarily centered on psychotherapeutic processes of change in
outlining the utility of adopting perspectives of imagined others or part-selves (akin to theory of
mind; Premack & Woodruff, 1978), rather than mental imagery or pronoun use per se, the proposed
benefits of dynamically moving through the details of difficult past experiences in order to move
past them (i.e., achieve closure) holds clear relevance for the current writing interventions.
Decades of research underscores how writing about traumatic events in this way (per
Pennebaker & Francis, 1996) can promote physical and mental health benefits, including reduced
rumination, improved mood, and fewer visits to the doctor (Baikie & Wilhelm, 2005; Frattaroli,
2006; Pennebaker & Chung, 2007, Pennebaker & Seagal, 1999; Smyth, 1998). Park and colleagues
(2016) propose that greater subjective distance between the current self and the past self contained
in the event is what accounts for the benefits of multi-session expressive writing (vs. thinking).
Further, expressive writing instructions prompt an experiential starting point by asking people to,
“Write about your very deepest thoughts and feelings…really let go and explore your very deepest
emotions and thoughts…” (Pennebaker & Chung, 2011, p. 419). If people begin with a focus on
their internal (distressing) experiences and continue writing about them over consecutive sessions, it
is reasonable to expect such reflections to wane, which in turn, leads to a sense of greater distance.
In contrast, the present narrative perspective and mental focus instructions made no mention of
current feelings regarding an unresolved event; they simply asked people to recall and write about
the event using different perspectives and then to focus on different elements of the event (concrete
details vs. self-narrative significance) within a single session. That the shift-to-first condition
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reported less negative affect, less intensity, and less reactivity, relative to the other conditions, may
be indicative of emotional processing incited by this shift sequence, even without explicit
prompting. In other words, people may not need to be told to reflect on their emotions in order to
reflect on their emotions, due to an already present motive to do so.
Nevertheless, whereas the traditional expressive writing paradigm encourages a coming
away from current experience (where the focus is on present stressors), the current paradigm can be
said to support a move toward past experience (via the shift toward a first-person account and an
experiential focus), as a means of achieving greater resolution. Such discrepancies amongst writing
interventions raises questions about the temporal placement of emotion and relations to the current
self as rememberer, which, even if retrospective, may constitute a pivotal determinant of emotion
change and closure. That is, the drive toward cognitive and affective resolution may be
differentially supported by methods that guide the processing of recollected emotion at encoding
versus current emotion at retrieval. Resolution-seeking efforts can also be distinguished from
resolution made, and it remains unknown whether and how closure (outcome) is related to narrative
modes and reflexive emotional processing (processes). If narrative mode sequences inform emotion
and meaning, both of which characterise closure, and narrative perspective shifting produces
changes in closure, then perhaps narrative mode sequences, by way of narrative perspective
shifting, can explain the current findings.
Pennebaker and Chung (2007) note that greater meaning for distressing experiences can be
achieved via “a perspective shift and the ability to detach ourselves from our surroundings” (p.
432). The current findings lend credence to this idea, and add to it through the specification of more
optimal (third-to-first) and less optimal (first-to-third) perspective shift sequences for the attainment
of greater closure and lower emotional reactivity. It may be that a narrative perspective shift
sequence from third to first represents a toggling of cognitive and emotional contact with
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unresolved event-memories in a way (toward the event, rather than away from it) that facilitates
resolution. Indeed, a number of participants provided feedback that identified re-engagement with
the event, reduced avoidance, and new ways of understanding and experiencing their event as
helpful aspects in the attainment of greater closure. Unravelling issues pertaining to reference points
for emotion and relations amongst narrative perspectives and process modes as determinants of
closure and emotion for unresolved events may be achieved through a more refined mixed-methods
approach. For instance, future studies could contrast writing interventions with different emotional
referents and analyze participants’ narratives for process modes and other change mechanisms.
Implications for Event-Memory Theory
Using the theatre metaphor of event memory (Rubin & Umanath, 2015), it appears that the
usual “seat” to take within the space context of remembering a distressing autobiographical event is
on the stage, where one is able to view and describe the event using the first-person narrative
perspective. Engaging in a narrative perspective shift for this personally experienced event, then,
places oneself in an unfamiliar seat in the audience, relative to the event (rather than in it), which
affords the possibility of scene reconstruction in support of a coherent narrative. Moving from this
never-experienced third-person perspective in the audience back to the usual first-person
perspective on stage not only invites new insights, evaluations, and interpretations of the event, but
it also offers novel ways of re-engaging with the event that are less threatening (hence, there is less
inclination to avoid them). In other words, shifting from a third-person to a first-person narrative
perspective offers a more nuanced understanding of the character (remembered self), a more
contextualized understanding of the scene (the unresolved memory), and enhances performance
(less avoidance and reactivity at recall). In contrast, performing on stage without a director to guide
the meaning-making process (thinking alone) is not effective in achieving such an integrated view.
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Implications for Adaptive Self-Reflection
To the potential adaptiveness of narrative perspectives, there have been disagreements in the
literature, particularly with regard to the use of the third-person perspective (akin to self-distancing)
for distressing event-memories (e.g., Kross & Ayduk, 2010; McIsaac & Eich, 2004). If more
abstract construal methods (third-person perspective, coherence focus) aid in the integration of
events within an overarching framework of self-views and life-themes, yet the events under
consideration continue to be experienced as distressing or unresolved, then it is conceivable that
prompting such construals would be problematic and threatening to current conceptions of self.
This notion is supported by the present findings showing that ratings of closure varied around the
mid-range of the PCS (i.e., events were not deemed fully resolved). Further, those who shifted from
third-person to first-person not only reported greater closure and less emotional reactivity, but they
also appraised their unresolved event as less central to their identity and life-story, and they were
less avoidant to thinking about it, relative to those who shifted from first-person to third-person or
who thought about their event. Berntsen and Rubin (2006a) suggest that perceived centrality for
distressing or traumatic events can coincide with maladaptive attributions, rumination, depression,
and PTSD symptom severity. Further, Williams and Moulds (2007) highlight the importance of
first-person experiential processing (as opposed to avoidance) in the adaptive reconciliation of
troubling event-memories (indicated by reduced intrusions) for individuals with depression.
Therefore, that participants in the shift-to-first condition indicated that their unresolved
events were less central to their identities and life-stories and that they reported being less avoidant
to reflecting on their thoughts and feelings about the events, relative to the other conditions,
suggests that this narrative perspective shift sequence likely confers adaptive value in the
resolution-seeking process. Future research could further elucidate the adaptiveness of narrative
perspective shifting and mental focus in recall and writing tasks by investigating relations with
132

theoretically more versus less adaptive cognitive and emotional responses to upsetting eventmemories, for instance, as operationalized by Garnefski and colleagues (2001).
Implications for Clinical Work
This study extends research on expressive writing, and is the first to identify particular
narrative perspective and mental focus sequences that foster increased closure for unresolved eventmemories. This is particularly relevant in a clinical domain, where troubling or traumatic memories
are a frequent focus. There are numerous schools of thought that emphasize the importance of
identifying ways of changing the way people process and represent aversive past experiences that
can lead them to become less distressed when thinking about them again in the future (e.g., Foa &
Kozak, 1986; Greenberg & Angus, 2004; Rachman, 1980; Resick, Monson, & Chard, 2007).
Indeed, many effective therapies use a combination of distancing and engagement strategies (e.g.,
Beck, 2011; Greenberg, 2011; Linehan, 2015) and many prominent theories regard the
establishment and maintenance of an integrated self as vital to adaptive functioning and
psychological well-being (e.g., Kohut, 1977).
In the context of psychotherapy, writing interventions and construal methods can be
regarded as representational tools that, in combination with other therapeutic tools and processes,
may help to facilitate resolution, rather than as a sole means of cultivating resolution cart blanche.
Indeed, there may be individual difference factors to consider, such as baseline abilities to abstract
or retrieve specific details in memory, or vulnerabilities to psychopathology. For instance, clinical
populations (e.g., those diagnosed with PTSD, depression, and/or generalized anxiety) are generally
more prone to a memory phenomenon known as overgeneralized memory (OGM) – an inability to
retrieve specific events or details in autobiographical memory (e.g., Moore & Zoellner, 2007;
Sumner, Griffith, & Mineka, 2010; Williams, 1996; Williams & Broadbent, 1986) – which could
place limits on the processing of events in the first-person. Furthermore, Giovanetti et al. (2019),
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provide evidence suggesting that a third-person perspective in expressive writing may be harmful
for individuals who possess cognitive vulnerabilities to depression (e.g., negative thinking and
recall biases), while the current findings, based on a non-clinical undergraduate population, suggest
that shifting toward a third-person perspective is not exactly harmful; in terms of promoting closure,
it is just no better than thinking alone.
In any case, the current writing interventions are likely to offer a useful aid for
psychotherapeutic work aimed at helping patients reprocess difficult life experiences or episodic
memories (e.g., as in the context of systematic evocative unfolding; Greenberg, 2011).
Additionally, the PCS offers a fitting assessment of autobiographical event resolution that can be
implemented to assess changes session-to-session or over the full course of therapy. It will be
important for future work to continue to identify effective means of supporting individuals in their
search for psychological closure and to evaluate their effectiveness in real-world clinical settings.
Limitations
There are some limitations worth highlighting for Study 3 that may serve to modify
interpretations. To start, group sizes were disproportionate – the control group consisted of nearly
twice as many participants than each of the four experimental writing groups. This was due to a
randomization error (based on survey construction and software). Although there is no generally
agreed upon cut-off for size discrepancies amongst groups (Wickens & Keppel, 2004), unequal
group sizes may introduce confounds or unequal variances that can reduce statistical power and
increase risks for Type 1 Error (via the constriction of CIs; Rusticus & Lovato, 2014). Such risks,
however, pertain to group interaction contrasts more so than condition contrasts for the two main
factors, narrative perspective shifting and mental focus, as these groups sizes were roughly
equivalent. That the assumption of homogeneity of variance was met in this study also lessens risks
for errors in inference based on the results. Thus, while unequal group sizes constitute an important
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consideration in interpreting results, this is most pertinent to interpretations of crossed effects
(narrative perspective shift x mental focus), and is less likely to unduly influence interpretation of
univariate effects (narrative perspective shift and mental focus, separately).
Second, all participants were given the option of providing additional information about
their event or feedback about their experience in the study. These options were added for ethical
reasons in light of the unresolved nature of events, so that risk could be monitored and participants
could be afforded agency over choosing whether and how to describe their event. Following
completion of Part 1 of the study (after the intervention and ratings on the dependent measures),
approximately 73% of those in the control condition (98 participants) chose to provide information
about their unresolved event and/or to offer feedback; this estimate stands in contrast to the 34–49%
of those who did so across the recall and writing conditions (21–29 participants). Additionally, 42%
of those in the control condition (56 participants) reported that their event was still experienced as
unresolved, while 3–14% of those in the recall and writing conditions (2–8 participants) indicated
as such. These estimates accord with quantitative findings showing that the control condition
provided statistically significantly lower ratings of closure and higher ratings of emotional
reactivity, on average, relative to those in the recall and writing conditions. The perceived lack of
resolution for control participants may have prompted a desire “take action” through writing to try
to achieve greater resolution (in agreement with the behavioural deactivation subscale of the PCS).
Given the relatively large portion of individuals in the control condition who opted write
about their event at the end of Part 1 of the study (71% or 95 participants), potential threats to
internal validity need to be considered for Part 2/Time 2. That is, Time 2 findings regarding
changes or differences in closure and emotion ratings for the control condition may not necessarily
be attributable to thinking alone, and could, at least in part, be a function of additional unstructured
writing. Given known benefits of writing, this potentially implies larger differences amongst control
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and writing conditions at Time 2 than those reported here. In any case, the control condition showed
no changes in closure and emotion over time (i.e., ratings remained stable from Time 1 to Time 2),
which further indicates that the way in which individuals are guided through the recall and writing
process for unresolved events matters. Future research aimed at contrasting recall and writing
interventions against focused thinking may wish to consider alternative ethical buffers that would
allow for more confident interpretations.
Third, as previously mentioned, the current methodology prevents inferences regarding the
localization of effects for narrative perspective shifting and mental focus, and the use of multiple
shifts in sequence within a condensed timeframe (15 minutes) is likely to add another layer of
complexity. The present interventions called for individuals to quickly and flexibly shift amongst
cognitive frames in mental imagery and pronoun use while writing about unresolved and distressing
material - arguably not a common practice in everyday life. That individuals reported greater
difficulty, on average, with adopting a third-person (vs. first-person) perspective, remarked on the
novelty of the third-person perspective (via written feedback), and provided lower ratings of
adherence to the mental focus instructions than in previous research (Boucher & Scoboria, 2015;
2019), all suggest increased cognitive and emotional demand, and hence, more gradual than abrupt
shifting. Interestingly, despite reported difficulties with the third-person narrative perspective, many
participants across conditions identified this as a helpful component of the writing task.
It is also important to recognize that the effects of narrative perspective shifting and mental
focus on closure at each time point were moderate at best, and that shifts in closure over time were
not dramatic (< 1 point), with even the highest mean ratings landing around the mid-point of the
scale. Future studies aimed at strengthening internal validity for independent versus combined
effects of narrative perspective and mental focus call for revised experimental designs that include,
for instance, recovery or distractor periods between construal methods, increases time allotted for
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each construal method, and/or more sessions as in traditional expressive writing interventions (i.e.,
15-minute writing periods over three or four consecutive days; Pennebaker & Francis, 1996).
Finally, although convergence amongst quantitative and qualitative findings was highlighted
throughout, it is crucial to acknowledge that the analysis of participant feedback and resolution
status was conducted post-hoc as a supplemental means of contextualizing the current unexpected
findings for closure and emotion. That is, the analysis of participant feedback is not intended to
serve as a stand-alone method from which to draw conclusions. Confident inferences based on the
integration of quantitative and qualitative methods calls for more robust approaches to narrative
analysis, for instance, through the use of independent raters who are blind to the purpose and
quantitative findings of the study, the assessment of interrater agreement, and the application of
validated coding schemes or word-reading software aimed at identifying content, meaning,
structure, function, and/or style of both event narratives and feedback responses. Such mixedmethods approaches are likely to shed more light on the processes, predictors, and outcomes of
autobiographical event resolution.
Future Directions
There are many potential directions stemming from the current research that serve to further
elucidate our understanding of construal methods in recall and writing tasks. To summarize,
suggestions for future research include further investigation of potential moderators or mediators of
the effect of narrative perspective shifting on closure and emotion, including subjective temporal
distance (e.g., cueing for events that vary in proximity to the present and/or degree of closure),
current self-theories (e.g., priming theories of change vs. stability), degree of self-focus (e.g., cueing
for events pertaining to self vs. others), presence of self-conscious emotions (e.g., using pre-post
measures), story coherence (e.g., identifying cognitive mechanism words), reference points for
evoked emotion (e.g., contrasting recollected emotion at encoding vs. retrieval), narrative process
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modes (e.g., coding for internal, external, and reflexive statements), degree of memory rehearsal or
sharing (e.g., using ratings scales), vulnerability to or presence of psychopathology (e.g., assessing
risk factors and levels of depressive or post-traumatic stress symptoms), and/or other individual
difference factors (e.g., mental imagery, cognitive flexibility, memorial specificity, psychological
mindedness, or tendencies to engage in more vs. less adaptive coping strategies).
Future research could also examine independent and combined effects of construal methods
(e.g., using construal method interventions in isolation, multiple sessions, baseline measures of
perspective and closure), and introduce methodological changes that would allow for more
confident and internally valid inferences (e.g., equal and larger group sizes, ethical safeguards other
than writing, recovery periods between construal methods, greater duration and/or frequency of
construal interventions and sequences thereof, and sound approaches to narrative analysis). Finally,
investigating applications of the current recall and writing tasks and the PCS in real-world clinical
contexts would further clarify their utility as psychotherapeutic tools and/or indicators of progress.
Summary and Conclusion
In a series of three studies, this research sought to construct a measure of psychological
closure (Study 1), evaluate its psychometric properties and construct validity (Study 2), and apply it
as an outcome measure within the context of an experimental writing paradigm for unresolved
event-memories (Study 3).
The Psychological Closure Scale (PCS) is a 42-item self-report measure for use with
nonclinical populations and a range of autobiographical events. The PCS assesses seven aspects of
event resolution: finality, understanding, felt distance, emotional relief, changed aspects of
experience at recall, less preoccupation, and reduced need to take action. The PCS delivers a
multifaceted operationalization of the construct of psychological closure that is based on a thorough
review of various definitions, dimensions, and theoretical contexts. The scale has demonstrated
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good model-fit, internal consistency, test-retest reliability, and construct validity via statistically
meaningful correlations with theoretically related constructs (e.g., unfinished business resolution),
along with the lack of correlations with theoretically unrelated constructs (e.g., trait responses to
emotions). Model fit was replicated using independent samples from Studies 2 and 3, which speaks
to the robustness of the current factor structure for the PCS.
Study 3 then explored changes in closure and aspects of emotion (valence, intensity, and
reactivity) immediately and 1-2 days after recalling and writing about an unresolved event-memory
using one of two narrative perspective shift sequences (first-person to third-person vs. third-person
to first-person) and one of two mental foci (experience focus vs. coherence focus), or simply
thinking about the event for an equivalent amount of time. Participants who wrote about their event
using a third- then first-person narrative perspective (shift-to-first) provided the highest ratings of
closure, particularly on PCS subscales pertaining to freeing finality, emotional release, mental
liberation, and behavioural deactivation, relative to the other conditions (shift-to-third, control).
Mental focus alone did not inform ratings of closure. The shift-to-first condition also reported the
lowest mean ratings of negative affect and emotional reactivity at recall. The same pattern of effects
remained 1-2 days later. Also at follow-up, the shift-to-first condition indicated higher average
ratings on the PCS subscale pertaining to clear understanding along with lower average ratings of
emotional intensity than the other conditions. Closure increased and aspects of emotion decreased
over time for all recall and writing conditions but not the control condition. Finally, relative to the
shift-to-third and control conditions, those who shifted from third-person to first-person indicated
less avoidance to thinking about their unresolved event and they appraised their event as less central
to their identity and life-story. Various potential accounts for the current findings, as informed by
research on perspective-taking, expressive writing, narrative processing, and adaptive selfreflection, along with limitations and fruitful avenues for future research were presented.
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This program of research provides a new measure of psychological closure with preliminary
evidence of good psychometric properties, along with an applied use as an outcome measure within
a randomized control writing paradigm aimed at elucidating effective means of facilitating
autobiographical event resolution. In so doing, it addressed theoretical and empirical discrepancies
concerning the function and adaptive value of imagery and narrative perspectives and ordered
sequences thereof. On the whole, that those who shifted from third-person to first-person reported
greater closure, lower emotional reactivity, lower event centrality to identity, and lower cognitive
avoidance, relative to the other conditions, points to the adaptive value of this narrative perspective
shift sequence in the resolution-seeking process. This holds relevance for psychotherapeutic work
where autobiographical event resolution, memory-induced emotion regulation, and self-narrative
integration are sought-after outcomes. Psychological closure and adaptive self-reflection are
thought to be facilitated by features of the retrieval context – shifting vantage points in visual
imagery and narration – that support sufficient distance from, followed by re-engagement with,
unresolved past events, elements within the events, and the self as rememberer, tied to the present.
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APPENDICES

Appendix A
Nomenclature

Imagery perspective: The vantage point used to envision events. A first-person (field) perspective
entails mentally “seeing” an event from one’s own vantage point, whereas a third-person (observer)
perspective involves visualizing the event from the vantage point of an observer so that one can
mentally see themselves as well as their surroundings (Nigro & Neisser, 1983).
Narrative perspective: In the current studies, the matched combination of imagery perspective
pronoun use in narrative accounts. A first-person narrative perspective involves both first-person
imagery and use of the first-person pronoun, ‘I’, whereas a third-person narrative perspective
involves both third-person imagery and use of a third-person pronoun, ‘She’, ‘He’, or ‘They.’
Shift-to-first: The switch from using a third-person narrative perspective to a first-person narrative
perspective in narrative accounts.
Shift-to-third: The switch from using a first-person narrative perspective to a third-person
narrative perspective in narrative accounts.
Self-consistency/change: An assessment of oneself or aspects of one’s personality as having
changed versus remaining stable over a specified period of time.
Mental focus: The two levels of mental construal emphasizing different elements of personal
experiences upon retrieval: the concrete details (experience focus) versus broader life significance
(coherence focus; Libby & Eibach, 2009, 2011a).
Experience focus: A focus on what it was like to experience an event directly as if one is actually
there again, noting specific sensorial and contextual details (e.g., the location, specific actions,
sights, sounds, smells, objects involved; Libby & Eibach, 2009, 2011a).
Coherence focus: A focus on the broader significance of an event, noting how it relates to personal
characteristics and other life events (e.g., previous experiences, accomplishments, relationships, the
future, one’s life as a whole and self as a person; Libby & Eibach, 2009, 2011a).
Psychological distance: The dynamic intersection of multiple dimensions along which a subjective
sense of remoteness can be created in mental simulation. Anchors of distance can be classed along
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features contained within the mental representation, the mental representation as a whole across
time, in relation to the current self or experience, or in terms of objective, subjective, or
hypothetical mental representations.
Construal level: The way in which people mentally represent information in terms of concreteness
or abstractness (Trope & Liberman, 2003, 2010).
Methods of construal: Changes in aspects of the retrieval context that serve to alter construal
levels and/or psychological distance (e.g., narrative perspective, self-consistency priming, and
mental focus).
Adaptive: The ability to adjust and function well in response to changes in cognitions, emotions,
and/or social environment. Such responses are productive for the individual and are associated with
psychological health (http://psychologydictionary.org/).
Maladaptive: The inability to adjust and function well in response to changes in cognitions,
emotions, and/or social environment. Such responses are counterproductive to the individual and
are associated with psychological dysfunction (http://psychologydictionary.org/).

175

Appendix B
Original Item Pool

Instructions: Carefully consider the event you have selected and rate the degree to which the following statements are
true of your experience of your event right now in this moment. The scale ranges from 1 (completely disagree) to 7
(completely agree). If your experience falls somewhere between complete disagreement and agreement, indicate this by
choosing a value between 1 and 7 that most reflects your current experience.
Explicit
1. (closure) I have complete closure on this event*
closure/
2. (peace) I have made peace with this event
Completeness
3. (settled) This event feels settled or put to rest
4. (moved on) I have moved on from this event
5. (closed book) The event is like a ‘closed book’ to me*
6. (finished) The event is ‘unfinished business’ for me (R)*
Coherence/
7. (event coherence) The pieces of the event fit together like a complete story with a beginning,
Connectedness
middle, and end
8. (event coherence) This event comes to my mind as disconnected scenes, facts, or experiences (R)
9. (part of larger story) This event is part of a meaningful story for me
10. (life story) This event is meaningfully connected to other events in my past, present, and future
Event
11. (conclusion) I have reached a meaningful conclusion about this event
Understanding
12. (clear understanding) I have a clear understanding of the event*
13. (lack of confusion) I am confused about this event (R)
14. (answered questions) I have unanswered questions about this event (R)
15. (understand what) I can make clear sense of what happened
16. (understand why) I just wish I could figure out why the event happened (R)*
Self17. I can make sense of this event in relation to my identity
Understanding
18. I can make sense of this event in relation to my life story
19. I have grown a lot from this event
20. This event is part of who I am
21. I understand how this event affected my personal development
22. This event has taught me an important lesson about myself
Less
23. (attention) I can now turn my attention to other problems and concerns*
Preoccupation/
24. (attention) Now I can stop thinking about this event
Attention
25. (preoccupation) I am not preoccupied with this event
26. (preoccupation) This event will stay “stuck” in my mind for a long time (R)
27. (mental effort) This event is taking a lot of my mental energy (R)
28. (control) I want to stop thinking about this event but I can’t (R)
29. (control) I feel the need to replay the event over and over in my mind until I solve it
Readiness to
30. (readiness) I need more time to completely move on from this event (R)
Move On/
31. (readiness) I feel ready to move on from this event*
Reduced
32. (desire to act) I feel the need to do something to resolve this event within myself (R)
Need to Act
33. (desire to act) I feel the need to do something to resolve this event with others (e.g., to make
amends or to get revenge) (R)
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Experiential
Change

Felt Distance

Memory
Characteristics

Emotional
Activation

Negative
Reactions

Positive
Reactions

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

(different thinking) I now think differently about the event*
(different understanding) I have a new understanding of the event
(different meaning) The meaning this event holds for me has changed
(different relation to event) The way I relate to this event has changed
(different experience) The experience I have when I think about this event has changed
(temporal) This event feels like ancient history*
(temporal) The event feels like it happened a really long time ago
(spatial) I have put this event behind me completely*
(spatial) The event feels far away from me
(self) I no longer identify with the person I was when this event occurred
(experience) As I think about the event now, I feel like an outside observer
Thinking about the event now, the details are vivid in my mind
As I think about the event now, I feel like I am re-experiencing it (R)
As I think about the event now, the images that come to my mind are from a perspective as seen
through the eyes of an observer
(intensity) This event arouses strong emotions in me (R)
(intensity) As I think about the event now, my emotions are intense* (R)
(physical/bodily reaction) Thinking about the event now, I have a physical/bodily reaction (R)
(emotional boundary) As I think about the event now, my emotions are close to the surface (R)
(experience) This event feels ‘alive’ in the present (R)
(powerlessness) I feel powerless in relation to this event (R)
(restriction) I feel that this event is holding me back from doing things I want to do (R)
(regret) I have regrets about this event (R)
(pressure) I feel pressure to resolve my feelings about this event (R)
(upset) As I think about the event now, I feel upset (e.g., rejected, angry, hurt, sad)* (R)
(distress) This event is an active source of distress for me* (R)
(bothered) I feel bothered, tense, or uneasy as I think about this event (R)
(negative emotions/ general) Thinking about this event now brings up unpleasant emotions (R)
(release) I feel that I have been released from the emotional grip of this event
(recovery) I have recovered emotionally from this event
(balance) As I think about the event now, I feel emotionally balanced
(relief) I feel relief, satisfaction, or fulfillment as I think about this event
(positive resolution) The ending of the event is more positive than the beginning
(positive resolution) I have come to a positive resolution about this event
(positive emotions/ general) Thinking about this event now arouses pleasant emotions in me

Notes. * denotes item drawn from a previous source (Beike et al., 2007; Beike & Wirth-Beaumont, 2005; Kross et al.,
2012; Savitsky et al., 1997; Skitka et al., 2004; Turner & Avison, 1992). (R) denotes reverse scoring.
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Appendix C
Validity Check Items (adapted from Oppenheimer et al., 2009)

(Validity check item A) Please check the first box (7 options available).
(Validity check item B) Check the third box (7 options available).
(Validity check item C) Please check the second box (7 options available).
(Validity check item D) Check the last box (7 options available).
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Appendix D
Optional Open-Ended Questions Following Studies

(Studies 1 and 2: Unstructured Event Description) If you wish to provide additional information,
perhaps about what it was like to experience your event and/or what your event means to you and
your life, you may take some time to write about it here.
(Study 3: Unstructured Event Description) Earlier, you were asked to describe or think about your
event. If you wish to provide additional information, perhaps about what it was like to experience
your event and/or what your event means to you and your life, you may take some time to write
about it here.
(Studies 1, 2, and 3: Feedback about the Study) If you wish to leave any comments, questions, or
concerns about your experience as a participant in this study, please feel free to do so here. Your
feedback is greatly appreciated.
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Appendix E
Demographics Questionnaire

(Study 2 and 3: Current Age) What is your current age?__________
(Study 2 and 3: Gender) What is your gender? __________
(Study 2 and 3: Ethnic Background) What is your ethnic background? __________
(Study 2 and 3: Primary Language) What is your primary language (i.e., the one you speak most of
the time)? __________
(Study 2: Education) What is the highest level of education you have completed? __________
(Study 3: Academic Major) What is your academic major? __________
(3: Academic Year) What year of study are you in? __________
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Appendix F
Study 1 Event Cue Instructions (informed by Beike & Wirth-Beaumont, 2005; Crawley, 2010)

Note. The following event cues were presented in a counterbalanced order across participants.
First Event Cue
Please choose an event from your past that you now think of as [unresolved, meaning it is not
settled or behind you vs. resolved, meaning it is settled or behind you]. Choose an event that you
were involved in on any day after you turned 18 but not in the last month. Take a moment to
identify this event now, before moving on to the next page. Describe your [unresolved vs. resolved]
event in a few sentences:
Second Event Cue
Please choose an event from your past that you now think of as [insert description not previously
used for first event]. Choose an event that you were involved in on any day within 12 months of the
event you identified earlier but not in the last month. Take a moment to identify this event now,
before moving on to the next page. Describe your [insert description not previously used for first
event] event in a few sentences:
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Appendix G
The Psychological Closure Scale (PCS; Boucher & Scoboria)

Carefully consider the event you selected and rate the degree to which the following statements are true for you right now in
this moment. The scale ranges from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree). If your experience falls somewhere
between complete disagreement and agreement, indicate this by choosing a value between 1 and 7 that most accurately
reflects your current experience.
1
Completely
Disagree

2
Mostly
Disagree

Freeing Finality
1

I have complete closure on this event

2

I have made peace with this event

3

This event feels settled or put to rest

4

This event is like a 'closed book' to me

5
6
7

I have reached a meaningful
conclusion about this event
I feel free from the emotional grip of
this event
I feel relief, satisfaction, or fulfillment
as I think about this event now

8

This event feels resolved
As I think about this event now, I feel
9 content with the way things worked
out
10 I am totally over this event
This event is completely behind me
11
now
Clear Understanding
12

I have a clear understanding of this
event

13

I am confused about this event*

14
15

I can make clear sense of what
happened
I fully understand what this event is
about

Felt Distance
16

This event feels like ancient history

17

It feels like this event happened a
really long time ago

18

This event feels far away from me

19

This event feels far-off in the distant
past

20

This event feels like a distant memory
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3
Somewhat
Disagree

4
Neutral

5
Somewhat
Agree

6
Mostly
Agree

7
Completely
Agree

1
Completely
Disagree

2
Mostly
Disagree

Emotional Release
Part of me is still upset about this
21
event*
I feel bothered, tense, or uneasy as I
22
think about this event now*
As I think about this event now, it
23
brings up unpleasant emotions*
I have lingering negative feelings
24
about this event*
Deep down, this event still irritates
25
me*
Experiential Change
I now think differently about this
26
event
I now have a new way of looking at
27
this event
I now have a different perspective on
28
this event
The way I relate to this event has
29
changed
The experience I have when I think
30
about this event has changed
The meaning this event holds for me
31
has changed
Mental Liberation
32
33
34
35
36
37

This event is taking a lot of my mental
energy*
This event is mentally holding me
back*
I am preoccupied by this event*
This event is demanding of my
attention*
This event is intruding on my
thoughts*
I am mentally 'stuck' on this event*

Behavioural Deactivation
38
39
40
41
42

I feel the need to do something to
resolve this event within myself*
I feel the need to do something to
resolve this event with others (e.g., to
make amends or to get revenge)*
I feel pressure to take steps to resolve
my feelings about this event*
I feel the need to take action to put
this event to rest*
I have an urge to do something that
will help me get over this event*
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3
Somewhat
Disagree

4
Neutral

5
Somewhat
Agree

6
Mostly
Agree

7
Completely
Agree

Appendix H
Mental Itch Scale (MIS; Jarman, 2016)

During the period of time that you were working on the problem, to what extent would these
statements describe what you were experiencing? (1 = not at all; 7 = very much).
1. If I’m not working on the problem, I feel anxious.
2. The problem won’t let go of me until I solve it.
3. I know that a feeling of mental unease will be there until I solve the problem.
4. The problem is in my head no matter what I’m doing.
5. It feels like an internal conflict.
6. The longer it takes, the more the internal pressure builds for me to solve it.
7. The problem eats at me.
8. My mind feels rushed to solve the problem.
9. I can’t rest until I figure it out.
10. The problem keeps pushing its way to the surface of my thoughts.
11. The problem bugs me until I can solve it.
12. The problem feels like a constant itch that can’t be scratched until I solve it.
13. The problem is mentally uncomfortable.
14. I feel an overwhelming need to solve the problem as soon as possible.
15. There’s a feeling of unease in the back of my mind.
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Appendix I
Need for Closure Scale – Short Version (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011)

Note. Items are rated on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).
1.
2.
3.
4.

(Ambiguity) I don't like situations that are uncertain.
(Closed-mindedness) I dislike questions which could be answered in many different ways.
(Order)I find that a well-ordered life with regular hours suits my temperament.
(Ambiguity) I feel uncomfortable when I don't understand the reason why an event occurred
in my life.
5. (Closed-mindedness) I feel irritated when one person disagrees with what everyone else in a
group believes.
6. (Predictability) I don't like to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it.
7. (Decisiveness) When I have made a decision, I feel relieved.
8. (Decisiveness) When I am confronted with a problem, I’m dying to reach a solution very
quickly.
9. (Decisiveness) I would quickly become impatient and irritated if I would not find a solution
to a problem immediately.
10. (Predictability) I don't like to be with people who are capable of unexpected actions.
11. (Ambiguity) I dislike it when a person's statement could mean many different things.
12. (Order) I find that establishing a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more.
13. (Order) I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life.
14. (Closed-mindedness) I do not usually consult many different opinions before forming my
own view.
15. (Predictability) I dislike unpredictable situations.
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Appendix J
Responses to Emotions Questionnaire (REQ; Jeffries et al., 2016)

When I experience distressing emotions, I typically do the following: (0 = not at all; 4 = a lot).
Suppression
1. I try to hold back or suppress my emotions.
2. I try to push my thoughts and feelings from my mind.
3. I try to tell myself to stop thinking about my negative thoughts or emotions.
Avoidance
4. I try to avoid things that will make me feel bad.
5. If I know something will make me upset, I avoid those situations.
6. I try hard to avoid feeling negative emotions.
Rumination
7. I try hard to analyze why I have negative feelings by thinking about it over and over.
8. I try hard to analyze why I have negative thoughts or emotions by replaying events over in
my head.
9. I dwell upon my thoughts and feelings.
Reappraisal
10. I try to think about my feelings in a way that makes me feel less distressed.
11. If I find myself thinking negative thoughts, I try to reframe them in a more balanced way.
12. When I have negative thoughts or emotions, I try to change the way I interpret the situation
in a more realistic way.
Note. Higher scores on each subscale reflect a greater use of that particular strategy.
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Appendix K
Centrality of Event Scale (CES; Berntsen & Rubin, 2006b)

Answer the following questions in an honest and sincere way, by selecting a number from 1 (totally
disagree) to 5 (totally agree).
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

I feel this event has become part of my identity.
I feel that this event has become a central part of my life story.
This event has become a reference point for the way I understand myself and the world.
This event has colored the way I think and feel about other experiences.
This event permanently changed my life.
I often think about the effects this event will have on my future.
This event was a turning point in my life.
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Appendix L
Transitional Impact Scale (TIS-12; Svob et al., 2013)

Carefully consider the event you have described. In assessing your life after the event, rate the
degree to which the following statements were true of your experience. The scale ranges from 1
(completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree). If your experience falls somewhere in between
complete disagreement and agreement, please indicate this by choosing a value between 1 and 5
that most closely reflected your experience.
Material Subscale
1. This event has changed the places where I hang out.
2. This event has changed the things I own.
3. This event has changed my material circumstances.
4. This event has changed the activities I engage in.
5. This event has changed the people I spend time with.
6. This event has changed where I live.
Psychological Subscale
7. This event has changed my attitudes.
8. This event has changed the way I think about things.
9. This event has impacted my emotional responses.
10. This event has changed my sense of self.
11. This event has impacted me psychologically.
12. This event has influenced my understanding of right and wrong.
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Appendix M
Subjective Impact and Personal Significance Scale (Wood & Conway, 2006)

Note. Items are rated on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 6 (very much).
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

This past event has had a big impact on me.
I feel that I have grown as a person since experiencing this past event.
Having had this experience, I have more insight into who I am and what is important to me.
Having had this experience, I have learned more about what life is all about.
Even when I think of the event now, I think about how it has affected me.
I have often spent time thinking about what this event means to me.

Note. Items are presented in a counterbalanced order.
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Appendix N
Sudden Restructuring of Experience Scale (SRES; Jarman, 2014)

To what extent would you agree with the following statements to describe your experience of the
sudden mental click? (1 = not at all; 7 = very much).
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

It was as if I were seeing the same problem through new eyes.
Something deep inside of me changed.
The problem looked different all of a sudden.
I knew I would never again go back to seeing the problem how I had before.
My new understanding of the problem really sunk in.
It was like I was truly seeing the problem for the first time.
It was more than just solving this one problem – something seemed to sink in for me,
changing how I would approach future problems as well.
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Appendix O
Unfinished Business Resolution Scale (UBRS; Singh, 1994)

Note. Individuals will be screened prior to responding to the UBRS with the following items: “The
event I selected involved at least one other person at the time it occurred” (yes, no); (If “yes”) “How
many other people were present at the time the event occurred? (enter number here:____).
Instructions: The following questions ask you how you feel now in terms of your unfinished
business with the significant other person whom you specified at the beginning of therapy. Please
circle the number of the scale that best represents how you currently feel (0 = not at all; 5 = very
much).
1. I feel troubled by my persisting unresolved feelings (such as anger, grief, sadness, hurt,
resentment) in relation to this person. (distress) (RS)
2. I feel frustrated about not having my needs met in relation to this person. (needs) (RS)
3. I feel worthwhile in relation to this person. (self)
4. I see this person negatively. (other) (RS)
5. I am comfortable about my feelings in relation to this person. (distress)
6. This person’s negative view or treatment of me has made me feel badly about myself. (self)
(RS)
7. I feel okay about not having received what I needed from this person. (needs)
8. I feel unable to let go of my unresolved feeling in relation to this person. (distress) (RS)
9. I have a real appreciation of this person’s own personal difficulties. (other)
10. I have come to terms with not getting what I want or need from this person. (needs)
11. I view myself as being unable to stand up for myself in relation to this person. (self) (RS)
12. I feel accepting toward this person. (other)
Degree of Distress Associated with Lingering Feelings: 1, 5, 8
Not Having Needs Met: 2, 7, 10
Perceptions of the Self: 3, 6, 11
Perceptions of the Other: 4, 9, 12
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Appendix P
Self-Assessment Mannequin (SAM; Bradley & Lang, 1994)

Arousal

Valence

On each row below, place the slider under one figure, or between two figures, that accurately
portrays how you are feeling today.
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Appendix Q
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988)

This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Read each
item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Indicate to what extent
[the ‘Moment’ time instruction will be inserted here]. Use the scale to record your answers.
1
Very slightly or
not at all

2
A little

3
Moderately

4
Quite a bit

___interested
___distressed
___excited
___upset
___strong
___guilty
___scared
___hostile
___enthusiastic
___proud

5
Extremely

___irritable
___alert
___ashamed
___inspired
___nervous
___determined
___attentive
___jittery
___active
___afraid

The following time instructions have been used with the PANAS:
Moment
Today
Past few days
Week
Past few weeks
Year
General

You feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment.
You have felt this way today.
You have felt this way during the past few days.
You have felt this way during the past week.
You have felt this way during the past few weeks.
You have felt this way during the past year.
You generally feel this way, that is, how you feel on the average.
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Appendix R
Emotion Items (adapted from Berntsen & Bohn, 2010; Johnson et al., 1988; Libby & Eibach,
2011a; Rubin et al., 2003)

(Valence) As I think about the event now, my emotions are [were] (-3 = extremely negative; 3 =
extremely positive).
(Intensity) As I think about the event now, my emotions are [were] (1 = not intense; 7 = very
intense).
(Reaction) I have had a physical/bodily reaction to the memory – for example, by talking to myself,
smiling, crying, shivering, palpitation, laughing, etc. (1 = Not at all; 7 = To a very high degree).
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Appendix S
Temporal Distance and Self-Change Items

(Objective temporal distance) What is your current age?___How old were you when the event took
place?___If you indicated your current age, how many days from today is the event in the past?
(derived from Berntsen & Bohn, 2010).
(Subjective temporal distance) Regardless of when events actually occurred in the past, sometimes
they feel very far away, while other times they feel very close almost like yesterday. As you think
about it right now, how far away does the event you recalled FEEL to you? (1 = feels like yesterday;
7 = feels very far away; 1 = feels very close; 7 = feels very distant; adapted from Libby & Eibach,
2011a; Ross & Wilson, 2002).
(Self-change in relation to event A) How much have you changed since the event happened? (1 =
not at all; 10 = completely; adapted from Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992).
(Self-change in relation to event B) I feel like the person in this memory is a different person than
who I am today (1 = totally disagree; 10 = totally agree; adapted from Crawley, 2010).
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Appendix T
Manipulation Checks

Imagery Perspective Manipulation Checks
(Third-person) Indicate the extent to which you could mentally see the event replay from a
perspective as seen through the eyes of an observer (1 = not at all; 7 = to a very high degree).
(First-person) Indicate the extent to which you could mentally see the event replay from a
perspective as seen through your own eyes (1 = not at all; 7 = to a very high degree).
Narrative Perspective Difficulty
(Pronoun use difficulty) How difficult or easy was it for you to write about your event in the firstperson [third-person] pronoun? (1 = extremely easy; 7 = extremely difficult; adapted from Gu &
Tse, 2016).
(Pronoun use shifting difficulty) How difficult or easy was it for you to change the pronoun you
used as you wrote about your event? (1 = extremely easy; 7 = extremely difficult).
(Mental imagery difficulty) How difficult or easy was it for you to visualize the event in your mind
as you wrote about it? (1 = extremely easy; 7 = extremely difficult; adapted from Libby & Eibach,
2011a).
(Imagery perspective shifting difficulty) How difficult or easy was it for you to change the
perspective you used to visualize your event as you wrote about it? (1 = extremely easy; 7 =
extremely difficult).
Mental Focus Manipulation Check (Study 3)
When describing your event earlier, you may have focused more on what is was like to experience
the event directly, for example, by describing the sights, sounds, and smells you experienced and/or
your thoughts and feelings during the event. OR, you may have focused more on analyzing the
meaning of the event in your life, for example, by explaining the broader significance of the event,
what it says about your personality and/or goals, how it connects to other events in your life, and/or
what the consequences were or are.
Please indicate the focus of your thoughts using the scale below: (1= focused completely on what it
was like to experience the event, not at all on analyzing the event; 8 = focused completely on
analyzing the event, not at all on what it was like to experience the event).
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Appendix U
Cognitive Avoidance (Ayduk & Kross, 2010; Kross et al., 2012)

(Avoidance A) When prompted to recall this experience, I tried to avoid thinking about it (1 =
strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree).
(Avoidance B) When prompted to recall this experience, I tried to suppress (push away) my
feelings about it (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree).
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Appendix V
Study 3 Event Cue and Narrative Perspective Manipulation Instructions

Event Cue (adapted from Beike & Wirth-Beaumont, 2005)
Please choose an event from your past that you currently consider to be very unpleasant and
unresolved, meaning you do not currently have closure on it, you do not understand it, or it feels
unsettled.
Choose an event that you were involved in on any day within the past 6 years but not in the last
month. Take a moment to identify this event now. Provide a cue word for your event below:
(Age at Event) How old were you when this event took place (estimate age in years)?______

Narrative Perspective (adapted from Gu & Tse, 2016, and Libby et al., 2005)
(First-person) Now visualize your event from the same perspective that you originally had when the
event happened. In other words, in your mind, form images of your surroundings in the event as if
you are seeing it replay through your own eyes.
Close your eyes for a moment and picture your event from this perspective.
Holding these images in your mind, write about your event and refer to yourself using the 1stperson pronoun, ‘I’ (e.g., “I crossed the street, I saw a group of people, and I walked over…”
Please use the next 5-7 minutes to visualize and write about your event in the 1st-person below.
(Third-person) Now visualize your event from an observer's perspective. In other words, in your
mind, form images of yourself and your surroundings in the event as if you are seeing it replay
through the eyes of an observer.
Close your eyes for a moment and picture your event from this perspective.
Holding these images in your mind, write about your event and refer to yourself using a 3rd-person
pronoun ‘he’, ‘she’, or ‘they’ (e.g., “He/She crossed the street, he/she saw a group of people, and
he/she walked over…”
Please use the next 5-7 minutes to visualize and write about your event in the 3rd-person below.
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Appendix W
Study 3 Mental Focus Manipulation Instructions

Mental focus (adapted from Boucher & Scoboria, 2015; Libby & Eibach, 2011a)
(Experience focus) Now elaborate on the concrete details of your event. That is, describe (or
continue describing) what it was like to experience the event directly as if you are actually there
again. For example, where did this event take place? What specific actions (e.g., drove, walked, sat,
etc.) did you engage in? What did you see? What did you hear? What did you smell? What objects
and what people were involved?
Please use the next 5-7 minutes to recall and write about ONLY the specific facts and details of
your event (location, actions, sights, sounds, scents, objects, people).
(Coherence focus) Now elaborate on the broader significance of your event. That is, describe (or
continue describing) the meaning of this event to you and your life. For example, how does this
event relate to your previous experiences, accomplishments, and personal relationships? How does
this event relate to your future? What are the implications of this event? What is the meaning of this
event in terms of your life as a whole and yourself as a person?
Please use the next 5-7 minutes to recall and write about ONLY the broader meaning of your
event (relation to previous experiences, accomplishments, relationships, your future, and meaning
to you and your life).
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